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Abstract 
 
Incident analysis is a structured method of investigation to determine the underlying cause 
of adverse events in healthcare so that recommendations for safety enhancements can be 
implemented to improve patient safety. Despite significant investment in incident analysis for over 
18 years, Australian hospital reports suggest that the rate of adverse events is not decreasing. In 
Queensland (QLD) public hospitals, the human error and patient safety (HEAPS) method is the 
most widely used form of incident analysis. HEAPS teams consist of members from different health 
professions and status levels and include those who have been involved in the adverse event. 
Since healthcare is an intergroup context, this makes incident analysis an intergroup 
environment. The first aim of this thesis was to identify the challenges to incident analysis from the 
perspective of the healthcare executives, policy makers, and clinicians involved in the process. The 
second aim was to use intergroup theories to understand how professional identity and status level 
of those involved impacts the analysis effectiveness. 
Methods 
 
Four qualitative studies were undertaken. Data were analysed using a thematic content 
analysis approach. A data-driven approach was used to understand participants’ perspectives of 
challenges to analysis effectiveness. A theory-driven approach invoking social identity theory (SIT) 
and communication accommodation theory (CAT) was used to investigate how intergroup factors 
impact. In Study 1, 11 senior healthcare executives were interviewed to provide an organisational 
and regulatory context and in Study 2, three Patient Safety Officers, who conduct analysis 
meetings, were interviewed. In Study 3, three HEAPS analysis meetings in a Queensland hospital 
were observed and communication categorised according to CAT. Finally, to triangulate the 
findings, in Study 4 six participants from the observed meetings were interviewed. 
Results 
 
Study One: Power, status and professional identity were categorised as barriers to analysis 
effectiveness: impacting open disclosure; feedback to stakeholders; and dissemination of learnings. 
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Organisational capacity to remedy error was perceived to conflict with organisational requirements 
to meet key performance indicators around financial performance and capital expenditure. The 
current model of accreditation and a decentralised model of error management were perceived to 
adversely impact the quality of the analysis process, service improvements and the sharing of 
learnings. The capacity of clinical governance committees to enact change was perceived to be 
hampered by status, organisational agendas and cost concerns. Stakeholders’ limited understanding 
of human-factors principles resulted in a persons’-approach to incident analysis. 
 
Study Two: PSOs were found to view analysis as an intergroup process. They used communication 
strategies to reduce intergroup differences and build a superordinate team identity. From a CAT 
perspective, interpersonal control, interpretability, emotional expression and discourse management 
were employed to reduce intergroup differences. 
 
Study Three: Intergroup differences adversely impacted team processes in analysis meetings. 
Members’ and the PSO’s use of accommodative communication strategies reduced intergroup 
differences, heightened team identity and facilitated member engagement. Non-accommodative 
communication strategies heightened intergroup divides and resulted in unequal participation and 
deviation from analysis methodology. There was no integration of a human factors methodology 
nor systematic method for generating error cause or recommendations to reduce error. 
 
Study Four A: Professional identity and status were salient for members: historic intergroup tension 
and professional and hierarchical boundaries impacted members’ engagement, receptiveness to the 
input of others, and cross disciplinary knowledge sharing. Profession informed members’ 
motivations in the process. Fear of blame was a concern for nurses but not allied health 
professionals. 
 
Study Four B: Participation in analysis was perceived to facilitate interdisciplinary collaboration, 
knowledge sharing, reduce intergroup divides, promote reflection on practice and increased 
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awareness of safety factors. Management was perceived to not value the analysis process. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This research extends the applicability of CAT and SIT into a systematic description of 
how group identities manifest in the intergroup analysis environment and demonstrates the 
utility of an intergroup approach in informing communication tools to facilitate the analysis 
process, reduce intergroup differences and improve the rigour of the process and its capacity to 
generate patient safety improvements. 
Human factors training and intergroup communication skills could facilitate a more 
effective analysis process. This research demonstrates the need for transparency of analysis 
reports, the importance of developing an infrastructure to ensure timely feedback to relevant 
users and objectivity around translating learnings to practice. Accreditation of healthcare error 
management processes should be extended to include requirements to ensure the robustness of 
the process and change management. The appointment of independent expert investigators has 
the capacity to reduce the impact of intergroup factors on analysis effectiveness. The 
development of a centralised knowledge repository database has the capacity to disseminate 
learnings, provide ongoing feedback on the effectiveness of recommendations across the 
healthcare industry and build a critical body of understanding on error patterns for users. 
Future Research. 
 
Future research could focus on integrating a CAT framework to develop 
communication tools to reduce intergroup differences in incident analysis teams. 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Research Questions 
 
1.1 Background and Problem 
 
This research was motivated by concerns regarding the rate of adverse events in healthcare. 
 
Research has shown that despite significant human and financial resources invested in error 
management methods worldwide (Daniel & Makary, 2016) and in Australia for 18 years, the rate of 
adverse events in Australia are at best staying the same and at worst rising (Productivity 
Commission Report, New South Wales [NSW], 2016). Worldwide, hospitals use a systematic 
process of investigation called incident analysis to review the care a patient received to understand 
what went wrong and why (Wu, Lipshutz, & Provonost, 2008). In Australia, two analysis methods 
are used: root cause analysis (RCA) and human error and patient safety (HEAPS) analysis. RCA 
originated in high risk industries and was introduced to US and Australian healthcare in the mid 
1990's. It is the most popular form of analysis in healthcare worldwide (Percarpio, Watts & Weeks, 
2008). The RCA method conforms to strict legislative requirements, whereby the identity of 
analysis team members and analysis content are protected by law. However, it is the HEAPS 
method that is used most in Queensland hospitals. This is because, whilst it follows the RCA 
methodology, it is considered less restrictive and complex: it is not governed by the same legislative 
requirements and the identity of team members and analysis content are not confidential (Patient 
Safety: From Learning to Action, 2012). Perhaps the most critical difference between the two 
methods is that HEAPS teams include those health professionals involved in the error whereas RCA 
teams do not. Both methods require a multidisciplinary team of 3-6 health professionals to attend 1- 
2 analysis meetings, conduct interviews with those involved in the error and to analyse data. The 
participants in principle - but not always in practice - have had training and experience in incident 
analysis. 
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Notwithstanding the popularity of incident analysis to determine the cause of the most 
serious forms of medical error, internationally and in Australia, questions still persist about the 
efficacy of analysis methods to reduce the rate of adverse events (Grissinger, 2013; Nicolini, 
Waring & Mengis, 2011b), and to inform practice improvements (Hibbert, Thomas, Deakin et al., 
2018). A number of studies have examined why this might be the case. For instance, two recent 
studies have suggested that analysis is ineffective because half of RCA processes result in “weak” 
recommendations (the development of new policies or implementation of training processes) rather 
than identifying and addressing the underlying latent factors considered more likely to result in 
sustainable change to mitigate error recurrence (Trbovich & Shojania, 2017; Kellogg, Hettinger, 
Shah et al., 2016). Even when recommendations are strong, other research points towards to a level 
of resistance to organisational change, citing a lack of support by senior management uninvolved in 
the generation of those recommendations (Iedema, Jorm, & Braithwaite, 2008). 
Recent research has taken a psychological perspective to this paradigm and examined how 
participants' cognitions impact the analysis process, namely how clinicians’ fear that analysis is 
about finding someone to blame for the error, or how hierarchy impacts members’ willingness to 
speak up against high status members in analysis meetings (Peerally et al., 2017). Given that 
healthcare promotes analysis as a ‘no blame’ setting where members are considered equal 
(Donaldson, Corrigan & Kohn, 2000), these findings suggest a divergence between the intentions of 
the organisation and the perceptions of the health professionals involved. Since analysis teams are 
multi-disciplinary and medicine hierarchical (Walton, 2006) where role and status are meaningful 
(Hewett, Watson, Gallois, Ward & Leggett, 2009a; Srivastava, 2013), the organisational assumption 
that team members can not only assume equal status and communicate effectively across 
disciplinary and status divides in the analysis setting is problematic (Braithwaite, Clay- Williams, 
Vecellio, Marks et al, 2016; Makary et al., 2006). That they may also feel a level of guilt or 
defensiveness about their role in the error under examination may also pose further barriers to 
effective communication. 
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Multi-disciplinary communication in health care has long been shown to be challenging, and 
lead to conflict between professional groups in the form of tribalistic and defensive behaviours 
(Braithwaite et al., 2016; Hall, 2005; Lingard, Espin, Whyte, Regehr et al., 2004; Weller, Boyd & 
Cumin, 2014), rendering optimal patient care and sharing of professional knowledge difficult 
(Zwarenstein, Goldman & Reeves, 2009). These findings suggest that the salience of analysis team 
members’ professional identity may well impact their communication and behaviours in the 
analysis setting. This is an area that has not been considered in the research previously. By 
identifying how professional identity informs communication in incident analysis, this research may 
inform an understanding of how communication can be managed to result in a more collaborative 
and effective investigative process, that is cognisant of the salience of members’ professional 
identity and status level, with the ultimate goal of improving patient safety. 
1.2 My Approach 
 
The focus of this research is on the perceptions and communicative behaviours of various 
organizational participants involved in incident analysis. This includes senior management who 
work in organisations concerned with health strategy, and the management and health professionals 
working in hospitals involved in incident analysis. I deliberately chose to exclude patients and their 
families/supporters as participants in this research because they are do not have input into the 
analysis process and I wanted to focus on how to improve the effectiveness of the incident analysis 
process itself. 
Since research suggests professional group membership and status are meaningful in 
hospitals, making them inherently intergroup in nature (Hewett et al., 2009a, 2009b), I wanted to 
understand how intergroup factors impact analysis. Therefore, I used two intergroup theories: social 
identity theory (SIT: Tajfel, 1978) and communication accommodation theory (CAT: Gallois & 
Giles, 2015) to understand how intergroup factors impact the analysis environment. Not only is this 
the first time an intergroup lens has been applied to the analysis setting, but it is also the first-time 
communication has been studied in analysis teams. 
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In Study 1, I interviewed 11 senior managers who work in organisations concerned with 
health strategy and management. The reason I chose to interview them was that I wanted to 
understand how regulatory and organisational factors influence the analysis processes. This 
approach was informed by Nicolini, Waring and Mengis (2011b) who suggested that organisational 
and socio- political dynamics obstruct the capacity of incident analysis to enact improvements in 
patient safety. Since healthcare analysis methods are modelled on the aviation approach to error 
investigation, I also wanted to explore their perceptions of how the aviation model of incident 
analysis has translated to healthcare and their thoughts on the methodological and organisational 
barriers to its effectiveness. 
In Study 2, I wanted to take a more granular perspective and explore the perspectives of the 
health professionals who manage the analysis meetings, the PSOs. Since PSOs are trained 
clinicians, they have an in-depth cultural understanding of how hierarchy and professional divides 
manifest in healthcare. Three PSOs were interviewed (2 from a regional hospital and one from a 
metropolitan hospital). I asked about the challenges they encountered in managing communication 
in analysis teams and what communication strategies they said they used. I then categorised the 
communication according to CAT to understand how intergroup factors impacted. 
For study three, I wanted to triangulate the findings from Study 2 by observing communication in 
analysis meetings. As a non-participant observer, I observed three HEAPS analysis meetings in a 
regional Queensland hospital. The transcripts were analysed using a CAT framework to explore 
how the use of accommodative and non-accommodative communication strategies influenced 
intergroup dynamics in the analysis team. 
Lastly, I wanted to triangulate my findings from studies 1, 2 and 3 by exploring the 
perspectives of 6 analysis participants who I had observed in study 3. By interviewing the front-line 
workers of healthcare delivery, I hoped to provide a counterpoint to what healthcare executives and 
PSOs consider are the challenges to analysis effectiveness. I invoked CAT and SIT to explore how 
intergroup factors impacted their behaviours, cognitions and motivations (Study 4a). In Study 4b, I 
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explored their perceptions of the process, their goals in attending and the barriers to analysis 
effectiveness. This is pertinent because research suggests that there are methodological barriers to 
analysis effectiveness (Iedema, Jorm, Braithwaite et al., 2006; Nicolini et al., 2011b) and clinicians 
have a reduced understanding of a human factors approach to patient safety (Timmons et al., 2015). 
While I could have used Leximancer (a text analytics software tool to analyse text-based data set) to 
analyse the text automatically (Smith & Humphreys, 2006), I felt this would not elicit the nuanced 
nature of healthcare professionals’ cognitive mindset in this potentially fraught and sensitive 
environment. Therefore, I used Braun & Clarke’s (2006) thematic content analysis approach. I used 
an inductive content analysis approach where there was no previous research on the phenomenon 
being investigated and the codes originated directly from the data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). I used 
a deductive content analysis approach to test intergroup theory in the analysis setting (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Mayring, 2014). Content analysis has been used widely in 
healthcare research (Vaismoradi, Turunen & Bondas, 2013) and is considered a useful tool to 
explore how group identity informs communication and cognitions in multidisciplinary groups in 
hospitals (Hewett et al., 2009a). As such, these data may assist with assessment of how intergroup 
factors inform the analysis process, from the meetings through to the recommendations, the 
implementation of change and the dissemination of learnings. 
1.3 Aims 
 
The aims of this thesis are to: 
 
1. understand the challenges to incident analysis from the perspective of senior 
healthcare management. 
2. examine how intergroup factors inform analysis from their perspective (Study 1) 
 
3. examine how intergroup factors influence incident analysis from the perspective of 
the PSOs (Study 2) 
4. explore how intergroup factors inform communication of analysis team members 
through observation of HEAPS meetings (Study3) 
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5. explore how intergroup factors impact HEAPS analysis from the perspective of the 
participants (Study 4a) 
6. understand analysis participants’ perceptions of the HEAPS process, their goals 
and perceptions of barriers 
1.4 Overall Structure of the Thesis 
 
The current chapter introduces the thesis. I now provide an overview of the thesis structure. In 
Chapter 2, I present the literature review where the current situation around medical error is 
considered. I review the human factors framework that informs the analysis approach, discuss its 
aetiology in aviation and review its application in healthcare. In Chapter 3, I describe the RCA and 
HEAPS methods. I review the Australian regulatory environment that informs incident analysis in 
healthcare. In Chapter 4, I describe the intergroup theoretical frameworks of SIT and CAT and their 
relevance to healthcare. In Chapter 5, I present the rationale for my methodology and discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of the approach taken. 
In Chapters 6–10, I present the main body of the thesis. This is composed of four qualitative 
studies that together address the research aims. In Chapter 6, I present Study 1, an interview study 
with healthcare executives and policy makers. In Chapter 7, (Study 2) I present an interview study 
with PSOs. In Chapter 8, I present the results of Study 3: an observational study of three HEAPS 
meetings. Chapter 9 consists of Study 4a, which takes an intergroup lens to the perceptions of 
analysis participants and Chapter 10 consists of Study 4b which examines their experience of taking 
part, their perceptions of the barriers and their goals. Chapter 11 concludes with a discussion of the 
major findings from the studies, an examination of how opinions differed or converged between 
groups and considers implications for theory, practice and future research. 
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1.4.1 Research Questions 
 
Study 1: Interviews with 11 Senior Healthcare Executives 
 
• What are the perceptions of participants of the challenges to effective incident analysis 
in Australian healthcare? How do intergroup factors impact? 
Study 2: Interviews with Three Patient Safety Officers 
 
• How do professional identity and intergroup relationships manifest in incident 
analysis from the perspective of the PSOs? 
• How do PSOs manage intergroup relationships in the incident analysis process using 
accommodative and non-accommodative behaviours and strategies? 
Study 3: Observation of Three HEAPS Meetings 
 
• How are intergroup relationships reflected using accommodative and non- 
accommodative communication strategies in the HEAPS process? 
• How do intergroup communication strategies differ between analysis meetings? 
 
Study 4: Interviews with Six HEAPS Participants 
 
Study 4a 
 
• How do professional identity, status and intergroup relationships influence the 
HEAPS analysis setting from the perspective of the participants? 
Study 4b 
 
• What are participants’ perceptions of the HEAPS process? 
• What are participants’ goals in the HEAPS meeting? 
• What are participants’ perspectives on the barriers and facilitators to an effective 
HEAPS process? 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
For over two decades, international research has demonstrated that healthcare carries 
significant risk of patient injury (Hindle, Braithwaite, Iedema & Travaglia, 2005; Marsal & Heffner, 
2012; Runciman & Moller, 2001). In 2000, in the U.S, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published a 
seminal report ‘To Err is Human’, which brought medical errors to the vanguard of healthcare, to 
change the way health professionals, policy makers and the public regarded patient safety 
(Donaldson, Corrigan, & Kohn, 2000). The report included the concerning statistic that over 10% of 
hospital admissions in the United States (US) in 1997 suffered an adverse event because of medical 
error during their clinical care. Medical error was defined as ‘an error of execution or the use of a 
wrong plan to achieve an aim’ and an adverse event as when medical error causes injury to a patient 
that is not due to their underlying condition (Donaldson, Corrigan, & Kohn, 2000, p. 27). In 
Australia, the Quality in Australian Health Care Study (Wilson, Runciman, Gibberd, Harrison, 
Newby, & Hamilton, 1995) had already situated the issue of patient safety at the forefront of policy 
making when it stated that 16.6% of patients suffered from an unintended physical or psychological 
injury due to medical error. 
While medical error appears to be a common factor in developed healthcare systems, various 
international studies since 1995 indicate that over 50% of adverse events are preventable (Vincent, 
Neale, & Woloshynowych, 2001; Baker, Norton, Flintoft, Blais, Brown, Cox, et al., 2004), a 
finding previously highlighted in the Australian Healthcare Study (Wilson et al., 1995). The 
distinction between preventable and non-preventable error triggered the IOM to urge governments 
and healthcare leaders to break down legal and cultural barriers that impede safety improvement 
and acknowledge their responsibility to the public to make patient care safer (Bosk & Bosk, 2005). 
Thus, the Institute set a goal for healthcare organisations to reduce their rate of adverse events by 
50% within five years by implementing a systems approach to error management. This triggered a 
series of public enquiries into organisational specific failures in healthcare systems, which found 
that medical error sits at approximately 10% of all hospital admissions in the Western world 
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(Hindle et al., 2005; Hollnagel, Braithwaite, & Wears, 2013). Subsequently, patient safety moved 
from being a poorly understood topic to becoming a dominant focus for healthcare organisations 
and governments worldwide (Mitchell, Schuster, Smith, Pronovost, & Wu, 2015; Leape & Berwick, 
2005). In Australia, in the 2017/2018 federal budget, the federal government has moved patient 
safety to the top of state government health agendas by linking funding to a requirement that state 
and territory governments implement health care reforms to incorporate quality and safety into 
hospital pricing and funding; and reduce potentially avoidable hospital readmissions (Macquarie 
Centre for Health Economy, 2017). 
 
 
In 2001, Josie King, an 18-month-old toddler, was admitted 
to hospital in America, having suffered third degree burns 
after getting into a hot bath at home. She recovered and was 
due to be discharged from hospital but two days before her 
release date, she died due to dehydration and misused 
narcotics. An enquiry found her death was due to lack of 
communication between the health care providers assigned 
to her care and minimisation of her parents’ concerns. 
Accessed from the Josie King Foundation website 
(http://www.josieking.org) 
 
 
Box 1: The case of Josie King, which galvanised public attention to the issue of patient safety in 
2001. 
The impact of medical error is far reaching. While cases such as that of Josie King (Box 1) 
exemplify the heavy psychological and physical toll of medical error on patients and their families 
(Carayon & Wood, 2009), medical error also takes a toll on the morale of health professionals, 
causing them to lose confidence and experience reduced job satisfaction, increased anxiety and 
frustration at not being able to deliver optimal levels of care (IOM, 1999). This is a concern 
reflected in Australian hospital reports (Queensland Health Annual Report, 2010–2011). 
Medical error is also costly (Shreve,et al., 2010). Whilst estimations of the cost of medical 
error have been widely researched in US healthcare, with Perez (2016) estimating the economic 
cost of medical error to be US$20.8 billion per annum, a review of medical errors in Australian 
hospitals in 2003-4 estimated that the cost of adverse events to equate to 18.6% of the total inpatient 
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hospital budget (Ehsani, Jackson, & Duckett, 2006). 
 
Beyond the financial cost, increasing significant media attention surrounding litigation rates 
and payouts for adverse events has eroded public trust in healthcare (Iedema, Jorm, Braithwaite, 
Travaglia, & Lum, 2006; Nisselle, 2004). Consequently, medical consumers’ associations and 
complaints commissions now demand greater transparency in the delivery of healthcare (Ehsani, 
Jackson, & Duckett, 2006) and the availability of safety and quality information so consumers can 
make informed decisions about where they access healthcare services (Berger, Steckelberg, Meyer 
Kasper & Mühlhauser, 2010; Bosk & Bosk, 2005). 
2.1 Changing the Way Medical Error is Managed in Healthcare—An Aviation 
Approach 
Following their recommendation that healthcare organisations halve error rates within five 
years, the IOM (2000) proposed strategies to improve patient safety. These integrated the 
philosophies and work routines of a ‘total quality improvement’ approach that was based on a 
systems approach to determining error causation (Bosk & Bosk, 2005; Sharpe & Fadden, 1998). A 
systems approach views error as caused by embedded systemic weakness rather than individual 
culpability (Carayon & Wood, 2009; Donaldson et al., 2000; Reason, 1990). This approach was 
drawn from the concept of ‘safety science’, a discipline that draws upon theories of 
cognitive and social psychology, ergonomics and ‘human factors’ to understand how individuals 
interact with systems and processes to inform analysis of organisational accidents (Rasmussen, 
1997; Rasmussen, Pejtersen & Goodstein, 1994; Reason, 1997). This approach to safety and 
organisational learning (Leape, 1999; Reason 1997, 2000; Vincent & Reason, 1999) had already 
been integrated into safety practices in high- reliability organisations (HROs) such as aviation, 
mining and the nuclear power industry, where it has proved highly successful in reducing accident 
rates for over 40 years (Rasmussen, 1997; Rasmussen et al., 1994; Reason, 1997). 
Aviation was held up by the IOM as an exemplar of an industry that had significantly 
reduced accident rates through the adoption of a systems approach to error causation (Donaldson et 
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al, 2000). Indeed, accident data showed that since 1961, aviation accidents had declined from 50 
accidents per million worldwide departures to two (Boeing, 2014; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003). 
While improvements in aviation safety can be attributed to many factors, including 
technological advancements, procedures and training (Nagel, 1988; Yacavone, 1993), it was 
aviation’s embrace of a safety culture and a focus on learning from error that played a pivotal role 
in error reduction (Barach & Small, 2000; Helmreich, 2000; Mahajan, 2010). In aviation, safety is 
considered the obligation of all rather than the duty of some (Kapur, Parand, Soukup, Reader, & 
Sevdalis, 2015). Errors are seen as opportunities to understand the factors that underpin safe and 
efficient work processes to support continual improvement of service delivery (Burke, Wilson, & 
Salas, 2003; Currie, Waring, & Finn, 2008; Donaldson, et al., 2000; Gaba, 2003). The safety 
approach in aviation is underpinned by human factors principles of error management. 
2.1.1 Human Factors Methodology 
 
The human factors approach to reducing error was devised in 1990 by James Reason, who 
argued that errors happen when pre-existing, latent factors that have arisen in organisational and 
management sectors combine with local triggering active conditions to compromise the 
organisation’s safety systems and multiple defences. 
Reason argued that errors are rarely caused by one single event or act but a combination of 
active and latent failures (La Pietra, Calligaris, Molendini, Quattrin & Brusaferro, 2005; Reason, 
2000). Therefore, a human-factors approach to incident investigation entails the identification of 
pre-existing performance shaping factors (task complexity, workflow, process design, training, 
fatigue) as well as system weaknesses, design issues and other environmental issues that have 
contributed to error occurrence (Hibbert et al., 2018). 
2.1.1.1 Active and latent errors 
 
Reason defined an active error as an unsafe act performed by individuals in direct contact 
with people or the system, in other words how humans’ interface with complex systems. While an 
active error may be barely perceptible and could be a lapse, mistake or procedural violation, it is 
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current and situational and arises shortly before an incident occurs (Reason, 2000). A latent error on 
the other hand, represents the failure of a system design and is the result of structural weaknesses 
caused by organisational factors that may have lain unrecognised in the system for years. Latent 
errors may be inherent in the culture at several levels: nationally, organisationally, professionally or 
within the team (Maamoun, 2009; Mahajan, 2010). The underlying premise being that human errors 
(active errors) are inevitable but can be mitigated if the system weaknesses or latent factors that 
exacerbate the potential for human error are identified (Currie, Waring, & Finn, 2008) and 
processes put in place to prevent error occurrence (Jensen, 2008; Reason, 2000; Reason & Hobbs, 
2017). The goal of a human factors informed approach to error analysis is to identify latent defects 
that cause error so that systems can be redesigned to prevent the same error from recurring (IOM, 
2000). 
2.1.2 Learning from Error 
 
At the core of a human factors approach to error analysis is the emphasis on learning from 
error (Marx, 2001; Waring, Allen, Braithwaite & Sandall, 2016) and focus on encouraging 
individuals to be responsible for their role in contributing to the safety culture (Wachter & 
Pronovost, 2009). However, learning from error can only occur if the organisation has a ‘just 
culture’. A just culture is defined as one where individuals can disclose what they know without 
fear of blame or punishment (Leistikow, Mulder, Vesseur & Robben, 2016; Reason, 2000) and 
incentives to conceal error removed. However, whilst it appears as though a human factors 
philosophy espouses a ‘no blame’ approach to error analysis, this does not imply that individuals 
are not accountable for error in all circumstances. Rather, they are viewed as potential sources of 
failure as well as being the safety filters that prevent error. 
Aviation provides an example of how the blame culture has been mitigated through a human 
factors approach. While blame was a factor in the early days of the safety culture in aviation 
(Hudson, 2003), this changed over time due to the committed efforts to train staff in proactive 
safety behaviours (Hudson, Parker & van der Graaf, 2002) and human factors systems. This has 
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resulted in aviation taking a mindful approach to danger and safety and showing initiatives around 
knowledge sharing and learning (Rijpma, 1997; Rochlin, 1993); traits consistent with those 
exemplified in high reliability organisations (HRO). 
2.1.3 Mapping a Human Factors Approach onto Error Analysis in Medicine 
 
The understanding that a focus on learning from error was integral to the success of 
the aviation safety culture prompted the IOM to recommend that healthcare organisations become 
‘learning organisations’ (Wachter & Pronovost, 2009; Waring, 2009, p. 1722). Subsequently, safety 
professionals were hired to train clinicians to examine the processes and mechanisms that contribute 
to adverse events. This informed the implementation of a voluntary, blame-free model of error 
reporting and a human-factors approach to error analysis using the RCA. It was hoped this would 
facilitate a just culture where clinicians would feel comfortable to disclose what they know so 
learning could occur (Barach & Small, 2000; Currie, Waring, & Finn, 2007; Duckett & Jorm, 2018; 
Leape, 2002; Leape & Berwick, 2005; Vicente, 2002). 
 
 
2.2 A Socio-Historic Perspective of Attitudes to Error Within 
Medicine 
 
A human factors approach was appealing for healthcare organisations due to its focus on 
open disclosure and the removal of blame. Prior to the IOM’s exposure of a previously 
underappreciated public predicament, there was a pervasive belief in medicine that patient harm 
was inevitable and the ‘cost of doing business’ (Bagian, 2006). Freidson (1970) found that errors 
were distinguished by clinicians as either blameless or blameworthy, with blameless errors 
considered a normal part of the learning and training process. Regardless of error type, Freidson 
argued that clinicians were reluctant to deal with errors publicly, preferring to manage them 
privately and informally within their professional silos. Consequently, learning from error was 
haphazard and there was a culture of “naming, blaming and shaming” (Johnstone & Kanitsaki, 
p.368) and error being shrouded in silence (Bosk & Bosk, 2005; Freidson, 1970). 
Traditionally, errors have been relatively easy to conceal in medicine. Hughes (1951) argued 
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that hospitals have social processes that inhibit understanding of where individual responsibility or 
accountability for error lies. He found that elaborate work processes by multiple health 
professionals, involving supervision, second decisions, cross coverage and consultation, created a 
landscape where it was difficult to assign accountability for error, concluding that this created an 
environment of risk sharing and guilt shifting that obscures whether error is caused by systems 
factors or individual mistakes. 
Socio-historical factors offer insight as to why high-status clinicians (doctors or specialists) 
might deal with errors within their professional group. The practice of dealing with errors in house 
can be traced back over 500 years through to the professionalisation of medicine, when Crafts 
Guilds were established in Europe to protect members of the medical profession (doctors and 
surgeons) by controlling access to knowledge and the learning of the craft (Epstein, 1996; Reeves, 
MacMillan & Van Soeren, 2010). This concept of professionalism built a cohesive professional 
identity of members through promoting the political power base of the profession while demoting 
and marginalising the scope of other healthcare groups (Frankel, Speechley & Wade, 1996; Reeves 
et al., 2010). Turner (1995) argued that the practice of restriction of access to prestigious knowledge 
and expertise perpetuated doctors’ dominance in medicine. 
Leape (1994) argued that the culture of silence around error existed because clinicians are 
conditioned through training and work models to strive for perfection. For a clinician to admit error 
was tantamount to admittance of failure and conflicted with their need to be perceived as infallible. 
Srivastava (2013) contended that this provided a strong incentive against disclosure of personal 
mistakes and questioning the mistakes of other clinicians, resulting in a culture of error 
minimisation. Unsurprisingly, research has shown that these factors have spilled into the analysis 
setting, resulting in barriers to disclosure (Barach & Small, 2000; Tamuz, Franchois, & Thomas 
1994). 
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2.2.1 Lost in Translation 
 
Despite the implementation of a human factors approach to error management and an 
increased momentum in the patient safety movement that has seen an escalation in funding, 
legislation and regulation over the last 18 years (Kellogg et al., 2016), the task of building a patient 
safety culture has proven far slower than stakeholders envisaged (Kapur, Parand, Soukup, Reader, & 
Sevdalis, 2015; Sari, Sheldon, Cracknell, & Turnbull, 2007; Soop, Fryksmark, Koster & Haglund, 
2009). This is evidenced by hospital reports worldwide showing that error rates are at best stable and 
at worst rising (Kellogg et al., 2016; Baines, Langelaan, de Bruijne, Spreeuwenberg, & Wagner et 
al., 2015; Daniel & Makary 2016).This is also evident in Australian public health service reports 
(Productivity Commission Report, NSW, 2016; QLD Health Annual Report, 2010–2011). 
While at first glance it may seem that the lack of progress on reducing error rates is indicative 
of error management systems failing (Carayon & Wood, 2009), researchers argue that error rates are 
not increasing but becoming more visible due to clinicians and patients becoming empowered to 
lodge reports of medical error without fear of repercussion due to the delivery of safety training 
programmes and a human factors approach to error management (Stevens, Sixta, Wagner, & Bowen, 
2008). Despite this, in Australian healthcare, government reports on sentinel events suggest there is 
little evidence hospitals are becoming safer with the same types of sentinel errors continuing to 
occur. A sentinel event is a serious adverse event which has resulted in death or serious physical or 
psychological injury to a patient unrelated to their underlying illness. The 2016 Productivity 
Commission Report showed that the rates of sentinel events for the period FY2014–15 in New South 
Wales had increased over the previous five years, with certain types of errors such as medication 
errors accounting for the bulk in increase (Productivity Commission Report., NSW, 2016). In 2018, 
the Grattan Institute reported that the prevalence and mix of complications experienced by patients in 
Australian hospitals had not decreased between 2012 and 2015 (Duckett & Jorm, 2018). These 
findings were situated in real terms, when the authors stated that a patient had a one in nine chance of 
developing a complication not present when first admitted if they accessed hospital services between 
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2012–13 and 2014–15. 
 
The confusion over error rates has been exacerbated by a dearth of reliable patient safety data 
in Australian healthcare (Leape & Berwick, 2005; Vincent et al., 2008). At state and territory level, 
reports on medical error have a narrow focus, depicting only sentinel events and hospital-acquired 
complications. This represents a fraction of the complications affecting patients (Duckett & Jorm, 
2018). Further, safety data at a local health service level are limited, with doctors and patients 
reporting that they are unable to access full information on complications and procedures (Duckett & 
Jorm, 2018; Shojania, 2008; Vincent et al., 2008). The dearth of error data impacts organisational and 
clinical learning; firstly, hospitals, clinicians and patients do not have a comprehensive understanding 
of where significant complications occur in order to make informed decisions about risk; secondly, 
clinicians and hospitals do not have the opportunity to learn from instances in which clinical teams 
achieve extraordinary patient outcomes that defy the odds (Duckett & Jorm, 2018). 
Whatever the aetiology of error rates, these findings have prompted researchers to question 
whether the emulation of an aviation approach to error management is appropriate for healthcare 
(Reader & Cuthbertson, 2011; Ricci, Panos, Lincoln, Salerno & Warshauer, 2012), given the 
complex, variable and unpredictable nature of medicine in comparison to standard aviation operating 
procedures, the siloed approach to medical training and practice and the complex and contingent 
nature of medical and (inter- professional/intergroup) communication processes. Currie, Waring and 
Finn (2008) argue that the IOM’s assumption of a ‘just culture’ in medicine ignores the complexity 
of the deeply institutionalised blame culture that pervades healthcare and the political blocking of 
knowledge sharing that is driven by power differentials between doctors and other occupational 
groups. Their findings were supported by research on incident analysis by Nicolini et al.(2011b) who 
found that clinicians feared incident analysis was a tool used by hospital management to discipline 
staff. Researchers have taken a broader perspective and proposed that patient safety initiatives are 
ultimately undermined by a subculture in medicine which resists change because it is informed by a 
perfectionistic model of autonomous individual performance and an adherence to evidence-based 
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advancements in healthcare delivery (Degeling, Kennedy & Hill, 2001; Leape & Berwick, 2005). 
 
Barriers to error reduction also include the way clinicians conceptualise error size. Because 
errors occur multiple times in different locations and are not reported because no harm resulted, or 
because clinicians disagreed whether an event was an error or an outlier, error risk is both normalised 
and minimised (Kapur et al., 2015; Leape, 1994). Error minimisation leads to patterns of under 
reporting, a de-sensitisation to error occurrence and minimisation of error impact. As Pronovost and 
Colantuoni (2009, p.1273) asserted, patients may ‘inevitably die of system complications despite 
receiving the best-known medical therapies’ which is not considered preventable harm. These factors 
inform a blurring of the lines between the inherent risks of healthcare delivery and non-systemic risk 
caused by medical error that is preventable. 
In view of what Hollnagel, Braithwaite and Wears (2013, p. 20) referred to as ‘this sorry state 
of affairs’, examining why efforts to improve patient safety are failingis critical. However, as Molla, 
Walshe and Boaden (2006, p. 5) state, ‘patient safety failures have rarely had the consequences for 
healthcare organisations or those who lead them’. Thus, while there is a financial imperative for 
healthcare organisations to determine why errors occur, the critical drivers of change should be 
humanitarian and ethical—to devise strategies to reduce error frequency and mitigate consequences 
for patients (Runciman & Moller, 2001). In a landscape of increasing complexity in healthcare 
delivery, social science researchers have raised the need for new approaches to researching patient 
safety (Iedema, 2009; Ovretveit, 2009). In this thesis, I employ three novel approaches: firstly, I use 
an intergroup theoretical lens to understand how the group identities of those involved impact the 
analysis process; secondly I examine how communication occurs in the meetings as a function of 
participants’ professional identities and lastly I employ a process of triangulation by interviewing 
three sets of participants (management, PSOs and analysis participants) and mapping the interview 
data against what I observe in the HEAPS meetings themselves. 
18  
2.3 Incident Analysis—A Review 
 
Whilst RCA is the most popular method of incident analysis worldwide, due to its 
apparent simplicity and integration into safety training curricula (Percarpio, Watts & Weeks, 2008), 
in Queensland public hospitals, sentinel events are investigated most often using the HEAPS 
method (Patient safety: from Learning to action 2012 - QLD Health). Both the RCA and HEAPS 
are similar in their application, using systematic processes to understand why an error occurred. 
Whilst there is a body of literature on RCAs (Percarpio, Watts, & Weeks, 2008; Tamuz, Thomas, & 
Franchois, 2004), a literature search revealed none on HEAPS, which may be due to it being a more 
recent method localised to Queensland Health. Therefore, I focus on the RCA research. 
Even though the RCA method is popular, safety researchers question its capacity to 
improve patient safety outcomes (Nicolini et al., 2011b; Perotti & Sheridan, 2015; Cassin & Barach, 
2012; Shaqdan, Aran, Besheli & Abujudeh, 2014), highlighting the conduct of the process and 
organisational learning processes as problematic (Anderson & Kodate, 2015; Peerally et al., 2017; 
Shohjana & Marang-van de Mheen, 2015). There is little research, however, which considers the 
impact of the psychological motivations of the participants. This is worth examination because 
analysis teams consist of healthcare staff from different professions and status levels who may have 
had no experience nor training in incident analysis. What research there is focuses on factors that 
influence participants’ engagement with certain aspects of the process, but the findings are not 
comprehensive enough to shed light on how these factors impact the team dynamic and the research 
is a theoretical. For instance, Peerally et al. (2017) found that objectivity was reduced by cultural 
and contextual norms and other research has shown that learning from error is influenced by 
organisational trust, team and incident severity (Cooke, Dunscombe, & Lee, 2007; Lukic, 
Margaryan & Littlejohn, 2010). 
Interestingly, given that participants are required to enact an investigative role in the 
analysis process, which is outside of their professional training and practice, there is a body of 
research which examines how role conflict impacts the process. Research suggests clinicians 
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resenting participating in analysis meetings because it takes them away from their primary role of 
caring for patients (Braithwaite, Westbrook, Mallock, Travaglia & Iedema, 2006; Haw, Stubbs & 
Dickens, 2014; Wu et al., 2008). Clinicians state they are unsure how to translate the learnings to 
actionable organisational practice to reduce error (Cassin & Barach, 2012; Iedema et al., 2008), or 
how to determine whether errors are preventable in the first place (Wu et al., 2008). 
Other research hints at the team dynamic and relational aspects showing that clinicians 
experience tension between autonomy and the need to work within a team (Leape & Berwick, 2005; 
Nicolini et al., 2011b; Percarpio et al., 2008) and that managers struggle with the conflicting goals 
of investigating errors in their unit, and the need to manage the ‘emotional and communicative 
labour’ (p. 3) of those involved and the homophily that arises when participants are required to pass 
critical comment on a colleague’s practice (Iedema et al., 2008). The dynamic in multidisciplinary 
teams is significant because research shows that how members conceive of their role in the team 
and how they interact with others impacts team effectiveness and cross disciplinary learning 
(McFadden, Stock, & Gowen, 2015; Edmondson, 2012). 
Underpinning these findings is the disconnect between how organisations regard 
clinicians’ capacity to fulfil their role in analysis teams and how clinicians appraise this (Nieva & 
Sorra, 2003; Vincent & Amalberti, 2014). This research builds upon this by asking HEAPS 
participants their experience of participating in incident analysis given that it requires them to not 
only operate outside of their realm of professional practice and expertise, but also requires them to 
work with an unfamiliar team composed of other professional groups and status levels. 
2.4 This Research 
 
This research focuses on HEAPS for two reasons: since 2015 HEAPS has been the most 
widely used method for analysis of serious sentinel events in Queensland hospitals,; and secondly, 
the legal protection that surrounds participants in the RCA method has meant it has not been 
possible to gain ethics approval to research the RCA setting. 
Because HEAPS teams include health professionals involved in the error under 
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investigation, this research offers an opportunity to explore their perceptions of taking part. This is 
salient because research shows clinicians fear blame in the analysis setting (Nicolini et al., 2011a 
and b) and this affects their willingness to disclose what they know (Piotrowski & Hinshaw, 2002; 
Waring, 2005.They express a fear of reprisal, concern that they will jeopardise their own or 
colleagues’ careers and fear their professional practice will be scrutinised (Barach & Small, 2000; 
Wu & Steckelberg, 2012). All of which suggests clinicians’ engagement in analysis is informed by 
a contextual and cultural lens. 
Further, while there is a plethora of literature on error reporting process, there is none on the 
HEAPS process. Given the IOM focus on learning from error, there is an imperative to understand 
how learnings from HEAPS meetings are disseminated to enact meaningful patient safety change, 
and how this change is monitored and embedded into the safety culture. In this research I attempt to 
fill this gap in the literature by first interviewing the healthcare executives to understand how 
hospitals prioritise the implementation and management of learnings and then observe HEAPS 
meetings and interview those who conduct and participate in the process to understand how learning 
is disseminated and change implemented. 
2.5 Introducing an Intergroup Theoretical Perspective 
 
While research suggests hierarchy (Peerally et al., 2017; Percarpio, Watts, & Weeks, 2008) 
and interpersonal relationships (Iedema, Jorm, Long et al., 2006) manifest in the analysis setting, 
there is no research that invokes an intergroup lens to understand what informs this. I address this 
gap by using a social identity perspective to examine how professional identity, status and group 
memberships impact the process and its outcomes. 
Tajfel and Turner’s social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) offers 
a lens to understand how group identity informs an individual’s cognitions, behaviours and 
motivations. SIT proposes that an important part of how people identify themselves is informed by 
the groups to which they belong and that professional identity and status level influence interactions 
between individuals. In healthcare, SIT has been used to understand how professional identity 
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influences clinicians’ behaviours towards members of their ‘ingroup’ (e.g., nurse to nurse) and 
‘outgroup’ (e.g., nurse to doctor) in the hospital setting (Bartunek, Trullen, Bonet & Sauquet, 2003; 
Hewett et al., 2009). Findings such as this attest to hospitals being inherently ‘intergroup’ in nature 
and research shows that intergroup relationships (outgroup to ingroup) in healthcare can be 
conflictual (Hewett et al., 2009; Lingard et al., 2004) and a barrier to patient safety (Weller, Boyd & 
Cumin, 2014). 
SIT provides an interesting lens with which to consider the HEAPS setting, because it 
proposes that professional identity is more salient than personal identity in times of intergroup 
threat (Hewett et al., 2009; Hogg & Terry, 2000), and those involved in error in HEAPS meetings 
may feel a level of threat to their professional reputation. 
Whilst SIT investigates behaviour, it does not take account of the language individuals use 
as they negotiate ingroups and outgroups. CAT (Giles, 2016) provides a framework to understand 
language behaviour in intergroup relations, proposing that interactants use communication 
strategies to establish social identities and draw intergroup comparisons (Gallois et al., 2005a, b). 
As research has shown that intergroup communication in healthcare is a function of social identity 
and organisational context (Harwood, Giles & Palomares, 2005; Watson & Gallois, 2007), the 
examination of how communication takes place in HEAPS meetings builds on these findings. I use 
CAT to apply a communication focus to the inter-professional dynamic in the HEAPS process. I 
explain CAT and SIT in more detail in Chapter 4. 
2.6 Summary 
 
I presented the background to patient safety and the human factors approach that 
informs incident analysis. Since there is no research which considers how intergroup factors inform 
the effectiveness of incident analysis, I propose SIT and CAT as appropriate intergroup theories to 
examine this. In Chapter 3, I describe how incident analysis is operationalised and regulated and 
compare the healthcare model of analysis to that used in aviation. 
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Chapter 3: Incident Analysis in Healthcare 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, I presented the current situation around medical error and the approach to 
improve patient safety. I proposed incident analysis be examined using an intergroup lens and 
introduced SIT and CAT. In this chapter I examine how incident analysis is operationalised and 
regulated in healthcare. 
3.2 Types of Incident Analysis 
 
The RCA and HEAPS methods of incident analysis are used in Australian public hospitals 
to analyse why an adverse event occurred so that risk reduction strategies can be devised to reduce 
the likelihood of a similar event occurring (Jhugursing, Dimmock, & Mulchandani, 2017) and 
opportunities identified for changes to processes to minimise patient harm (Bagian, 2006; Rafter et 
al., 2014). Analysis methods were introduced to Australian healthcare in the mid 1990’s. Both RCA 
and HEAPS use a structured process to understand the timeline of the error (chronological map), 
and data such as interviews with those involved, patient charts and clinical notes. Whilst there are 
over 40 types of analysis techniques mentioned in the literature (Nicolini et al., 2011a, 2011b; 
Woloshynowych et al., 2005), HEAPS analysis uses the “Five Whys” method. This is based on 
problem solving techniques developed by the Toyota Motor Corporation (Ohno, 1988). The “Five 
Whys” is an iterative method which asks the question “Why” five times to remove the layers of 
symptoms to reveal the root cause of the error. An example of the Five Whys technique adapted 
from Battles, Dixon, Borotkanics et al., (2006) is depicted below in response to a patient medication 
error: 
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Figure 3.1: Example of the Five Whys Method used in HEAPS Analysis in Queensland Health. 
 
 
3.2.1 The HEAPS Analysis Team 
 
HEAPS analysis teams are multidisciplinary and consist of three to five healthcare 
professionals who have domain-specific expertise in the stages leading up to the error. Figure 3.2 
depicts the roles of analysis team members. While most team members are from the hospital where 
the error occurred, allowing a level of contextual and cultural understanding of the error, one 
member must come from an external healthcare facility, affording a level of objectivity to the 
process.  
 
• PSO: The analysis process is conducted by an in-house PSO, 
an experienced clinician (usually a nurse), considered to have 
expert knowledge of front-line use of systems, organisational 
and medical cultures, and hierarchy (Rooney & Heuval, 2004). 
• Team Leader: The team leader leads the team where the error occurred. 
Error 
 
Why 
Why 
Why 
Why 
Why 
• Patient received incorrect medication 
• Wristband not checked 
• Wristband missing 
• Wristband printer on unit was missing 
• Label jam 
• Product Design 
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• Content Expert: A clinician from an external facility with no 
involvement in the error, but with content specific knowledge of 
the processes associated with the error. 
• Front Line Staff Member: A staff member (there could be more 
than one in the analysis meeting) with direct involvement in the 
error. 
• The “So What” Person: This is a clinician from the hospital where 
the error occurred but from an unrelated area, with no involvement in 
the error. This person is required to question assumptions and 
provide a new lens to examine existing practices whilst still familiar 
with the organisational culture. 
• Relevant Person: This is a team member who has experience 
relevant to the error and s familiar with processes leading to the error. 
 
Figure 3.2. Composition of HEAPS team (QLD Health: Patient safety: from learning to action, 
2012) 
 
3.2.2 The Requirements of HEAPS and RCA Analysis Team Members 
 
Team members are required to determine error causal and contributing factors through 
understanding the nature of the error, why it happened and who was involved (Figure 3.3; Shaqdan 
et al., 2014) and to develop and implement ways to prevent the same error occurring in the future 
(Barach & Small, 2000; Pham et al., 2010). 
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This requires team members to have an in-depth understanding of individual, team and 
organisational factors reflective of the complexity of the healthcare environment. Analysis teams 
consider the role of the clinician and the role of latent or ‘upstream’ factors such as work design, 
supervision, staff allocation, ability, communication, medical equipment and knowledge (Reason, 
2000. Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3. Causal factors considered by incident analysis teams in healthcare based on Reason 
(2000). 
The wide range of latent factors that require consideration means that the composition 
of an incident analysis team needs to be carefully constructed to ensure it has the capability and 
capacity to effectively address the role of these factors. This may include aspects of care delivery 
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outside their expertise and realm of professional practice, depicted in Figure 3.4 (Andersen & 
Fagerhaug, 2006; White, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Dataset required for error analysis derived from meta-analysis of error analysis methods 
(White, 2007) 
3.2.3 How HEAPS Analysis differs from RCA 
 
Whilst RCA and HEAPS teams use the same processes and methods, they differ in 
two ways. Firstly, HEAPS teams include those involved in the error whereas RCA teams do not. 
Secondly, the identity of RCA members and information discussed is protected by law under the 
provisions of Part 4B of the Health Services Act 1991 (QLD), so members are protected from 
liability in the provision of release of information and disclosure, with the intention that members 
can disclose what they know without fear of reprisals. In HEAPS, the identity of members and 
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nature of discussion are not afforded the same legal protection. Given that Iedema, Jorm, Long et 
al., (2006) found that even with legal protection in the RCA setting, clinicians find the task of 
scrutinising each other's errors challenging, it is worth investigating how this tension informs 
processes in the HEAPS setting, when those involved in the error participate and identity and 
content are not confidential. 
 
 
3.2.4 The HEAPS Analysis Process 
 
 
Figure 3.5. The stages of the HEAPS analysis process 
 
 
The following section outlines the process involved in a HEAPS analysis depicted in 
Figure 3.5. RCAs and HEAPS follow the same methodology, however in an RCA, team members 
interview staff involved in the error, but in HEAPS, this is done by the PSO. 
3.2.4.1 Stage One- Reporting and Categorisation of Error Phase 
 
Once a sentinel event has occurred, it must be logged on the hospital error reporting 
system and the National Safety and Quality Commission (NSQC) must be informed within 7 days 
of the error occurring. The error is stratified on a severity scale according to error type and impact 
upon the patient and given a severity assessment code (SAC) (Khanna, Boyle & Zeitz, 2014). 
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Figure 3.6 depicts error categories and exemplars for SAC1, SAC2 and SAC3 errors (SAC4 errors 
are not included as they are defined as causing trivial or no harm to a patient). SAC1 and SAC2 
errors are analysed on a case-by-case basis using an RCA or HEAPS method. SAC3 and SAC4 
errors are aggregated to determine frequency and patterns in error (Patient safety: from learning to 
action 2012). 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Medical error severity of SAC1, SAC2 and SAC3 errors (adapted from Khanna et al., 2014) 
3.2.4.2 Stage Two – The Analysis Phase 
 
The PSO invites healthcare professionals to participate in the analysis team. They are 
required to attend one to two analysis meetings lasting between 60 to 90 minutes. The PSO assigns 
members specific roles in the analysis, (see section 3.2.1). 
The PSO interviews staff with knowledge of the error, collates relevant documentation 
(patient charts and other data) and establishes a chronological map that tracks time and sequence of 
relevant events. This is emailed to members prior to the meeting so they can familiarise themselves 
with the data. The quality of this information is a critical requirement of determining error cause 
(Middleton, Chapman, Griffiths et al., 2007). 
During the analysis meeting, members analyse the data and discuss the active and latent 
factors that caused the error. They formulate recommendations to reduce the likelihood of a 
similar adverse event recurring. The PSO acts as lead investigator and scribe during the 
meeting. 
 
29  
3.2.4.3 Stage Three – The Reporting Phase 
 
In the reporting phase, the PSO collates the findings in a structured report format comprising 
of the recommendations, the identification of the person responsible for implementing them and the 
timeline within which implementation must happen. The report contains performance and 
evaluation measures (Hibbert et al., 2018). It is circulated to participants for their comments and 
consensus is sought. 
Once the PSO has integrated feedback and consensus reached, the report is submitted to the 
hospital Patient Safety Committee (PSC) who consider whether they will endorse the 
recommendations to management. If this is not the case, the PSC can request another HEAPS 
meeting be conducted. If, they are satisfied, they endorse the recommendations in a final report to 
the CEO which includes an executive summary of the error occurrence, recommendations and risk 
reduction strategies. 
3.2.4.4 Stage Four – Report Submitted to National Safety and Quality Commission 
 
The report is sent to the National Safety and Quality Commission (NSQC) within 
90 days of the error occurring as part of the accreditation process. 
3.3 The Regulatory Environment in Healthcare 
 
While the analysis methodology mirrors that of aviation, the regulatory system that 
surrounds it differs. In Australia, the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare 
(ACSQH), a federal government body, is responsible for leading and coordinating national 
standards for safety and quality in healthcare. Healthcare organisations need to implement the 
NSQC healthcare service standards to gain accreditation to practice. They must implement a clinical 
governance framework which is responsible for ensuring that error reports are collected, serious 
incidents are analysed and—depending on the type of incident—change management occurs. 
However, there is no accreditation requirement to demonstrate to the ACSQH that analysis 
processes are robust, feedback delivered, or learnings disseminated to relevant stakeholders. 
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Analysis reports are not made public, resulting in a lack of transparency around the quality of the 
process. 
In Queensland public hospitals, the management of patient safety matters is at the discretion 
of each Hospital Health Service (HHS). In each HHS, the clinical governance committee is tasked 
with ‘minimising preventable patient harm’ (Health and Hospitals Network and Other Legislation 
Amendment Regulation (No. 1), 2012, p. 25). While this involves an understanding of the 
importance of hiring trained safety professionals to examine the processes involved in patient care, 
the resources allocated to patient safety initiatives and training of individuals depends on the 
priority the health service places on patient safety. This means that the quality of the analysis 
process and the capacity for learnings to improve patient safety processes is reliant on the 
commitment and competence of the individuals overseeing and engaging in the analytical process 
across the different levels of the organisation. Predictably, this means that analysis methods vary 
widely in terms of sponsorship, support, participation, robustness and function (Ovretveit, 2009; 
National Patient Safety Agency Framework, 2005). 
The fact that the quality of the analysis and capacity for learnings is managed at a local level 
is problematic. In 2005, the Queensland Public Hospitals Commission of Inquiry concluded that 
methods to improve patient safety and learn from mistakes appear to be less important to healthcare 
institutions than the processes of accreditation and auditing, suggesting that hospitals view patient 
safety measures as compliance processes rather than adding value to patient care delivery. While 
this idea seems to be inconsistent with national agendas on improving patient welfare, Rowley and 
Waring (2011, p. 3) assert that healthcare organisations’ approach to ‘measure and monitor’ error 
has disregarded the approach to safety informed by the ‘socio-cultural fabric of organisations’ in 
which the errors occur. This has a bearing on how participants conceptualise their legitimate power 
within the analysis team to enact meaningful patient safety outcomes. Research has shown that 
management commitment to safety and support of incident analysis is correlated with safety 
performance (Hoffman & Stetzer, 1996) and organisational learning from incident analysis 
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(Anderson & Kodate, 2015). 
 
3.4 The Regulatory Environment in Aviation 
 
The regulatory environment in aviation contrasts to the healthcare model in its exemplification 
of an independent, centralised approach to analysis. There is a level of national accountability that 
drives support for analysis methods at an organisational and industry level (Maurino, Reason, 
Johnston, & Lee, 2017; O’Leary & Chappell, 1996). Organisations are held to account by the 
national regulators, The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and their accreditation is 
dependent on not only submission of incident and air safety reports, but also demonstrations of 
organisational learning. Incident investigations are run by anational body and staffed by 
government-appointed investigators highly trained in human factors and systems thinking (Flin & 
O’Connor, 2013; Hudson, 2003). This means that a participant’s position in the aviation hierarchy 
is irrelevant when an independent investigator examines attribution of responsibility, and 
investigations are conducted free from the influence of cultural or contextual norms informed by 
organisational or individual agendas (Peerally et al., 2017). Aviation has a transparent reporting 
process: regulators mandate that reports are available to the public and findings disseminated across 
the industry. 
3.5 Summary 
 
The focus of this chapter has been the operationalisation and regulation of incident analysis 
in healthcare. This was compared to analysis in aviation. In chapter 4, I describe SIT and CAT to 
set the scene to explore how intergroup factors influence analysis effectiveness. 
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Chapter 4: An Intergroup Perspective 
 
In chapter 3, I described how incident analysis is operationalised and regulated in 
Australian healthcare. Research on how professional identity and status level influence interactions 
between health professionals (Hewett et al., 2009) led me to an approach hitherto unexplored in the 
incident analysis literature, namely how the analysis process is impacted by health professionals’ 
group identities and status levels. This approach shifts the focus from an examination of analysis 
methodology to an examination of the cognitions and motivations of analysis participants and their 
subsequent communication behaviours in this intergroupsetting. While this theoretical approach 
opens new ways of categorising communication and behaviours to inform an understanding of 
practical strategies and solutions to enhance the process, it does not assume that intergroup factors 
affect communication and behaviours —instead allowing for these aspects to emerge from the data. 
In this chapter, I describe intergroup theory and its application in healthcare. I explain 
Tajfel and Turner’s (1979) SIT, and CAT (Gallois & Giles, 2015; Giles & Baker, 2008). 
4.1 Intergroup Theory 
 
Intergroup theory is concerned with how people define themselves according to their salient 
group memberships (profession, workgroup, workplace or cultural background) and how this 
influences their cognitions and motivations in a setting where they interact with people from other 
groups. Since society is organised into groups and groups need to cooperate to be effective, 
intergroup relationships is important area of research in social psychology (Dovidio, Johnson, 
Gaertner, Pearson, et al., 2010; Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner & Fillenbaum, 1960). 
Organisations in particular are considered to be dynamic intergroup contexts where 
professional roles are salient. Intergroup theories have been used to explore how intergroup factors 
manifest in organisational contexts (e.g., Hewett et al., 2009; Jones, Watson, Gardner & Gallois, 
2004; Paulsen, Graham, Jones, Callan & Gallois, 2005). 
Intergroup theories offer a framework to understand the darker side of intergroup 
relationships in organisations, where intergroup perceptions and behaviours are often antagonistic 
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and ethnocentric, leading to conflict and prejudice (Haslam, 2001; Hogg & Giles, 2012). Social 
identity theorists reason that intergroup hostility in organisations confers psychological benefits on 
group members, including a sense of belonging and social support, a values framework and a system 
of behavioural norms and rules (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). At times of threat, the salience of group 
identity strengthens, resulting in support towards ingroup members and antagonism towards outgroup 
members (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
4.2 Social Identity Theory 
 
SIT seeks to explain people’s behaviours and motivations as a function of their group 
memberships (Tajfel & Turner, 1978). SIT proposes that people are cognitively motivated to 
construct their identity and the identity of others according to the groups they belong to. This 
provides them with a reference point to understand where and how they fit in a social world. 
Tajfel and Turner (1978) proposed three cognitive stages by which a person forms their 
social identity: 
• Categorization - Categorisation of others to understand how they fit into 
their social environment. In healthcare, a person may categorise others by 
their profession or status level. In incident analysis, this may also extend to 
team or ward membership. 
• Social Identification - People assume identity characteristics of the group 
they identify as belonging to. This influences their cognitions and 
behaviours. Thus, if someone identifies as a doctor, they will behave in 
ways consistent with their perception of how doctors behave. 
• Social Comparison - People are motivated to favourably compare their 
group to others along meaningful dimensions. Therefore, nurses may see 
themselves as being more nurturing and patient centred than doctors. 
 
SIT proposes that when people perceive the norms and world views of the groups they 
belong to as salient and significant, they gain positive psychological benefits such as pride, a sense 
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of belonging, lowered feelings of isolation and a sense of self-worth from their membership of those 
groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In intergroup environments, social identity is most salient: group 
identity strengthens and informs how people perceive and relate to others (Harwood & Joyce, 
2012). However, since people are motivated to construct a positive social identity, they will 
compete with outgroups to gain more favourable status for their ingroup (Reid, 2012). In intergroup 
situations, individuals conceptualise the worth of their own (in)group by applying negative labels or 
categories to outgroups. This means that ingroups are perceived as more heterogeneous by members 
and outgroups as more homogenous, a perception that ignores the complexity of culture and 
community. 
4.2.1 Healthcare—A Social Identity Theory Perspective 
 
Social identity has been found to be more salient in some settings than others. Hospitals are 
an extreme example of this, where group membership has been found to be dynamic, contextual and 
strongly role bound (Hewett et al., 2009; Lingard, Reznick, DeVito, & Espin, 2002; Watson, 
Hewett & Gallois, 2012; Watson, Jones & Hewett, 2013). Individuals not only identify themselves 
according to their profession (Oaker & Brown, 1986), workgroup, or specialty (Lingard et al., 2002; 
Watson et al., 2013), but also categorise others according to role stereotypes, such as expectations 
around role performance, competence and communication style, rather than individual 
characteristics and traits 
The salience of professional identity is enforced in the hospital environment through the 
embeddedness of disciplinary, sectoral and institutional silos (Hewett et al., 2009a; Kreindler et al., 
2012; Vazirani, Hays, Shapiro & Cowan, 2005). Bartunek Trullen, Bonet, and Sauquet (2003) argue 
that health professionals working in a community of inter-professional practice develop a sense of 
professional identity through group norms, socialisation and communication practices, fostering 
implicit forms of knowledge through working with expert clinicians that could not be gained in 
other settings (Bartunek et al., 2003). Because these behaviours are anchored in the traditions of the 
hierarchies prominent within their specialisation or profession, this type of informal learning serves 
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to exacerbate hierarchical and professional divides (Côté & Leclère, 2000; Cruess, Cruess & 
Steinert, 2008), stereotypical attitudes to patient care and a disconnection between professional 
groups (Braithwaite et al., 2012). Not surprisingly, these factors can manifest in ineffective inter- 
professional teamwork and communication practices (Hall, 2005; Hewett et al., 2009; Kvarnström, 
2008) with studies suggesting that inter-professional collaboration is infrequent and problematic 
(Freidson, 1970; Reeves et al., 2010; Watson et al., 2012; Zwarenstein et al., 2009). 
However, research suggests that despite a focus on multidisciplinary teamwork (Braithwaite 
et al., 2012; Sehgal, Fox, Vidyarthi, Sharpe et al. 2008), team-based interventions, shared goals 
around patient care and attempts to cross historical professional boundaries (Travaglia, Westbrook 
& Braithwaite, 2009), health professionals prefer to work in discipline-specific groups and may 
resist inter- professional collaboration (Braithwaite et al., 2016), preferring to turn to members of 
their own profession for advice, problem solving and support (Braithwaite, 2016; 
Creswick & Westbrook, 2015). Unsurprisingly, this has been found to engender lowered trust 
between groups, limited understanding of one another’s roles and a reduced ability to recognise 
others’ strengths and weaknesses (Lingard et al., 2002). 
But this is not to say that clinicians do not work effectively in inter- professional teams. 
 
They are familiar with working in large heterogenic teams with responsibility for delivering care to 
patients in a variety of healthcare settings (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006). This means they have 
a pre-established cognitive model of the dynamic of inter-professional team effectiveness, including 
communication break downs and intergroup inefficiencies (Dreachslin, Hunt & Sprainer, 2000; 
Lingard et al., 2004). Nonetheless, whilst members’ divergent expertise adds depth and scope to 
healthcare delivery, it is additive rather than substitutive, meaning that members’ ability to deliver 
opinions and recommendations around other professional groups’ practice in sufficient depth can be 
problematic. Since all the above findings suggest that professional identity has significant 
implications for multi-disciplinary teams and HEAPS participants are required to collaborate and 
understand the working practices of other professional groups in the HEAPS process, this renders 
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an understanding of how social identity impacts the process worthwhile. 
 
4.2.1.1 Hierarchy and Status 
SIT proposes that power and status labels are meaningful for individuals in intergroup 
interactions because they offer a means of identity demarcation and positive self-evaluation when 
someone identifies as belonging to a higher status group (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). 
Hierarchical influences have been embedded in hospitals since the 1900s with medical 
hierarchies dominating (Walton, 2006). Position on the hierarchy is salient and is characterised by 
power relationships such that those higher on the hierarchy are perceived to be superior to those 
below. A health professional’s status level is determined by the esteem accorded to them by others 
through status conferral processes (Blader & Chen, 2012) and is referenced by profession and 
position within the professional group (Patel, Cytryn, Shortliffe & Safran et al., 2000). 
However, it is important to note that power and status differ is as much a person may not 
have status within an organisational hierarchy but still possess power. This is explained by Ng and 
Bradac (1993) in their model of power. They draw a distinction between "power over” and “power 
to”. “Power over” relates to the control one person has over another: it could be 'legitimate power' 
which arises from different kinds of formal status and the associated rights/obligations of that 
status; and/or it could be 'expertise power' which rises from the specific skills or knowledge a 
person possess; or it could be 'social power' which arises from a person's role or position within a 
group or profession. “Power to”, on the other hand, is more relational and creates new possibilities 
for influence regardless of status level. Thus, a person can negotiate influence through a process of 
‘collaboration’ (consensual decision making) and/or ‘empowerment’ through delegation or 
facilitation. In medicine, high status professions (doctors) would be considered to have “power 
over” lower status professions (nurses) and less experienced members of their own profession, 
requiring ongoing negotiation (Kreindler et al. 2012). 
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Figure 4.1: Hierarchy of Profession in Healthcare taken from www.hierarchystructure.com 
 
Socio historic influences offer an insight into why some professions have higher status 
than others. Turner (1985) and Willis (1999) argued that since doctors were the first group to gain 
professional status, they were able to dominate over other professional groups by restricting access 
to knowledge and expertise. Doctors’ dominance persists today with studies showing that doctors 
prioritise their professional needs over those of other medical professions. Indeed, clinicians exhibit 
a deep awareness of their position in the ‘clinical pecking order’ of organisational ranking 
(Braithwaite et al., 2016, p. 2). However, the more nascent inclusion of allied health professionals 
(AHPs) in healthcare from the 1970s has challenged this tradition of medical sovereignty and 
compounded the potential for tribalism and conflict founded on professional divides and power 
imbalances (Braithwaite, 2016). For instance, even though AHPs have professional independence 
and status, they are still considered subordinate to doctors (Baker, Egan-Lee, Martimianakis & 
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Reeves, 2011). 
 
There is a substantial literature proposing that the organisational structure in hospitals 
promotes a culture of delineated power and status differences that affect intergroup interactions 
across a variety of healthcare settings (Franck, Roes, De Schepper & Timmermans, 2018; Patel, et 
al., 2000). For instance, the hierarchy engenders an environment of increased conflict between 
AHPs and doctors and nurses as they struggle to gain a foothold in professional models of care, gain 
more autonomy to practice and increase their status and professional standing in the hospital 
context. 
While there is not a great deal of literature examining how hierarchy manifests in incident 
analysis, a UK study by Nicolini et al., (2011a) found that status and power imbalances in the team 
disrupted the analysis process and this resulted in lower quality recommendations. For instance, 
high-status participants were found to have manipulated the process to produce recommendations in 
alignment with their interests and logic, leading the authors to conclude that healthcare has 
established ways of working and enduring lines of power which block learning from error. An 
earlier study by Currie, Waring, & Finn, (2008) found that high-status doctors used their power and 
status to influence what knowledge is shared and who has access in analysis meetings. This 
supports Willis’s (1999) argument that doctors restrict access to prestigious knowledge to support 
their dominant position in the medical hierarchy. These findings suggest that the type of power that 
manifests in analysis meetings meets Ng and Bradac’s (1993) definition of “power over” . In 
analysis, ‘power over’ has the capacity to supresses alternative viewpoints and outcomes, aspects 
which are symptomatic of a “power to” collaborative process. This has implications for open 
disclosure and knowledge sharing in the analysis environment (Hayes & Walsham, 2000). 
These findings have implications for incident analysis teams, with studies showing that 
hierarchical norms are a barrier to inter-professional collaboration (Reeves et al., 2010; Watson et 
al., 2012; Zwarenstein et al., 2009) and inter-professional communication. Research indicates that 
clinicians remain silent, or express barriers to assertiveness and questioning of others in inter- 
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professional teams where differences in status and profession prevail, fearing retaliation from high- 
status members (Francis, 2015; Kapur et al., 2015; Lyndon, 2006). Given that research suggests that 
less than 10% of clinicians are prepared to confront their colleagues if they observe behaviours that 
could cause harm to a patient (Maxfield, Grenny, Lavandero, & Groah, 2011) and that analysis  
team members are required to examine the performance of other clinicians involved in patient harm, 
an understanding of how analysis team members conceptualise their hierarchical status and how this 
impacts the HEAPS process is pertinent. 
4.2.1.2 Intergroup conflict 
 
SIT explains intergroup conflict occurs because people are motivated to construct a positive 
social identity by competing with outgroups to gain favourable status for their ingroup (Reid, 2012). 
This is apparent in medicine where research has found that clinicians interpret their own work as 
substantially more multifaceted and valuable to the delivery of healthcare than that of outgroup 
members (Bartunek, 2011). In situations where intergroup collaboration is required, this creates an 
antagonistic working environment where individuals become more protective of their professional 
identities and workgroups (Bleakley, 2006; Clancy, 2006), resulting in a ‘them and us’ mentality. 
Given the adverse effects of intergroup conflict on patient care across a range of healthcare 
settings, such as the operating theatre (Lingard et al., 2004), crisis management in acute care (St 
Pierre, Hofinger & Buerschaper, 2008) and inter-specialty management of patients with upper 
gastrointestinal bleeding (Hewett et al., 2009), social identity theorists have applied an intergroup 
theoretical framework to enhance understandings of strategies to mitigate its occurrence (Hewitt et 
al., 2009; Watson et al., 2012). This is especially pertinent in the current model of healthcare 
delivery whereby patients interact with a series of distinct healthcare teams and professional 
subspecialisations, with each having distinct professional responsibilities. This often leads to a 
fragmentation of care and role ambiguity. Not surprisingly, intergroup conflicts are particularly 
prevalent in high-pressure settings such as operating theatres when specialty teams are brought in to 
manage the complexity of patient care on a case- by-case basis (Hawryluck et al., 2002) and when 
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patient conditions deteriorate. For instance, Watson et al. (2012) found that health professionals 
engage in blaming behaviours when patient outcomes deteriorate, perpetuating intergroup tensions 
and conflicts. As Walshe and Shortell (2004) reported, intergroup conflicts result in endemic 
secrecy, deference to authority, defensiveness and protectionism—all factors that have the potential 
to impede knowledge sharing in the analysis setting. These findings support SIT’s assertion that 
intergroup conflict increases when individuals perceive their group identity is threatened and will 
act in ways to minimise the diminishment of their group reputation. 
Whilst it must be said that these findings are drawn from populations where hierarchy is an 
accepted norm and fundamental to the quick responsiveness required of clinical teams in acute 
patient care, they do indicate how identity threat is heightened when clinicians focus on an 
individual case. In the HEAPS meeting, team members are required to examine the case of an 
individual patient seen by a series of health professionals and who also may have been treated by 
themselves or a member of their profession. Since research shows that in situations of intergroup 
threat, defending group territory and boundaries often takes priority over the delivery of patient care 
(Bartunek, 2011; Hewett et al., 2009; Watson et al., 2012), the examination of a group’s actions in a 
patient case may be perceived as an intergroup threat in the HEAPS setting. 
4.2.1.3 The organisation and the clinician 
 
Another intergroup aspect pertinent to the analysis setting is the interaction between the 
organisation and clinicians. Duckett and Ward (2008) proposed that three foci direct the delivery of 
care: the patient; the clinician; and the financial interests of the organisation. Incident analysis 
combines all three foci: it is an organisational directive bound by budgetary constraints, where 
clinicians are required to give their input to the analysis process to facilitate organisational change 
to enhance patient safety. Given that clinicians’ requirements for patient care are often at odds with 
the fiscal constraints or organisational needs of hospitals around increasing patient throughput, cost 
cutting and meeting budgets (Berwick, DeParle, Eddy, Ellwood, et al., 2003), it is not surprising 
that research on incident analysis teams shows that conflict between organisations and clinicians 
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adversely affects analysis outcomes. For instance, Nicolini et al. (2011b) found that analysis teams 
will not propose meaningful patient safety solutions if the findings are perceived to be at odds with 
organisational directives or not perceived to be within the organisation’s budget. 
Bate (2000) contended that high-status clinicians perceive analysis as a demonstration of 
power by the organisation, suggesting that they resist the legitimacy of analysis as a patient safety 
measure, stating that ‘Within health care systems, professional cultures may be primarily defensive 
… [clinicians] simply refuse to accept the controlling legitimacy of the management position’ (p. 
495). This speaks of high- status clinicians having high professional and low organisational 
identification (Kreindler et al., 2012). Studies suggest that this results in reduced compliance with 
organisational directives and retaliation from clinicians if they perceive the 
organisation has breached their ‘psychological contract’ by failing to uphold its obligation to protect 
them from harm to their professional reputation (Rousseau, 1990). 
While these findings offer different perspectives on how hierarchy influences the analysis 
process, they demonstrate the bi-directional nature of power in error management systems in 
healthcare; power is both legitimate and illegitimate in the analysis setting (clinicians refusing to 
accept management directives). Given that clinicians perceive hospital management prioritise 
financial interests before patient care in their decision to allow system gaps and failures to continue 
(Kippist & Fitzgerald, 2009; Watson et al., 2012) these factors may also influence the validity 
clinicians attach to the HEAPS process. 
4.3 Intergroup Communication Research in Healthcare 
 
By comparing the communication styles of analysis participants, this research applies an 
intergroup communication theoretical lens. While both interpersonal and intergroup factors may 
influence communicative interactions in analysis meetings, the status and professional differences 
between members suggest a predominantly intergroup dynamic that merits exploration. Invoking an 
intergroup communication focus may incline PSOs to not only pre-empt communication 
behaviours, but also foster communication effectiveness and manage communication breakdowns. 
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However, interpersonal communication, which is concerned with how individual differences inform 
communication between interlocutors, may also occur and an examination of this offers further 
insight into the group dynamics in incident analysis. 
4.3.1 Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT) 
 
CAT is a theoretical framework of interpersonal and intergroup communication based on 
speech accommodation theory (SAT) developed by Giles Taylor and Bourhis (1973). SAT sought 
to explain why people adjust their communication styles and predict how and when this happens. In 
1987, SAT was renamed as CAT to signal its broader scope (Giles, Mulac, Bradac & Johnson, 
1987; see also Gallois et al., 2005b). CAT draws on SIT, but while SIT describes intergroup 
cognitions and motivations, CAT provides a means of explaining how identity and status inform 
communication styles, proposing that social outcomes arise from communication (Dragojevic, 
Gasiorek & Giles, 2015). The theory draws on language, communication and social psychology to 
offer a broader understanding of communication dynamics. 
While CAT argues that interpersonal and intergroup communication occur as two distinct 
yet related constructs, (Gallois, Franklyn-Stokes, Giles & Coupland, 1988; Harwood et al., 2005), 
the central tenet of CAT is that it is through communication that individuals negotiate group 
identities, intergroup relationships and boundaries and norms. Therefore, how individuals 
communicate as a function of their social identity influences cooperation, perceptions of status 
relative to other groups and the extent to which hierarchy is legitimised. However, CAT also 
proposes that socio-historical factors inform attitudes, arguing that intergroup history (i.e., history 
of group inequalities), interpersonal history and societal/cultural norms and values determine how 
individuals approach intergroup interactions. People evaluate intergroup interactions based on their 
views about the other’s group identity, this informs the socio-historical context and approach for 
their next interaction and adds to their broad communication framework. 
The underlying mechanism of CAT is that people are motivated to adapt their 
communication style to reduce perceived differences with their interlocutors (accommodation; 
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convergence) to demonstrate liking towards them. Conversely, if they wish to emphasise social 
distance from their interlocutor, they will adjust their communication to heighten perceived 
differences (non-accommodation; divergence). 
This is done in a variety of ways, such as altering speech rate, accent, tone or pitch, utterance length 
or pausing. Non-accommodation can include hostile communication (counter-accommodation), 
patronising communication (over-accommodation) or non-empathic communication (under- 
accommodation). Accommodative and non- accommodative communication can either be 
linguistic, where the speech behaviour converges or diverges, or it can be psychological, where 
interlocutors’ motivations converge or diverge (Giles, Coupland & Coupland, 1991). 
CAT has been invoked as a communication framework in intercultural communication 
(Giles & Watson, 2008), intergenerational communication (Giles & Gasiorek, 2011) and health 
communication (Hewett et al., 2009; Watson & Gallois, 1998). Watson and Gallois (1998) 
described the types of accommodative and non-accommodative communication strategies employed 
by individuals in intergroup encounters to demonstrate convergence or divergence with 
interlocutors: these include interpretability, discourse management, interpersonal control and 
emotional expression (Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1 
 
Communication Strategies in CAT Based on Coupland et al. (1988) and Watson 
and Gallois (1998) 
Communication 
strategy 
Definition Examples 
Interpersonal control Interpersonal control is 
about the roles speech 
partners play in 
communication 
interaction. Examples 
include minimal 
encouragers; silence to 
prompt someone to speak; 
minor interruptions 
A high-status speech 
partner may use 
communication strategies 
to emphasise their 
dominant role and the 
speech partners’ passive 
role by changing topics, 
talking over someone or 
interrupting. 
 
A person accommodates 
their speech partner by 
using words they think 
their speech partner will 
understand clearly; or they 
can be non- 
accommodative and use 
words that they think their 
speech partner will not 
understand. 
A high-status team leader 
encourages a low-status 
team member to elaborate 
on a point using minimal 
encouragers such as 
‘mmm’, ‘oh I see’ 
 
 
The speech partner uses 
appropriate emotional 
expressions such as 
reassuring language or 
facial expressions to denote 
reassurance. 
Interpretability Interpretability is about 
how an interlocutor 
judges the 
communication 
competence of their 
speech partner (Watson 
et al., 2012) 
 
 
Discourse management is 
about how the 
communication process is 
managed; it entails the use 
of the following behaviours 
to manage effective 
communication (Watson & 
Gallois, 2004): 
 
 
 
 
Discourse management 
Emotional expression Emotional expression is 
about responding to the 
expressed emotional or 
relational needs of speech 
partners 
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4.4.1.1 Interpersonal control 
 
 
Interpersonal control focuses on role relationships between interactants. 
 
Accommodative interpersonal control refers to the degree to which a participant is not 
constrained by their professional identity or status level and is viewed by others as an 
individual (Gallois et al., 1988). Non-accommodative interpersonal control could include a 
senior status clinician using condescending terms towards lower-status clinicians 
(Willemyns, Gallois & Callan, 2000). Ongoing references to a participant’s own status 
and/or experience may serve to reinforce power imbalances and prevailing medical 
hierarchies. The use of inappropriate interpersonal control may constrain more junior staff 
from voicing their opinions in a team setting where status differentials are prevalent. 
However, if appropriate interpersonal control is employed, this may engender flexibility of 
roles, highlight respect and equality between team members and reduce the potential for 
conflict. Items include interactants trying to establish a common role or keeping others and 
themselves in a specific role; interruption; or conducting separate conversations to the 
main discourse. 
4.4.1.2 Interpretability 
 
Interpretability refers to the extent to which each person’s communication 
 
competence levels are appropriately met; for instance, the degree to which each speaker perceives 
that the interaction is clearly understood (Gallois & Giles, 1998). In the HEAPS setting, 
accommodative interpretability may consist of a specialist adjusting their vocabulary to enhance 
understanding by members of other professions. Non-accommodative interpretability would be 
when they use specialist jargon not easily understood by team members. Items include the use of 
clear communication that is appropriate to the interactant’s knowledge to aid understanding. 
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4.4.1.3 Discourse management 
 
Discourse management focuses on the communication process (Coupland et al., 1988) and 
involves assessing and responding to the conversational needs of others. Importantly, discourse 
management is about the process rather than the content of the communication (Gallois & Giles, 
2015) and includes sharing of topic selection and turn taking (Coupland et al., 1988; Jones et al., 
2018). Accommodative discourse management is where a participant perceives mutual topic sharing 
and appropriate levels of floor holding (Watson & Gallois, 1999). Non-accommodative discourse 
management is where a participant perceives unequal topic sharing or turn taking and feels unable 
to engage in the conversation. 
4.4.1.4 Emotional expression 
 
Emotional expression focuses on the emotional needs of interlocutors. In HEAPS meetings, 
emotional expression may consist of participants feeling comfortable to voice their concerns or 
show understanding and reassurance towards others. HEAPS meetings are not easy events and the 
use of accommodative emotional expression may be critical. Non-accommodative emotional 
expression may involve a participant feeling that their expression of emotional distress is dismissed 
by others. Items that measure emotional expression include members showing sympathy, 
reassurance, or providing support to others or validating their emotional concerns. 
4.4.2 Healthcare—A Communication Accommodation Theory Perspective 
 
Since the early 2000s, research has consistently demonstrated that group norms and identities 
in medicine influence communication behaviours in intergroup settings in hospitals. Since SIT 
proposes that social identity becomes more salient in situations of intergroup interactions, the 
research findings suggests health professionals use communication behaviours to evaluate other 
groups and draw social comparisons with them (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, a number of 
studies have found that cases of miscommunication are informed by intergroup dynamics, such as 
professional rivalries (Lingard et al., 2002), professional or tribal affiliation (Hawryluck et al., 
2002; Lingard et al., 2002, 2004) and the divergent goals of clinicians and administrators (Sutcliffe, 
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Lewton, & Rosenthal, 2004). For instance, in a study of team communication in operating theatres, 
Lingard et al. (2002) found that rival professional groups may selectively attend to those aspects of 
others’ communication that suits their own group's competitive purpose. In a study of inter 
professional teams in the ICU, Hawryluck et al. (2002) found that ICU team members use 
communication to signal to others whether they are aligned with their professional group or not and 
in interviews with clinicians in a US teaching hospital, Sutcliffe, Lewton, & Rosenthal (2004) found 
that communication mishaps occurred because groups within the organisation (i.e., subunits, 
specialties, departments) have embedded communication practices which differ from one another. 
Braithwaite (2010) argued that communication breakdowns occur between groups because 
clinicians see their role in terms of their profession rather than in a wider organisational context, 
concluding that this results in a failure to recognise the input and ways of working of other 
professional groups. Indeed, Haslam (2001) had already taken a socio historic perspective to 
intergroup miscommunication when he argued that it is perpetuated by a hospital model of care 
setting where disciplinary silos reinforce group alignments and mute inter-professional 
communication. Concerningly, Espin, Levinson, Regehr, Baker, and Lingard, (2006) proposed that 
health professionals have been working within an entrenched culture of intergroup 
miscommunication for so long that they have limited awareness of how this leads to near misses or 
adverse events. 
However, prior to the early 2000’s the research on communication between professional 
groups in healthcare has been largely atheoretical. In the last ten years, Australian researchers have 
applied an intergroup theoretical lens to this paradigm (Hewett et al., 2009a, b; Watson et al., 2012; 
Watson, Jones & Hewett, 2009). For instance, Hewett et al. (2009a) used CAT to explain how 
clinicians negotiate patient care responsibility and win conflicts through communication, finding 
that doctors employ interpersonal control strategies to reinforce perceptions of their status and role 
in situations of intergroup conflict. In a related study of medical records, Hewett et al. (2009b) 
found that doctors emphasise the status associated with their specialty identity using non- 
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accommodative communication such as abbreviated and coded language unlikely to be understood 
by outgroup members. But there is no research which explores how social identity influences 
communication in incident analysis meetings. My research addresses this gap in the research by 
using CAT to 1) examine how social identity informs communication between team members in 
analysis meetings, and 2) to categorise the communication strategies PSOs say they use with team 
members. This is the also the first-time a triangulation process has been used to understand how 
intergroup factors inform communication in incident analysis from diverse standpoints. 
4.5 Summary 
 
SIT and CAT were presented as intergroup theories to examine the cognitions and 
communication behaviours of health professionals involved in HEAPS analysis. In Chapter 5, I 
present the methodology rationale that informs this research. 
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Chapter 5: Rationale for Methodology and Approach 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter 4, I described SIT and CAT and their application in healthcare. In this chapter, I 
explain the rationale underpinning my research methods. Table 5.1 depicts the methodologies used 
and how they fitted together. 
Table 5.1 
 
Overview of Methodologies used in Research and Triangulation Approach 
 
Study Methodology 
used 
Research Questions Theory 
used to 
analyse 
inter 
group 
factors 
Purpose of triangulation 
of viewpoints 
One: 
Interviews with 11 
regional and 
national healthcare 
executives and 
policy makers (3 
telephone/8 in 
person) 
Unstructured 
narrative 
elicitation 
followed by a 
semi structured 
interview 
1. What are the barriers 
to analysis 
effectiveness? 
2. How do intergroup 
factors impact? 
SIT and 
CAT 
How does what senior 
management say is 
happening in incident 
analysis map onto what 
participants (study 4) and 
PSOs (study 2) say is 
happening and what is 
observed in meetings 
(study 3)? 
Two: 
Interviews with 3 
Patient Safety 
Officers (3 in 
person) 
Unstructured 
narrative 
elicitation 
followed by a 
semi structured 
interview 
1. What are the barriers 
to analysis 
effectiveness? 
2. How do intergroup 
factors impact? 
SIT and 
CAT 
How does what PSOs say 
is happening in incident 
analysis map onto what 
senior management (study 
1) and participants (study 
4) say is happening and 
what is observed in 
meetings (study 3)? 
Three: 
Observation of 
3xHEAPS meetings: 
18 participants 
across 3 meetings 
Observation of 
three HEAPS 
Meetings 
1. How do intergroup 
factors impact 
communication between 
participants? 
CAT How does the 
communication observed 
in HEAPS meetings fit 
with what participants 
(study 4) and PSOs (study 
3) and senior management 
(study 1) say is happening? 
Four: 
Interviews with 6 
participants who 
attended the HEAPS 
meetings 
(4 telephone/2 in 
person) 
Unstructured 
narrative 
elicitation 
followed by a 
semi structured 
interview 
1. What are the barriers 
to analysis 
effectiveness? 
2. How do intergroup 
factors impact? 
SIT and 
CAT 
How does what HEAPS 
participants say happening 
in incident analysis map 
onto what senior 
management (study 1) and 
PSOs (study 2) say is 
happening and what is 
observed in meetings 
(study 3)? 
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I begin by examining epistemology, which is defined by Crotty (1998) as the theory of 
knowledge. This offers a philosophical foundation for determining what types of knowledge are 
possible, which informs the process required to gather that knowledge. Although there are several 
knowledge frameworks, I use Crotty’s explanation of constructivism as the structure within which 
to situate my research. 
Constructivism posits that there is no one objective truth to be gained; rather knowledge 
acquired about any reality consists of a person’s socially constructed perceptions or interpretations 
(Crotty, 1998). Powell and Kalina (2009) explained that people make sense of their world through 
their cultural and social interactions and this influences their critical thinking process. Because 
people are adaptable and the context of their experience changes, there is a diversity of 
interpretation that can be applied to any reality (Hugly & Sayward, 1987). Therefore, it is important 
to take context into account in understanding social reality (Hudson & Ozanne, 1988). This has 
implications for what is understood to be the true nature of knowledge, with the constructivist 
approach positing that behaviour and situation are inextricably linked. Rubin and Rubin (2005) state 
that ‘meaning emerges through interaction and is not standardized from place to place or person to 
person’ (p. 31). The role of the researcher is integral to a constructivist approach. Since the 
researcher collaborates with the informant to develop new understandings of the research topic, the 
research process becomes doubly heuristic in nature. Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 207) explain ‘the 
investigator and the object of investigation … are interactively linked so that the findings are 
literally created as the investigation proceeds’; adding that ‘every act of observation influences what 
is seen’. 
Since we cannot know the diversity of people’s critical thinking on a topic or how they give 
meaning to phenomena under investigation, constructivism recommends the use of non- 
experimental methods such as interviews to explore someone’s perceptions and interpretations 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). The researcher’s role is to construct an impression of how participants 
view their worlds relative to one another and the context within which they experience their reality, 
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informing a relativist approach to the research (Cassell & Symon, 1994), allowing the inference of 
meanings, motives and reasons behind people’s interactions. 
Iedema, Jorm, Long, Braithwaite, Travaglia, and Westbrook, (2006) found that 
organisational, cultural and individual factors affected incident analysis in a study of RCAs in 
hospital settings. In my qualitative interviews with hospital executives and policy makers (Study 1), 
PSOs (Study 2) and HEAPS analysis participants (Study 4), I use a constructivist approach to 
explore how the organisational context, medical culture and professional context influence the 
socially constructed perceptions or interpretations that health professionals attribute to incident 
analysis (Guthrie, 2010). I employed an unstructured interview method because it enabled 
participants to articulate the ways they experience incident analysis and allowed a deeper 
exploration of their perceptions and experiences (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003; Denzin & Lincoln, 
2000). Participants’ answers informed the direction of future questions making this an iterative 
process. I tested convergence or divergence about specific topics or concepts by using participants’ 
answers to build prompts for subsequent interviews (Hewett et al., 2009a). This level of exploration 
would not have been achievable using quantitative research methods (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
5.2 Research Approach 
 
In Chapter 4, I described hospitals as intergroup settings (Hewett et al., 2009a; 2009b). This makes 
hospitals particularly multifaceted environments to investigate because the way individuals interpret 
the decisions, communications and behaviours of others will vary according to their group 
orientation and the context of their interaction with people from other groups, in other words their 
intergroup interactions (Tajfel & Turner, 1997). Therefore, I utilise intergroup theories to examine 
how health professionals attribute meaning to the analysis process as a function of their professional 
identity and salient group memberships. 
5.2.1 Triangulation Using a Mixed Methods Approach 
 
Triangulation involves sourcing data from several perspectives so that a comprehensive 
understanding of the data can be obtained (Kohlbacher, 2006) and validity and credibility of the 
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data increased (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Seachrest, 2000). Whilst I use a mixed methods 
approach by using two methods of data collection (observational and interview data), I employed a 
triangulation approach by interviewing health professionals at three levels in the HEAPS process: 
namely the hospital executives and policy makers who govern and regulate incident analysis, the 
PSOs who conduct analysis meetings and the health professionals who participate in it. Thus, the 
triangulation of data sources afforded the development of concepts and categories to provide an 
understanding of how intergroup factors impact analysis effectiveness from an industry to an 
organisational level. Since this is the first time a theoretical communication lens (CAT and SIT) has 
been applied to the analysis setting, it was critical to explore how communication occurs as a 
function of a participant’s professional identity rather than relying on participants’ perceptions in 
the interview data. Thus, by observing HEAPS meetings and then interviewing participants, I was 
able to gather a more comprehensive and well-developed dataset than could be gathered through 
interviews alone or observation alone. This served to reduce potential biases that are characteristic 
of participants’ reports, such as selective perception and a desire to present oneself in a favourable 
light. 
I now discuss the interview method employed for Studies 1, 2 and 4 and the observational 
method for Study 3, along with their strengths and weaknesses. 
5.2.2 The Interview Method—Studies 1, 2 and 4 
 
An interview is effectively a one-on-one conversation with a person where one person (the 
interviewer) asks questions of the other (the interviewee), who then responds with an answer 
(Kvale, 2007). The purpose of the interview is decided by the interviewer. The aim of the interview 
is to transfer information from the interviewee to the interviewer, although sometimes the flow of 
information is bi-directional. Kvale (2007, p. 8) described it thus: ‘an interview with the purpose of 
obtaining descriptions of the life world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning 
of the described phenomena’. In psychological research, interviews are used to explore how 
participants make sense of their experiences as communicated in their own words. A popular form 
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of interview is the semi-structured interview, which is an open form of interview allowing new 
ideas to be explored as the interview progresses. This contrasts with a structured interview, which 
has set questions with no room for interviewer or interviewee to divert. Even though a semi 
structured interview is less restricted and allows themes to be explored more fully, the interviewer 
will normally prepare an interview guide informed by the research themes. This enables the 
interviewer to focus the interview on areas of interest without being restricted to a specific format. 
5.2.2.1 Benefits and limitations of semi-structured interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews are more like guided conversations than a structured interview 
and allow the researcher to adapt questions, remove or add questions or change the order of 
questions dependent on the interviewee’s answers. The use of open- ended questions in a semi- 
structured approach allows the interviewee to talk in depth about an issue and the interviewer to 
probe answers to gain clarification (Gill, Stewart, Treasure & Chadwick, 2008). Given that this 
research is concerned with understanding a phenomenon that has hitherto been unexplored in the 
literature, this was an important criterion for the research gathering process. This method also 
allowed the interviewee to ask questions of the researcher, enabling two-way communication. 
There are limitations to the semi-structured interview method: namely that it can be time 
consuming to conduct the interview and the quality of the data is dependent on the interviewer 
establishing rapport with the interviewee and being skilled enough to probe their answers (Cohen & 
Crabtree, 2006). Data analysis is resource intensive, requiring funds to transcribe interviews, and 
time and cognitive effort to code and analyse interview data. The interviewer, as the research 
instrument, needs to be proficient in both interviewing and analysing data without conferring too 
much of their own viewpoint on the findings. Often interviewers may find themselves dealing with 
unexpected situations such as an overly emotional response to a question, an interviewee unwilling 
to disclose what they know or interviewees controlling the direction of the interview according to 
their own agendas and their perceptions of the interviewer’s power level (Denscombe, 2010). This 
can also work in reverse with the researcher being unduly influenced by their own perceptions of 
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the interviewee. Therefore, interviewers need to develop a series of questions that are clear and not 
leading, and the confidence to steer the interview in the direction of the themes. It is for these 
reasons that participant numbers are relatively low in interview studies compared with questionnaire 
survey studies. The use of telephone interviews serves to remove some of these obstacles. 
5.2.2.2 Telephone versus in-person interviews 
 
Telephone or Voice over Internet Protocol video calls (Skype, FaceTime) enable interviews 
to be conducted remotely rather than face to face and are widely used as a survey modality in 
developed countries. While this method enables interviews to occur irrespective of their 
geographical location (Novick, 2008), it is often defined as a less suitable option than traditional 
face-to-face interviewing. This is because visual cues are missing in a telephone interview and this 
results in a deficit of contextual information that is gleaned from non-verbal communication, such 
as posture, facial expression or body language. This can reduce the interviewer’s ability to build 
rapport with the subject, which can in turn reduce the subject’s willingness to expand on the 
research topic or may cause misunderstandings to arise. 
Nonetheless, the loss of visual perceptions can be an advantage. There is less opportunity for 
the interviewer to be influenced by or misinterpret visual cues (Novick, 2008). Since the 
interviewee is not seen by the interviewer, this may result in them feeling more relaxed and more 
likely to disclose sensitive information (Novick, 2008). Rapport building can occur through having 
an informal chat with the interviewee before the interview commences. The interviewer can also 
pay extra attention to their choice of words and intonation to accommodate the 
interviewee’s communication style and convey an empathic and non-judgemental response. 
Qualitative researchers have found telephone interviews to be sources of rich and detailed data 
(Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004). Since some of my participants were located interstate or had busy time 
schedules, telephone interviews provided an inexpensive and convenient interview modality. 
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5.2.2.3 Emotional dynamics of interviews 
 
Regardless of interview method, it is important that the interviewer is aware of that both 
interviewer and interviewee may experience an emotional response to the interview process. Given 
the sensitive nature of the HEAPS incident analysis process where clinicians are asked to discuss 
medical error in which they may have been involved, it is inevitable that some may experience a 
level of re-traumatising in discussing the analysis. This may lead to a level of emotional strain for 
both parties and interrupt the rapport building process. Further, given the hierarchical nature of 
medicine and the fear of repercussions for making error, subjects may feel fearful about discussing 
their role or the role of their colleagues in a medical error, associating it with a ‘fear of blame’ 
(Iedema et al., 2005). Hoffman (2007) suggested that both parties face the dilemma of how much 
emotion to express during the interview: too much can result in the researcher halting the 
discussion; too little and the researcher can appear to lack empathy and understanding. However, 
expression of emotion can also enhance the understanding of the research topic and build further 
knowledge. 
5.2.2.4 Considerations of Interview Method 
 
It is acknowledged that qualitative interviews can be a problematic source of data where the 
subject of the interview is sensitive in nature. In this research, participants may have been wary of 
discussing their attitudes and responses towards their own or their peers’ roles in error with an 
‘outsider’. Waring (2004, p. 1930) mentioned clinicians’ concerns at portraying themselves as 
‘competent’ and editing their responses to not provide information that could cast themselves or 
their peers in a negative light. Given that most participants in Study 4 were from a small hospital, 
they may have felt they could be easily identified because of their profession and this may have 
resulted in a degree of impression management. Therefore, it was necessary to factor in the 
limitations of extracting substantial conclusions based on six interviews. However, given that there 
are no qualitative data on health professionals’ perceptions of HEAPS analysis, it is believed that 
these data can be extrapolated to provide a deeper understanding of the empirical literature on 
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incident analysis in healthcare and provide starting points for more extensive research. Further 
given that no research has applied an intergroup theoretical lens to incident analysis, these data may 
be contextualised to build on existing theoretical data on how professional identity affects 
communication and behaviours in multi-disciplinary settings. 
5.2.3 The Observation Method—Study 3 
 
Observational research is a non-experimental social research technique involving the direct 
observation of a phenomenon in its natural setting. It can be ‘non-participant’ observation, where 
the researcher does not intervene in the process or know the population group being observed; or 
‘participant’ observation where the researcher is actively involved in the research setting over a 
period of time (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 2001). 
Marshall and Rossman (1989, p. 79) described observation as ‘the systematic description of 
events, behaviours, and artefacts in the social setting chosen for study’. As a non-participant 
observer of the HEAPS meetings, I aimed to deepen my understanding of intergroup 
communication through observing non-verbal expressions, participant interactions and 
communication with one another, and the time taken in communicative interactions (Schmuck, 
1997). As Musante and DeWalt (2002, p. 92) stated, this enabled me to build a ‘holistic 
understanding of the phenomena under study that is as objective and accurate as possible given the 
limitations of the method’. 
One limitation of observational research is the inability to determine the reasons why people 
communicate or behave in a particular way. Therefore, I triangulated the data by interviewing 
participants about their cognitions and motivations that informed the communication behaviours I 
observed. A further limitation of the observational data was the impossibility of determining 
whether what I observed was representative of what normally occurs in the HEAPS analysis setting. 
Indeed, in my reflexive process, I note that my presence may have inhibited communication and 
participants may have acted differently in accordance with their interpretation of my research aims. 
To institute rigour into my approach, I triangulated the data by observing three HEAPS meetings. 
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While the same PSO conducted all three meetings, the participants and events analysed were 
different for each meeting (see Appendix 11.5). It is noted that this PSO was unavailable for 
interview, which is acknowledged as a limitation of this research. 
5.3 Reflexivity 
 
Reflexivity was defined by May (2011, p. 44) as ‘a consideration of the practice of research, 
our place within it and the construction of our fields of enquiry themselves’. Chamaz (2006) 
qualified interpretative research as being reflexive in nature; as such the views of the researcher will 
influence the research process. It is therefore important that the researcher is mindful of how their 
beliefs, viewpoints and values may influence the research material they collect and how they 
analyse it (Carr, 2011). To assume a value- free position in the research process may be considered 
“dishonest and unethical” (Ruby, 1980, p. 154). While some may argue that a reflexive approach 
interferes with the subjective nature of the research, Levy (2003) stated that the researcher’s 
personal interpretative framework helps build a new understanding of the area. Lincoln and Gaba 
(1985) argued that since the researcher is the main gatherer of data, the researcher is the only person 
who can fully understand, respond to and describe the complexity of interactions that took place in 
the research process. 
As the sole interviewer and lead interpreter of the data findings (Stake, 1995), I brought a 
subjective meaning to the data gathering process. My interpretation of participants’ answers 
informed the iterative nature of the research because as I gained further insight from their answers, I 
developed new lines of investigation. My identity and perceived power level may also have 
influenced the proceedings. Kvale (2007) posited that power initially resides with the interviewer, 
because the interviewer decides who to interview and what to interview them about. My 
consideration of this was informed by Aléx and Hammarström's (2008) suggestion that how 
interviewer and interviewee perceive each other’s power level shapes the research in several ways. 
Power may affect which aspects of the interview are highlighted and which aspects are repressed. 
Age, gender, education level, social divisions and hierarchies involving socio-economic status and 
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professional identity may also influence the interview process and how the researcher interprets the 
data. These points are pertinent when interviewing members with lower status levels in hierarchical 
organisations like hospitals. 
As a registered psychologist with extensive counselling experience, I am accustomed to 
putting clients in a safe therapeutic space to discuss their concerns. My counselling approach may 
have informed my interview style, resulting in participants feeling comfortable to divulge concerns 
that a less experienced interviewer may not have uncovered. I informed participants of my 
profession as psychologist when I introduced myself at the beginning of the interview, therefore as 
an allied health professional (AHP), I may have been perceived by participants through this 
intergroup lens, resulting in a shared recognition of the healthcare culture and a level of reflection 
and insight not afforded to an outsider. Conversely, participants may have viewed me as a member 
of an outgroup and comparisons and stereotypes associated with my professional identity may have 
been applied. However, this was not commented upon by participants during the interviews. 
As a non-participant observer of HEAPS meetings, I strived to remain as an accepted 
outsider, watching and recording the intergroup interactions as a fly on the wall. However, because 
the PSO introduced me as someone who was supported by senior management, this may have 
affected participants’ motivation to communicate openly in the HEAPS meetings I observed. Given 
that hospitals are strongly hierarchical, and status level meaningful (Walton, 2006), this would have 
been salient for participants and may well have served to inhibit communication behaviours in the 
meetings and disclosure in subsequent interviews. Again, no participants commented on this. 
Moreover, as the lead interpreter of the data findings (Stake, 1995), I may have brought a 
subjective meaning to the data analysis process. However, because I employed Braun and Clarke’s 
(2006) six stage thematic analysis approach, I used an objective coding process that mitigated a 
subjective interpretation. Informant checking was provided by a second researcher (AL). 
5.4 Analysis Rationale 
 
I invoked CAT and SIT to frame my analysis of the findings in studies 1, 2, 3 and 4a. My 
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approach was guided by Yin’s (2003a) proposition that when research questions have been 
formulated from previous research, the theories that inform the research questions can also be 
applied to the analysis of the data, which needs to consider the context in which the data collection 
took place. While researchers argue that data from case studies may not be generalisable to other 
populations or environments (Hartley, 2004, as cited in Yin, 2003a), data can be used to generalise 
theories (Kohlbacher, 2006). Hartley (2004) stated that data collection and analysis develop 
concurrently as an iterative process, thereby anchoring the development of theory in empirical 
evidence (Kohlbacher, 2006). As Patton and Appelbaum (2003) state, ultimately the goal of the 
analysis is to ‘uncover patterns, determine meanings construct conclusions and build theory’ (p. 
67). Thus, the analysis of my findings builds upon the development of both CAT and SIT in a 
setting that has hitherto been unexplored in the literature. 
5.5 Data Coding and Analysis 
 
Inductive and deductive approaches were employed to analyse the data. In studies 1 and 
4b, I examined the challenges to incident analysis effectiveness using an inductive approach. 
Whilst I was aware of previous research on the impact of organisational and regulatory factors on 
analysis effectiveness, I was unsure of the extent to which these applied to the analysis process in 
the Australian or Queensland healthcare setting. I did not want to test hypotheses but understand 
current analysis practices and challenges. 
Braun and Clarke’s (2006) thematic analysis approach was used to analyse the data. This 
was chosen because it is an analytic method within psychology that can be applied to produce 
data-driven or theory-driven analyses. It is theoretically flexible and works with research questions 
about people’s understandings of their experiences and their constructions of phenomena (Braun 
& Clarke, 2013). The six thematic analysis phases were strongly drawn from Braun and Clarke's 
suggested analytic approach. This was a recursive process whereby phases were revisited. 
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Phase 1—Familiarisation of Data 
• Audio recordings listened to in their entirety. 
 
• Interview transcripts read and checked for accuracy against the audio recordings. 
 
• The transcripts were re-read, and notes made of initial analytic observations. 
 
Phase 2—Coding 
 
• Codes, relevant to the research question, were generated to capture the 
concepts and semantic meaning in the data. 
• All data items were coded, and notes made of their relevance to the 
research question. 
• Codes were the collated according to similarity. 
 
• Data extracts relevant to the code were collected and assigned to the code. 
 
Phase 3—Themes 
 
• Coded data collected into themes which reflected patterns in the data 
relevant to the research questions. 
• Coding rules were devised to determine under what circumstances a data 
item could be categorised. 
Phase 4—Review of Themes 
 
• Preliminary themes were examined to examine how they worked in 
relationto extracts and the data set gathered for each study. 
• The relationship between the themes was examined to determine if they could 
be collapsed into one theme or discarded. 
Phase 5—Defining and Naming Themes 
 
• Themes were defined according to what they conveyed about the overall 
story of the data. 
• Themes were named informatively to convey what they said about thedata. 
 
Phase 6—Writing up of Results 
 
• Interpretation of the results was processed. 
 
• Analysis of themes integrated with relevant data extracts to convey 
meaning of the data in relation to research questions. 
• Analysis contextualised in relation to the existingliterature. 
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5.5.1 Reliability Testing of Coding Conducted 
 
Since Braun and Clarke (2013) argue that inter-rater reliability testing of codes is not 
essential if there has been objective coding of the data, I did not include this in the analysis 
process. 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
I described and justified the methodological approaches used in the research. The following 
five chapters elaborate on the specific details of how I collected and analysed the data for each 
study and provide the results. In chapter 6, I present the findings from the interviews with hospital 
executives and policy makers. 
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Chapter 6: Study 1—Healthcare Executives’ and Policy Makers’ 
Perceptions of Challenges to Incident Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This study explored the reflections of 11 leading Australian healthcare executives and 
national policy makers on the challenges of incident analysis. An intergroup lens was applied to 
explore how group membership and status impact the capacity of incident analysis to create safer 
patient outcomes. 
6.2 Aims 
 
The aims of this study were to: 
 
1. Understand the challenges to incident analysis 
 
2. Examine how intergroup factors in from the analysis process 
 
 
6.3 Method 
 
I conducted 11 semi-structured interviews with participants familiar with incident analysis 
systems and patient safety at a senior organisational or national governance level. 
6.3.1 Participants 
 
Participants were recruited between September and November 2016. Six were patient safety 
policy makers at a national level; three were healthcare executives at state level (one in QLD, two in 
South Australia); and two were CEOs of state health services. The policy makers contribute to the 
development and maintenance of the national patient safety standards that inform accreditation 
requirements for Australian healthcare. Four policy makers had previously practised as clinicians (3 
doctors, 1 nurse), and had held leadership roles as heads of hospital departments. The South 
Australian executives managed a state-based incident reporting system and were instrumental in 
building a clinical learning system to capture error patterns. The Queensland healthcare executive 
was a senior clinician with extensive experience of patient safety in clinical governance committees. 
It is acknowledged as a limitation that none of the participants were from the hospital where the 
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HEAPS meetings were observed. Participant demographic information is outlined in Table 6.1. 
 
 
Table 6.1 
 
Characteristics of Participants in Study 1 in Absolute Numbers and Percentages 
 
Characteristics Count (%) 
Gender (n1 = 11)  
Male 3 (27.3) 
Female 8 (72.7) 
Profession (n1 = 11)  
National policy makers 6 (54.5) 
South Australian healthcare executives 2 (18.2) 
CEO of state health service (CEO) 2 (18.2) 
Queensland healthcare executives 1 (9.1) 
Clinical background (n = 11)  
Clinician 5 (45.5) 
Non-clinical background 6 (54.5) 
 
Demographic information other than profession, gender and clinical experience was not 
collected because of ethical concerns about participant confidentiality. To ensure confidentiality, 
policy makers and healthcare executives were coded as patient safety experts, (PSE) and the Chief 
Executive Officers as CEOs, all were given a number within these categories. These are detailed in 
table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 Characteristics of Participants in Study 1 According to Identifier Code 
 
Participant Code (n=11) Characteristic Clinician Another Role 
PSE1 QUEENSLAN D 
healthcare 
executive 
 
Policy maker 
Policy maker 
 
 
 
Policy maker 
Policy maker 
Policy maker 
Policy maker 
SA PSE 
SA PSE 
NSW CEO 
Vic CEO 
Yes (Doctor) CGC member 
 
PSE2 
PSE3 
 
Yes (Doctor) 
No 
 
 
Hospital Manager 
 
PSE4 
PSE5 
PSE6 
PSE7 
PSE8 
PSE9 
CEO1 
CEO2 
 
Yes (Doctor) 
Yes (Doctor) 
No 
Yes (Nurse) 
No 
No 
No 
 
 
Clinical Director 
Clinical Director 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Board Chair 
 
 
 
 
PSE – Patient Safety Expert; CEO – Chief Executive Officer, SA – South Australia; NSW- New 
South Wales; Vic – Victoria 
 
 
6.3.2 Procedure 
 
Contact details for participants were provided by a personal contact who worked in 
healthcare. I emailed 12 participants to request an interview and 11 agreed. The email contained 
participant information and consent forms and explained all data would be confidential and de- 
identified (Appendix 11.4.3). A mutually convenient time to conduct the interview at their 
workplace or by telephone was arranged. Three participants ( CEO1, CEO2 and PSE8) requested a 
phone interview due to work commitments. All others (n=8) were interviewed in person at their 
workplace. 
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6.3.3 Materials 
6.3.3.1 Initial unstructured narrative elicitation followed by semi-structured interviews 
 
The literature on incident analysis, human factors and patient safety informed the interview 
questions (Reason, 1997; Reason & Hobbs, 2003; Nicolini et al., 2011a). The interviews were 
comprised of an initial unstructured narrative elicitation followed by a semi structured interview 
using a thematic question guide focused on gaining participants’ perceptions of challenges to 
analysis effectiveness. Participants did not distinguish between RCA or HEAPS, so this was not 
clarified in the analysis. Interviews began with a review of study aims and ethical considerations of 
the study. Participants were asked about their involvement in incident analysis, to allow them to 
provide free answers and reflect on their personal experiences. Further questions were asked about 
the following aspects: 
• Analysis methodology 
 
• Effectiveness of current analysis methods 
 
• Appropriateness of incident analysis for reducing error inhealthcare 
 
• How the following factors impacted analysis effectiveness: 
 
o the political environment 
o the current regulatory environment 
o organisational factors within hospitals 
o clinical factors 
o governance factors 
• Impact of the medical culture 
 
• Areas for improvement 
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6.3.4 Data Collection 
 
I conducted the interviews between September and November 2016. Seven participants were 
interviewed individually (three by phone, four in their place of work) and four were interviewed in 
two sets of pairs (in their workplace). Participants were informed their role, position and state 
within which they worked would be revealed. Interviews lasted to the point where no new themes 
emerged. The interviews were between 32 and 70 minutes in duration, were audio recorded on an 
iPhone 7 and were professionally transcribed verbatim, to achieve consistency in the transcription 
process. 
6.3.5 Data Coding and Analysis 
 
I conducted the analysis of the transcripts using Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six steps to 
qualitative thematic content analysis, (section 5.5). The issues that emerged were reviewed to see if 
they represented the general opinion of all participants or just one participant. Themes were then 
interpreted through an intergroup lens to understand how professional identity and status impacted 
analysis effectiveness. 
6.4 Results 
 
Four themes were identified, with 14 subthemes (Table 6.3). The four main themes were 
regulatory barriers, organisational barriers, methodological barriers and potential areas for 
improvement. 
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Table 6.3 
 
Themes and Subthemes 
 
Theme Subtheme Explanation 
• Regulatory 
barriers 
• Accreditation 
• Devolution 
• Politics 
• Legal environment 
How the regulatory and 
political environment 
influence analysis 
effectiveness 
• Organisational 
barriers 
• Lack of commitment to 
process 
• Clinical governance 
• Hospital Board and 
management response to 
error 
• Hierarchy 
• Lack of expertise 
• Professional identity 
• Limited understanding of 
error management processes 
• Inadequate understanding of 
human factors 
• Inadequate learning 
• Privacy 
How organisational 
factors influence 
analysis effectiveness 
• Methodological 
barriers 
• Unsuited to the complexity 
of healthcare delivery 
• Types of events analysed 
• Analysis team composition 
• Emotion 
Factors around the 
operationalisation of 
analysis that influences 
its effectiveness 
• Potential areas 
for improvement 
• Safety training 
• Strengths-based approach 
• Aggregation of data to 
determine error patterns 
Suggestions by 
participants on how 
analysis can be 
improved 
 
6.4.1 Overview 
 
All participants had a comprehensive understanding of how political, regulatory and 
organisational factors influence analysis effectiveness. They referred to an initial optimism that 
incident analysis would result in safer systems of care, shifting the focus 
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from counting errors to investigating them. However, whilst they were generally supportive of 
incident analysis as a tool to reduce error, the majority (n=9) believed it had not been effective in 
enhancing patient safety outcomes, as explained by CEO1: 
It was a good thing that happened to start to investigate rather than just 
count. That was great. At the time when it was all put in place that was 
probably the right thing to do, but this far down the track, after a decade 
I think we have to shift. I don't think that continuing to do more of the 
same is actually contributing to safer systems of care. [CEO1] 
9 participants gave reasons as to why analysis had not been effective. They stated hospitals 
had not put in place organisational structures 1) to monitor the quality of analysis processes; 2) to 
train those involved; 3) translate findings to process changes to enhance patient safety; 4) to deliver 
feedback to error stakeholders and 5) to disseminate learnings at a local or national level. 
Participants viewed clinicians, management and hospital board members as not understanding the 
systems approach (human factors) to error analysis. Both CEOs and those PSEs who had worked as 
clinicians in hospitals (PSE1,2,3) said this resulted in a persons’-approach to error analysis, which 
meant systemic causes of error were not uncovered, as commented on by CEO2: 
Those recommendations [from incident analysis] generally limit 
themselves to either review of a policy, retraining of the staff, both of those 
two things suggest that it's a person accident, so it is a persons’ rather 
than a systems approach… We initially issue the policy, we retrain the 
people, we maybe do a couple of other things but generally they're low- 
level controls that the recommendations result in. Then it all goes quiet 
and then the same things happen again. We go through the same process 
again. We come up with pretty much the same findings. [CEO2] 
Her comment encapsulates participants’ impression that a failure to take a systems approach 
to error analysis results in the same type of errors recurring. CEO1 suggested there has been an 
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attempt to take a systems approach, but it has not been successful: 
 
Every incident I see I could go back and say, I can recall a very similar 
thing to that that happened five years ago or three years ago, or in this 
hospital, or that hospital. I do feel the sense of frustration that whatever 
the system is that we've put in place to help us understand and fix those 
problems does not work. [CEO1] 
Participant responses to interview prompts on barriers to analysis effectiveness 
are presented under the following four key themes, and where applicable each subtheme is 
interpreted through an intergroup lens: 
1. Barriers within the regulatory and governance environment 
 
2. Barriers within the organisational environment 
 
3. Barriers within the analysis methodology 
 
4. Potential areas for improvement 
 
6.4.2 Theme 1: Barriers Within the Regulatory and Governance Environment 
 
Participants believed that even if incident analysis met an organisational compliance 
requirement, its capacity to deliver improvements to patient safety outcomes was not being 
optimised, saying this was due to the way in which hospitals were accredited in terms of their error 
management systems. 
6.4.2.1 Accreditation 
 
Six participants said that hospitals currently focus on incident analysis as a compliance 
exercise, whereas they felt it could act as a platform for continuous improvement in patient safety 
outcomes. One PSE explained that organisations differ in their attitudes towards incident analysis, 
with some seeing it as meaningful and others viewing it as part of the process to gain accreditation 
to practice: ‘Some are doing it properly and see it as useful and others will be doing it as a 
compliance think it’s a regulatory impost. They do the absolute minimum to get through’ [PSE6]. 
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From a CAT perspective, the participant’s inference that some hospitals are not invested in 
error reduction and perform incident analysis as an exercise in compliance, can be categorised as a 
downward derogation, suggesting she sees these hospitals as 'outgroup' along the dimension of not 
valuing this initiative to improve patient safety outcomes. 
Five participants who had worked in hospitals (n=5), spoke of hospitals seeing analysis as a 
bureaucratic expediency rather than valuing it as a tool to achieve the higher purpose of reducing 
error, in other words as "a tick box " approach. When asked why they had formed this opinion, they 
variously stated that (1) hospitals did not train clinicians in incident analysis; (2) the reports that 
emerged from the analysis process were sub optimal; (3) hospitals failed to act on analysis 
recommendations and (4) learnings were not disseminated to relevant stakeholders. Here, CEO1 
infers that hospitals are more concerned with compliance than gaining insight from the process: 
In my role when I look at the quality of the reports that I receive I think, I don't 
 
know what kind of confidence you could have in proceeding on the basis of 
this. It's a little bit right but it's not nearly specific enough to … It's generic, 
it's kind of … There are methodological flaws in it. You end up with a report 
that you look at and you say, well you know I suppose it shows that we've 
investigated. There's nothing necessarily inherently wrong with it but it 
doesn't go far enough. [CEO1] 
CEO1 implies the report provides insufficient detail to translate the findings into operational 
practice, symptomatic of the 'tick box approach' described above. From a CAT perspective, the 
insubstantial nature of the analysis report can be interpreted as a form of non-accommodative 
interpretability because it limits management’s understanding of factors that led to the error. This 
heightens intergroup divides between teams commissioned to analyse error and the senior 
management who review it. 
6.4.2.2 Devolution 
 
In Australia in 2012, error management decisions and responsibility for implementation of 
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recommendations was decentralised from state to local health and hospital services (HHS). All 
PSEs who had worked as clinicians in hospitals and both CEOs implied that devolution caused 
variance in 1) safety cultures between jurisdictions; 2) the quality and rigour of the analysis process 
3) the dissemination of learnings and 4) feedback to relevant units: 
 
So, one of the problems is each of the jurisdictions is different, and each of them has different 
strengths and weaknesses, and the clinical engagement and the clinical buy-in into safety and 
quality and incident management and the whole works varies as you go around Australia. … Okay, 
so there are no centralised policies. … Because they believe that the quality and safety and policy 
should be developed at a local level to suit the local community and the local hospital … There's no 
communication within them, forget that between them. [PSE4] 
If an error has occurred within a group (ward, department, hospital or health service) and it has 
been analysed to understand error risk but that learning has not been shared between other groups 
who also may be impacted by that error, this means that the possession of that knowledge creates an 
intergroup divide between jurisdictions, in terms of some groups having heightened vulnerability to 
error. Synonymous with SIT, since jurisdictions differ in terms of the knowledge they have around 
error risk, the fact that knowledge is not shared between jurisdictions could be interpreted as a form 
of non-accommodative communication. 
PSE4 and PSE5 gave examples to illustrate how devolution has impeded the ability to collate 
meaningful data sets across jurisdictions to inform prophylactic decisions around error prevention, 
leading to a lack of a systematic review process within a single hospital / ward. 
PSE 5: But I just think it's the feedback loop that's the crucial thing, because 
you don't know, in any particular ward. What are the mistakes that are most 
likely to happen in a GIT [Gastrointestinal and Colorectomy] ward? What are 
the mistakes most likely to happen in a respiratory ward... that kind of thing? 
There's not any kind 
of… PSE 4: Global 
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learning. 
 
PSE 5: ... What are the traps for young players? For example, there was a 
patient that was given hydromorphone instead of morphine, which is five 
times stronger, and died. The very next day, when my colleague was in the 
emergency department going over their drug safes to make sure that the 
hydromorphone wasn't in the same one as the morphine, another nurse said, 
‘But aren't they the same thing?’ So, the day after someone has died as a 
result of that, there hasn't even been a proper investigation within the 
department of the fact that there's a death due to this, due to this significant 
medication error. [PSE4, PSE5] 
From a CAT perspective, this comment provides an example of how a failure to share 
learnings from error occurrence within hospitals is non-accommodative because departments within 
hospitals vary around the information they receive to implement measures to prevent error. 
A critical component of error reduction in high-risk industries is the sharing of discipline- 
specific learning within the industry (Reason, 1990). From a SIT perspective, knowledge sharing 
permeates group divides and builds a superordinate safety identity amongst health professionals, 
who can share responsibility for mitigating error because they have the same understandings of 
learnings from error occurrence. These comments show how a localised model of error 
management, whilst it may have the capacity to tailor safety management processes to each 
jurisdictions’ requirements, imposes intergroup divides which reduce learning and can adversely 
impact patient safety. 
6.4.2.3 Politics 
 
The theme of political influence was only mentioned by PSE1 who suggested that 
politicians’ commitment to funding to improve patient care was at odds with their need to fund 
tangible initiatives that could be achieved within their term of office: 
From a politician point of view, you build something, but the new 
Children’s Hospital has less beds than the old one and … you say well we 
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have a new model of care, so we don’t need more beds. Then within a few 
months the politician has moved on and things are tipping, and so they’ve 
achieved goals and there have been positive outcomes if you look at their 
agendas but has that been patient focused? … So there all those agendas, 
when you start looking at RCAs, all of those come into the mix. [PSE1] 
From a SIT perspective, PSE1 makes a downward derogation in terms of health ministers’ 
motivation to engage in patient safety measures, categorising them as more motivated to manage 
public perception than addressing patient safety issues, thereby defining them as outgroup. Given 
that hospitals are public institutions and health ministers influence how public health money is 
spent, this suggest an intergroup tension may exist between clinicians and government. However, 
since only one participant commented on this, it is a deviant comment that cannot be extrapolated to 
represent the general view of participants. 
6.4.2.4 Legal environment 
 
The Australian Government aims to improve patient safety through the regulation of 
clinician behaviour through the legal system. Yet research suggests clinicians distrust the legal 
system, causing them to react differently to legal risks in comparison to other risks or consequences 
of their behaviour (Bosk, 2003; Johnson, 2009). Both CEOs and PSE2, PSE3 and PSE7 perceived 
that the drawn-out way in which the legal system enacts consequences for malpractice by high- 
status clinicians deters hospitals from addressing their behaviours that have resulted in patient harm, 
as highlighted in the following comment from PSE2: 
Can I tell you; the courts are as bad. You try and take a clinician to a court 
and see how the judge treats you. It's not pleasant. The bureaucrats are as 
bad. Doctors aren't sacked. …when you take them on, you're taking on a 
three-year fight, mainly…getting rid of that person. The courts will be 
against you, and even the ministry, because the minute they get into the 
press, nothing more powerful than a senior clinician unless he's killed a kid, 
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or maimed half a dozen, his story is always going to be better than yours, 
the bureaucrat. [PSE2] 
From a SIT perspective, this comment suggests that hierarchy transcends professional 
divides between the legal and medical profession and thus acts as a protective mechanism for high- 
status clinicians. In the following comment, PSE7 defines the legal fraternity and doctors as ingroup 
in their desire to conceal error: 
This is the under-dosing of chemo there, where the head of the 
chemotherapy at X hospital said, ‘Do we really need to tell the patients?’ 
What we have to ask ourselves is, how has that come to pass? … It's not just 
in medicine, I think the law and some other professions are the same. What 
is it about these closed-in cultures that you actually ask that question: ‘Do 
we really need to tell them?’ [PSE7] 
CEO1, CEO2 and PSE2 proposed that fear of litigation is a barrier to clinicians 
 
and organisations disclosing error facts, supported by US, UK and Australian research which 
suggests clinicians practice ‘defensive medicine’ to avoid malpractice claims (Studdert et al., 2006; 
Kessler, Summerton & Graham, 2006). CEO1 explains how the depth of the analysis in private 
hospitals is limited to protect the organisation against potential litigation: 
The investigation that happens after a serious adverse event in the private 
sector is generally one that provides us with information about the incident 
sufficient to defend ourselves should a claim be made against us. [CEO1] 
Participants’ comments infer a level of perceived intergroup threat provided by the legal 
framework informed by concern that the legal profession lacks understanding of the complexity of 
healthcare delivery and consequent risk to patient safety. All these participants had held senior 
management positions in hospitals and as such were familiar with how fear of litigation impacts 
both the organisation’s approach to analysis outcomes and clinicians’ willingness to disclose. The 
statement by CEO1 demonstrates how perception of legal threat heightens defensive behaviours in 
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the analysis setting, which come at the cost of improving patient safety, suggesting that defending 
self- interest is more salient than addressing error reduction. 
6.4.3 Theme 2: Barriers Within the Organisational Environment 
 
Only participants who were clinicians or health service CEOs commented on factors that 
impeded the effectiveness of analysis process. 
6.4.3.1 Lack of commitment to process 
 
There was a widely held impression that whilst healthcare had adopted the aviation analysis 
model, there has not been the same commitment applied to its implementation as in other high-risk 
industries, as in CEO1’s comment: 
I think you have to look at what an incident investigation looks like after an 
airline crash for example, how extensive that is, the kinds of resources that 
go into it, the kind of detail they go down to. Then you compare that with 
what the actual process of an incident investigation looks like in a hospital. I 
think there's not the same commitment…to understand what the prevailing 
conditions were so that we can engineer those out either in our processes or 
our systems. What we do is I think we've adopted some of the rhetoric without 
really a full commitment as there was in the airline safety industry, … to 
properly understand not just the immediate direct causes of an adverse event 
or an accident but the prevailing conditions. I don't think it's any surprise 
that it's not effective. [CEO1] 
CEO1 explained that the erosion of analysis methods began at inception, linking this to 
clinicians circumventing aspects of the method to suit the demands of their role and patient care, in 
particular the difficulties associated with bringing together the clinicians to make up the analysis 
teams: 
Right from the very beginning of the implementation of root cause 
analysis methodology in health, people were already adapting it to be 
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not comprehensive. The teams wouldn't come so they'd say, ‘well okay, 
we don't have to spend 70 days doing it, we can just have a one-day 
workshop and do it. We don't actually have to have a team; we can just 
have a group of people who are going to email each other’. Already the 
erosion of the methodology started very early in the implementation of 
root cause analysis work in X state. I think increasingly clinicians had 
become cynical about the robustness of the findings. [CEO1] 
This response reflects the findings of previous research that suggests that clinicians find 
incident analysis to be burdensome and time consuming (Braithwaite et al., 2006). Consistent with 
SIT, the derogation of health professionals by CEO1 in terms of their casual approach to analysis 
positions them as outgroup members and stereotypes them as not committed to patient safety 
initiatives. The promotion of aviation as conscientious in its approach to incident analysis suggests 
that this is a trait the CEO associates with effective patient safety initiatives. 
 
6.4.3.2 Clinical governance 
 
In Australian healthcare, the CGC oversees patient safety issues by monitoring 
patterns of error occurrence and mandating actions to reduce error. The CGC is responsible 
for reporting on patient safety issues to the hospital CEO, who reports to the hospital 
board. The effectiveness of the clinical governance process was raised as a concern by both 
CEOs and four PSEs. CEO2 gave an example of hospitals not picking up on error trends, 
which is a function of the CGC: 
Nobody had picked up until a year later that there was a bit of a trend of 
these hospitals having too many of these sorts of incidents [perinatal 
deaths]. . [CEO2] 
PSE1, who had served on a CGC, said that ineffective clinical governance impacts clinician 
engagement in analysis, explaining that they felt disempowered by hospital boards' lack of action on 
their recommendations: 
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Maybe the clinical review committee should have been the most powerful 
body in patient safety because they are the people that should be most aware 
of what is happening at the patient care level and those recommendations 
should have been what’s driving the agenda. So, ..., recommendations would 
go to the board and everything would get lost. …. So, ... a lot of time and 
effort was spent, and a lot of people were interviewed, nothing changed. ... 
So, what I would say at these meetings is ‘So we’ve now had presented the 
RCA, what changes are we going to make so that doesn’t happen tomorrow? 
So, what we can confidently say that this won’t happen next week?’ And most 
times you couldn’t say that … because there was little buy in. [PSE1] 
 
PSE1’s view was shared by both CEOs and two PSEs, who thought that clinical 
 
governance committees are disempowered within organisations to act upon analysis findings and 
hospital boards reluctant to enact change to enhance safety outcomes. This suggests participants 
viewed the hospital board as outgroup in terms of how they respond to patient safety 
recommendations. From a CAT perspective, hospital boards’ failure to respond to CGC 
recommendations communicates a power imbalance and can be defined as a non-accommodative 
interpersonal control strategy, heightening intergroup divides between the board and the 
organisation. 
These data also revealed that the power imbalance between the CGC and high-status 
members was considered a barrier to analysis effectiveness. PSE3 speaks of a high-status clinician 
who received no consequences for medical error (the PSE implied malpractice) because his status 
was perceived as equal to the clinical leader in the hospital: 
PSE3: …the clinical governance at the hospital where he worked had 
noticed that behaviour and had been too wary or too shy, or the hierarchy 
was not able to cope with telling him to pull his headin, basically .. Because 
there's a hierarchy amongst them, and he was probably on equal footing in 
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that hierarchy to the clinical leader in the hospital, and so there was 
nothing that could be done. Too afraid or something. [PSE3] 
Whilst this is an example of how status is meaningful for organisations when addressing 
threats to safety posed by high-status clinicians, this can be interpreted as an example of non- 
accommodative interpersonal control: the high-status clinician uses his status to assign hospital 
management to a less powerful role. 
6.4.3.3. Board and Management 
 
Only the CEOs commented on how hospital board decisions impact the analysis process. 
CEO1 and CEO2 acknowledged that incident analysis solutions compete with cost concerns and 
this is a barrier to the risk management performance of the hospital. Consequently, analysis 
recommendations and measures to address error were often more congruent with managerial goals 
than patient safety goals, and this impacted clinician’s exposure to error inducing conditions as in 
CEO1’s comment: 
I think it's that there's this tension between managing the service and 
coming in under all the KPIs and the performance targets … On that side of 
the equation their day-to-day job is about making decisions that affect the 
conditions within which we put our frontline clinical staff. [CEO1] 
CEO1 explains that in taking a persons' rather than a systems approach to error 
investigation, management and boards are effectively protecting themselves from not examining 
their own role in error, in not addressing the system vulnerabilities that they did not address in the 
first place due to cost concerns. This quote suggests incident analysis elicits a conflict of interest for 
management which can result in non-accountability: 
When an incident happens and the people who are commissioning the 
investigation actually are part of the incident… It's almost like ... there's an 
inherent bias in the power structure that pushes it down to we'll keep the 
focus on the people because we're the commissioners now of this 
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investigation … I had this conversation with that board. They said, well we 
want to know who's accountable. I said, well how far up do you want me to 
go, because at some point when you acknowledge and reward people for 
being too far on the side of the KPIs and the performance and the funding 
side of the equation and that that focus over there has negatively impacted on 
the kinds of putting in place the conditions that stop errors from happening 
then I'll include you will I? There's kind of like a bit of a shocked look at me 
about that because … I think that's part of the problem of why. Then when 
you've finished the investigation you give the report back to these same 
people. [CEO1] 
From a SIT perspective, by highlighting the board’s tendency to veer towards assigning 
blame for error to individuals to divert attention from organisational accountability, the CEO 
positions hospital boards as outgroup in terms of their commitment to patient safety. While the 
board members’ invocation of blame transgresses the norms of a ‘just culture’, the tendency to 
blame individuals suggest analysis findings present a threat to board group identity. It could be 
argued that boards invoke their status to not address analysis findings to reduce threat to their 
identity. 
6.4.3.4 Hierarchy 
 
Hierarchy was mentioned as a challenge to analysis effectiveness by the majority of 
participants (6 PSEs and both CEOs). PSE1 described how hierarchical tensions and conflict 
between group agendas thwart action to address error occurrence: 
Well the major case was where the hospital I was at couldn’t provide the 
care. There was this whole lack of support and what was frustrating was that 
after two or three process, … really nothing changed. So on the one hand 
people were saying ‘this is terrible, we need to do better as an organisation 
and have more engagement by the partners and the clinicians in this space’ 
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but individual directors of the departments involved said it was a staffing 
issue and we can’t provide better care, and that’s it … Hospitals are full of 
power blocks and they are informed by their agendas, so the units are saying 
‘we can’t provide that, we are under-resourced and we can’t attract staff to 
the area’ so they knew they had that out. That meant that management never 
had to sack people and discipline was not done formally. [PSE1] 
From a SIT perspective this comment highlights how power assigned to groups changes the 
way they evaluate measures to improve patient safety and suggests that analysis outcomes elicit 
defensive behaviours in units, heightening a sense of identity threat. This results in displays of 
“power over” (N &Bradac,1993) and because this type of power does not accommodate the views 
of those invested in improving patient safety, it can also be defined as non-accommodative, 
heightening intergroup divides between groups invested in patient safety and those invested in 
protecting group identities. 
Hierarchy was considered a barrier to analysis effectiveness by CEO2, who speaks of status 
protecting clinicians from consequence: This reflects the previous example of the senior consultant 
who was equal in status to the clinical leader (see 6.4.3.2). 
You’ve got a culture of people respecting the more senior people and not 
wanting to whistle blow or make complaints about them because they’re 
well respected in the community and they just have this perfectionist thing, 
he’s a fabulous well regarded, revered person, he or she, and its beyond 
question that this sort of thing is going on … that review went on in private. 
[CEO2] 
Both comments demonstrate how intergroup factors influence the analysis process in terms 
of the need to preserve interpersonal relationships and manage hierarchical tensions. The findings 
also purport to the hijacking of analysis findings by political power blocks and imply that 
intergroup conflicts, together with a need to protect group identity, group culture and group power 
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bases destabilise the formation of a nascent safety culture in the wake of medical error. 
 
6.4.3.5 Lack of expertise 
Six participants (4 PSEs and both CEOs) perceived that hospitals do not prioritise the role of 
those involved in incident analysis. Interestingly, all had held senior roles in hospitals. To support 
their view, they spoke of 1) staff with inadequate training or expertise conducting the process; 2) 
incident analysis being used as a domain to keep poorly performing clinicians away from patients; 
3) too few patient safety officers to run the process; and 4) inadequate resources, factors which 
suggested. hospitals lacked committed to the process and resulted in poor outcomes as exemplified 
in the comment from CEO1: 
There's not the resources either. There's not enough patient safety managers 
out there to be doing this. If you look at how long it takes to undertake one of 
these investigations and compare to other safety critical industries, we're 
seriously underpowered if this is something that we committed to and that we 
all believe is really important. All you've got is one poor patient safety 
manager who used to be a clinical nurse, who might have a bit of quality 
training trying to run this whole process. [CEO1] 
In the following comment, PSE2 and 3 speak of a trend to appoint staff unfit for patient care 
to analysis teams and clinical governance team, due to organisations not seeing the value in patient 
safety: 
PSE 3: The people we place in those positions tended to be people who 
were useless in any other role, or not good in any other role, and that's 
still the problem. 
PSE2: There's an element of thinking, well there was when it first 
started, of thinking the whole quality agenda was some kind of hippy-shit 
nonsense. 
PSE3: ... There wasn't much coming out of it, it was just sort of a process. I 
met with two hospitals that have recently been assessed for safety and 
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quality. Both of them had placed their quality officer, in both places, had 
been placed there because they were incapable of carrying out any other 
role, 
PSE1 spoke of hospitals placing traumatised clinicians on analysis teams to keep them away from 
patients: 
Often the people who get put on those things are those that aren't … So, 
we'll take you off clinical duties and you can do a root cause analysis, 
because you are looking a bit stressed. So, I don't want you to do clinics 
next week, what I want you to do is to go to Hospital X and… [PSE1] 
Participants’ appraisal of patient safety personnel as not having the capacity to function as 
clinicians positions them as outgroup members from the clinical group. The invocation of a 
downward derogation around hospitals’ placing vulnerable clinicians in these roles suggests that 
hospitals do not value the role of analysis team member and see the role as having little power. 
Given that a critical component of the incident analysis approach is that patient safety staff sit 
outside of the medical hierarchy to have the autonomy to address clinicians’ role in medical error, 
this invocation of “outgroup” status undermines this assumption. 
6.4.3.6 Professional identity 
 
Professional identity and status level were perceived by five members to bias the types of 
errors reported and analysed. PSE4 said professional groups tended to report those errors that 
related to their own professional practice, and this influenced the type of errors that entered the 
analysis process: 
The first thing is, reporting is voluntary, okay? ... So, depending on whichcraft 
 
group you're talking about, the craft group will report different types of 
incidents. For example, nurses tend to report incidents that are more likely to 
do with behaviour of other people or perceived slights. Allied health people 
will report different types of incidents. Doctors rarely report, and when they 
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report it's more likely to be the horrible tail-end of a high-level incident. So, 
therefore what goes into the incident-monitoring system is a sample of what's 
really going on. [PSE4] 
CEO2 supported this view, commenting that it was mainly lower status staff who reported 
errors rather than doctors: 
I think it’s more that because of their seniority, they [doctors] see those 
sorts of things as more administrative which support staff would do as 
opposed to them 
… they are less willing to see as their responsibility to do it. [CEO2] 
 
These comments illustrate the intergroup nature of engagement in error management 
processes and suggest that both status and professional identity determine what is reported and 
therefore analysed. PSE7 perceived that doctors, whilst interested in patient safety, saw the analysis 
of adverse events as a hospital issue and not part of their role: 
PSE7: “The doctors ... don't really see an adverse event as their problem. …a 
cardiologist, so I said, "Are you telling me that you don't ... You're not 
interested if the patient has a fall and fractures their femur, gets a hospital- 
acquired infection, ... you're not interested in any of that?" He said, "No, I  
am interested, but it's not my problem, it's the hospital's problem. [PSE7] 
The siloed model of clinical training instils in doctors the need to establish boundaries 
around their scope of practice. From a SIT perspective, this comment suggests that clinicians do not 
see the analysis of errors as part of their role and as a result, limit their engagement in actively 
supporting patient safety initiatives. 
This is concordant with a diffusion of responsibility whereby doctors assume others will 
take responsibility for safety actions. It could be argued that clinicians may view the people that do 
error analysis as outgroup. 
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6.4.3.7 Limited understanding of error management processes 
 
Both CEOs and PSE4 and PSE5 gave examples of clinicians being unclear around 
responsibility for error reporting , resulting in errors not being reported, as exemplified in the 
following comment from CEO2: 
I know of some examples where there is a high-profile incident, like 
everybody in the hospital's been talking about it, … and then nobody 
remembers to put in the incident management system... You get from the 
trivial ones that don't get in the system to really serious high-profile ones 
that for whatever reason get overlooked. [CEO2] 
From a SIT perspective, this suggests that clinicians do not see error reporting as an integral 
part of their role, which has implications for their willingness to engage in incident analysis 
processes. 
6.4.3.8 Inadequate Understanding of Human Factors Methods 
 
A common view held by the participants who had run hospitals (CEO1) and CEO2) or had 
worked on clinical governance committees (PSE1) was that organisations do not understand a 
systems approach to analysis. This results in a focus on assigning blame to individuals for error, 
which reduces learning on how to address error occurrence as in the following comment from a 
CEO: 
There's a reactive initial response when a serious incident happens and then 
 
after that there's a sort of structured response to understanding what 
happened, but our initial reactive response is still looking for who did this. 
Who's the person responsible for this? If that shapes everyone's perceptions 
of how we understand risk in health and how we seek to put controls in place 
to make sure that those errors cannot occur, we still think that serious 
incidents happen because people make errors. We don't really seek to 
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understand why people make errors and the processes have been very 
inadequate in giving us direction how to correctively engineer out the kind 
of systems and processes that contribute to error vulnerability within 
healthcare. [CEO1] 
Given HEAPS teams include clinicians involved in the error, it could be argued that by 
taking a person approach to error causation, clinicians approach analysis fearful of negative 
consequences and any resulting threat to their professional reputation. CEO1 speaks of how a 
hospital culture which ignores a systems approach to error investigation perpetuates clinicians’ 
beliefs that there would be negative repercussions: 
: I don't think they trusted that their involvement in this process wouldn't 
have negative consequences ...but I think it's a prevailing myth that 
compromises peoples' level of engagement in the process and their 
willingness to speak honestly about where the system failures occur. I think 
they're also not necessarily aware of what those system, what the 
contributing factors are. … I think the issues of safety and trust come from 
a predominant reliance still on a person-centred safety model which looks 
to apportion blame…blame is still the predominant responsive model to a 
significant clinical incident. [CEO1] 
 
Concordant with SIT, this perception of threat may heighten the salience of professional 
identity for clinicians, which reduces the salience of superordinate analysis team identity. 
6.4.3.9 Inadequate learning from error analysis 
 
For learning to occur from incident analysis, outcomes need to be shared with error 
stakeholders and reporters. There was a widely held view among all 
participants that current error management processes have failed to incorporate a focus on learning 
from error, as stated by PSE3: 
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I think we've got covered the incident, noticing the incident, the analysis of it 
and the singular solution, or we're dealing with it for each incident, but I 
don't think we've got covered this bit where somebody puts it all together 
and says, ‘Look, hang on, we've got these things. What's wrong with our 
systems? ...’ That feedback back to the hospital, and the conditions. [PSE3] 
PSE8 implied that there was insufficient focus on linking recommendations to measure to 
enhance patient safety: 
It's not a proper system. To be honest, I think we've got a culture that's been very 
 
focused on safety, which is get the reporting, close out the incident, and 
very little about them linking it up into quality improvement and targeted 
actions. [PSE8] 
PSE4 and PSE5 referred to this as there being no ‘closing of the loop’. They gave examples 
of clinicians not receiving feedback on errors and the learning being inhibited: 
PSE5: But in terms of the RCA, that's a separate group of people who've 
gone off and done that. That's not people who—Where the incident 
happened. So, some other group of external people, or internal and external 
people, go off and do that. They wrote a report that goes to chief executive 
who signs it off, it goes into the department. It goes in a whole bunch of 
directions. Doesn't necessarily come back here. 
PSE4: Doesn't go to the front line. 
 
PSE5: And it doesn't go to any of the other similar departments, or any of 
the other people that that same problem could affect. .... We haven't closed 
a loop [PSE4, PSE5] 
 
These comments point towards an intergroup divide between clinicians involved in the error 
and clinical groups who benefit from error feedback and organisational management. These 
findings support research which shows that clinicians become disenchanted with analysis processes 
because of poor feedback loops (Evans et al., 2006). From a CAT perspective, these findings 
87  
demonstrate how a failure to give feedback is a non-accommodative strategy because it heightens 
intergroup divides around possession of error knowledge and reduces a superordinate identity of 
management and clinicians of working together to improve patient safety. 
6.4.3.10 Privacy 
Four participants perceived that privacy issues created a barrier to sharing the learnings from 
error and they defined this as due to concerns about: 1) patient confidentiality; 2) protecting 
clinician reputation and 3) clinical privilege. This comment from PSE4 demonstrates that learning 
from error is impacted by cultural factors around protecting the patient’s confidentiality and other 
privacy issues: 
(Findings are) Lost in the system … An incident might happen in one 
hospital within an area, … and the learnings from that aren't even 
disseminated within that hospital, let alone anywhere else … A whole heap 
of privacy issues. A whole heap of patient confidentiality issues [PSE4] 
CEO2 referred to a situation where she conducted an enquiry into a high-status surgeon’s 
role in medical error in private, to protect his reputation: 
That review went on in private, no one else in the hospital knew it was 
happening, because these people came to me confidentially, and we didn't 
know what the findings were going to be, so we didn't want to disparage the 
surgeon obviously. [CEO2] 
From a SIT perspective, dealing with high status clinicians privately demonstrates how 
status heightens intergroup divides in terms of the consequence of involvement in medical error, 
conveying to health professionals that this is not a “just” culture. 
PSE3 and PSE 2 commented organisations limit their feedback to those clinicians involved 
in the error to mitigate the potential for them to feel defensive about blame: 
There's a whole bunch of stuff that confounds that, one of which is clinical 
privilege,... There's this thing that if you do anything to anyone afterwards, 
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the whole point of clinical improvement will be annihilated ..... there's no 
 
consolidation. You don't have to blame anyone or anything, but you do have 
to give them back information. I think it's clouded by that no-blame thing. 
[PSE3] 
These comments demonstrate how organisations stereotype clinicians as having a defensive 
response to error learning that is informed by an assumption that they are more invested in 
protecting their professional reputations than engaging in learning and clinical improvement, 
illustrating the negative influence of intergroup stereotypes in analysis. 
6.4.4 Theme 3: Barriers Within the Analysis Methodology 
 
Participants who had worked in hospitals (n = 9) commented on the limitations of the 
incident analysis methodology. 
6.4.4.1 Unsuited to the complexity of healthcare delivery 
 
PSE1 and CEO1 viewed analysis methodology as limited because of its focus on 
determining a root cause, which diverted analysis teams’ attention away from the role of latent 
factors, as exemplified by CEO1: 
I think that's where things like these kinds of process like root cause analysis, 
I mean there generally is no single root cause and so we send people off on a 
task that's probably not achievable. Instead of asking them to think about 
what are the underlying factors that in the systems and processes [CEO1] 
PSE1, PSE2 and PSE3 explained that the aviation model of analysis was not designed to 
capture the complexity of the medical model of delivery of patient care, in terms of the 
unpredictability of patient condition and the idiosyncratic nature of clinical practice, as depicted in 
the following exchange between PSE2 and PSE3: 
PSE 2: I think the thing they always complain about the aviation example, 
for one, is that health is a lot more complex…because every patient is 
different … 
89  
PSE3: The external barriers to going wrong are much clearer … and able to 
be enforced. 
PSE2: I think you can do it by checklist... you can't do that in health, 
because if the three of us had exactly the same disease, we would react 
differently to it. …. Not only is it the custom and practise and education and 
qualifications and experience, but there is personality of the clinician. 
PSE1 commented on how the multi-disciplined nature of healthcare delivery blurred the 
determination of error cause: 
You almost lose the wood for the trees. Because there is so much going on 
that everybody involved in a patient’s care in a hospital encounter, because 
there are so many people and care is cut into slices, all of them are important 
and all of them have an impact. [PSE1] 
Concerns expressed by participants point towards how the intergroup and interpersonal 
nature of healthcare delivery results in an idiosyncratic error trajectory that is hard to categorise 
according to the more linear nature of error trajectory found in aviation. 
6.4.4.2 Types of events analysed 
 
There was widespread concern amongst participants (6 PSEs and both CEOs) that because 
only SAC1 and SAC2 errors were analysed, the potential learning from SAC3 and SAC4 errors was 
lost: 
‘ What goes into the incident-monitoring system is a sample of what's 
really going on. The SAC 1s and 2s are looked at, but the SACs 3 and 
4 sit and effectively go nowhere’ [PSE4]. 
6.4.4.3 Analysis team composition 
 
The composition of the analysis team was mentioned by CEO1 and PSE1 as a barrier to 
analysis effectiveness. They stated that both analysis teams and the 
commissioning teams that receive the error reports were often so entrenched in their respective 
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professional cultures that they were blind to the system vulnerabilities that lay within organisational 
processes. CEO1 states that by populating analysis teams and commissioning teams with clinicians 
involved in the error, objectivity and insight into error factors are reduced because of normalisation 
of practice: 
There's no separation of the people investigating, and the people being 
investigated. … That was one of the fundamental rules is that people who are 
actually involved in the incident shouldn't be involved in the investigation of 
the incident. Not because we thought that they couldn't have insights but 
because they might not see the … … The prevailing conditions have become 
so normalised that they don't even see them. That separation might exist 
sometimes in the constitution of an investigation team, but it never exists for 
the commissioning or the receiving, the report receiving parts of the system. 
[CEO1] 
PSE1 thought that analysis teams required a level of objectivity to remove local bias and 
blindness and suggested that including team members from other hospitals was a way to achieve 
this: 
I think cross-fertilisation, you know coming from one hospital, it is not a 
bad way. You have the advantage of not knowing the politics, not 
knowing the outliers, not knowing the buy in. PSE1 
These comments suggest that intergroup diversity on analysis teams enhances the process 
because it allows a fresh perspective on group norms. SIT suggests that group members’ self- 
esteem is associated with the perceptions and the experiences of the group. Thus, for those involved 
in error, the capacity to determine how group action has contributed to harming a patient may be 
perceived as a threat to self-esteem. SIT posits that group members will then act to alleviate this 
threat to self-esteem by engaging in strategies to either bolster the group identity through ingroup 
favouritism, (by supporting group members involved in error) or through outgroup derogation (by 
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dismissing the findings of the analysis that damage group reputation) (Crocker, 2011; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). 
6.4.4.4 Emotion 
 
CEO1 and PSE1 commented that the prevailing analysis methodology failed to 
accommodate the emotional state of clinicians. CEO1 explained that the data collected on an 
adverse event is informed by a level of defensiveness and expressed concern that this data was used 
to inform the analysis meeting and final report: 
Because most of these processes start off with the documentation and a 
timeline, which is the immediate incident response, so the first response is to 
get people to report what happened. That happens within a very emotive time 
when everyone is just horrified at what's happened and scared about their 
own involvement in it…. They're in their own minds trying to justify their 
behaviours, but that gets taken as fact, because there's not actually any 
analysis, because there's not any interrogation of that and the separation of 
the retrospective feelings that from the what happened and moving beyond 
what happened to really be looking clearly at why it happened. Then some of 
these things don't get examined. They just get put forward into the end, the 
final report. [CEO1] 
In the following comment, CEO1 explains how clinicians’ emotional state results in 
defensive behaviours which reduces their capacity to engage effectively in the analysis: 
‘The guilt that's associated with this terrible incident's [sic]occurred, it's on 
my watch, really then starts to develop an emotional defensiveness about the 
whole thing which closes the ability to look at it’ [CEO1]. 
From a CAT perspective, these comments suggest that clinicians view stages of the analysis 
process as threatening to their professional identity and highlighting intergroup divides between 
themselves and the patient safety staff, making the analysis process non-accommodating. 
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6.4.5 Theme 4: Potential Areas for Improvement 
 
These data show that while participants viewed the prevailing analysis methodology as 
problematic, they still viewed analysis as an important tool to understand error causation factors and 
improving patient safety. 
6.4.5.1 Safety training 
 
From a holistic perspective, half the participants spoke of the benefits that had emerged 
from the implementation of error analysis systems, citing a heightened awareness of patient safety 
issues for clinicians, organisations and educators. For one PSE, the understanding that incident 
analysis was not producing reductions in error was the catalyst to adopt a proactive approach of 
training registrars about the importance of their role in ensuring patient safety awareness: 
Yes, it’s quite nice teaching at their level because you have less cynicism... 
The stuff we are doing around decision making and how it affects clinical 
outcomes … The Holy Grail is to try and show how patient outcomes arise. 
[PSE1] 
6.4.5.2 Strengths based approach 
 
Two participants, both from a State health service that had implemented a process of 
aggregate data analysis, making this more of a deviant observation, advocated for a strengths-based 
approach to error management focused on what was done well rather than what went wrong, as in 
this comment from PSE8: 
There are a lot of people who think that we have learned what we will learn 
from focusing on negatives, and that we now need to start actually focusing 
on what works well. Why are some people really good, and how do we 
actually get other people to that level rather than focusing on what's not 
worked? [PSE8] 
6.4.5.3 Aggregation of data to determine error patterns 
 
A CEO and PSE commented that the fact that incident analysis processes occurred 
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retrospectively meant that clinicians perceived them to be about finding someone to blame. This 
echoes participants' concerns about a lack of aggregate data across hospitals and jurisdictions due to 
the current policy of localising error management practices (see 6.4.2.2): 
I think its focus appears to me to have become wrong. … Take a maternal death 
 
… It's a high-risk area, we know that we still have a number of maternal 
death cases that probably shouldn't happen. Yet instead of proactively 
doing a systems’ review on the processes that are involved in that system of 
care we go backwards from an incident…. Going back from an incident 
suggests that what we're interested in is the ‘what happened’ and ‘who did 
it’. [CEO1] 
PSE8 spoke of using reporting data to identify trends in system vulnerabilities to reduce fear 
of blame and focus on learning from error: 
We've flipped the system to be reflective of the most serious events from a 
learning perspective, and it's completely changed. … They’re very 
resistant to begin with, but now they're very proud about sharing their 
results. [PSE8] 
PSE advocated for a data collection tool, such as a clinical safety audit tool, that collates 
incidents according to type so that professions can convene to identify system vulnerabilities 
We've standardised some of our reporting so that its really easy to monitor 
trends outside of the system, and we've grouped them against the standard … 
And that's where we really were able to see patterns … so it pulls you 
through in exploring what's the data telling you. It helps us continue to refine 
our classification and working with clinical groups around what's 
meaningful, what's national, what are the right things to be triggering… 
[PSE8] 
Concordant with SIT, the focus on individual cases inherent in current analysis 
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methodologies presents a threat to professional identity that is not found in aggregate error reviews. 
From a CAT perspective, these data suggest that clinicians perceive aggregate error reviews to be 
more accommodative in nature, thereby reducing intergroup threat and building a new safety 
identity around working together to reduce errors. 
6.5 Discussion 
 
This research shows how SIT and CAT provide a framework for interpreting the role 
intergroup factors play in analysis effectiveness. While participants acknowledged incident analysis 
as a critical tool to understand the role of systems factors in error causation, their responses suggest 
critical aspects of the analysis process remain inadequate. The findings suggest ways the incident 
analysis process can be improved that can be addressed by both healthcare organisations and 
regulators. 
 
6.5.1 Accreditation of Healthcare Organisations 
 
At a federal level, current accreditation requirements mandate only that hospitals conduct 
analysis processes but there is no requirement to ensure the quality of the process nor the sharing of 
learnings. This responsibility is deferred to localised health services. However, these data suggest 
that this form of self-regulation is ineffective, with hierarchies, cost concerns and organisational 
agendas impeding analysis effectiveness. In particular around which measures are addressed to 
ameliorate patient safety outcomes. Moreover, because there is no requirement to share learnings 
from error either between hospitals, health jurisdictions or even within hospital departments, there 
is a level of inequity around who has the benefit of knowledge to understand system vulnerabilities 
to prevent future error. 
Thus, these findings point towards the importance of using accreditation processes as a 
mechanism of change to ensure uniformity of analysis quality, implementation of recommendations 
and sharing of learnings at an organisational and jurisdictional level. Even though the Australian 
federal government has created a financial incentive for healthcare organisations to improve patient 
safety outcomes (Macquarie Centre for Health Economy, 2017) in terms of linking linked health 
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budgets to patient safety measures, these incentives do not specify that measures to ensure analysis 
quality or the sharing of learnings be implemented. Therefore, it is recommended that accreditation 
processes be extended to include these measures so that accreditation processes could work in 
tandem with budgetary incentives to improve patient safety outcomes. 
6.5.2 Governance of Incident Analysis 
 
The findings suggest that the capacity of Clinical Governance Committees (CGC) to address 
analysis recommendations to enact changes to ameliorate patient safety is undermined by 
organisational agendas around cost and protecting high status clinicians. As a consequence, 
participants doubted the power of the CGC to improve patient safety and subsequently viewed the 
organisation as ambiguous in its commitment to improving patient safety. From an intergroup 
perspective, these findings demonstrate that a lack of organisational support for the very body that 
is meant to enhance patient safety outcomes, actually heightens intergroup divides between 
clinicians and management. This has the potential to undermine health professionals’ faith in the 
analysis process and it could be argued the establishment of a meaningful safety culture. In order to 
mitigate this, it is recommended organisations endorse CGC’s authority to act as a consequence of 
incident analysis findings. 
6.5.3 Organisational Culture – a Systems Approach to Error Analysis 
 
Although organisations have adopted a human-factors approach to incident analysis, these 
data suggest that healthcare professionals, management and board members have a limited 
understanding of human factors principles. This results in a person-focused approach to error 
analysis, which was seen to reinforce a fear that analysis is about finding someone to blame for an 
error. These data showed that this is significant in a healthcare model where patient care is 
delivered by a multi-disciplinary team as it results in analysis stopping at one person rather than a 
consideration of a shared responsibility for error. 
From a SIT perspective, the focus on persons in error causation is perceived as a threat to 
professional identity, resulting in clinicians feeling unsafe to participate in analysis processes and 
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reducing their faith that the latent factors that cause errors will be addressed. However, this 
perception of threat can be reduced through the promotion and support of a systems approach to 
error analysis using a human-factors approach. These findings suggest that health professionals, 
management and board members need to be included in training initiatives so that safety is 
considered as the obligation of all and not determined by status level or profession. Given that 
diffusion of responsibility for error has been found to result in disengagement with helping 
behaviours (Ciccarelli & White, 2009), a focus on shared responsibility for engagement in a 
systems approach to error will assist in the building of a superordinate safety identity for hospital 
staff and board members. 
6.5.4 Hierarchy and Professional Identity 
 
An important finding from these data is the understanding that professional identity is 
pertinent in analysis processes. For instance, it was found that some doctors do not think it is part of 
their professional role to engage in error reporting or analysis processes and when they do, they 
want to protect their knowledge and expertise to maintain their status level and professional 
identity. This is reflective of Turner’s (1995) findings that doctors limit access to knowledge and 
expertise to maintain their dominance in the medical hierarchy. This results in analysis teams’ 
gaining a limited understanding of error causation and mitigation. One way to combat this is to 
factor in an understanding of clinicians' need to protect their status level and professional identity 
into how the analysis process is communicated to participants. This could take the form of 
emphasising the enhancement to professional identity through participating in the safety culture, 
and more emphasis on the responsibility of higher status clinicians to model patient safety 
behaviours. 
6.5.5 Learning from Incident Analysis 
 
Participants emphasised the importance of feedback loops to encourage health professionals’ 
engagement in error analysis. This finding reflects previous research that highlights the necessity of 
timely and adequate feedback to reporters and analysis participants to increase their engagement in 
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patient safety (Braithwaite et al., 2006; Taitz et al., 2010). CAT provides a lens to demonstrate how 
the lack of feedback or visible action is non-accommodative in nature and results in a dissembling 
of a safety identity for clinicians. 
Therefore, it is advisable that organisations establish systems to enable timely feedback to 
incident reporters, analysis team members and relevant staff so that they are aware of what action 
has taken place as a result of their involvement in the error process, thus reinforcing their group 
identity as patient safety advocates. 
However, these data also showed that concerns around privacy and legal implications have 
the potential to limit organisational feedback. This is informed by a need to protect clinical and 
organisational reputations. Because incident analysis is performed on a case by case basis, this has 
the potential to increase defensiveness. These data revealed a means of reducing this barrier to 
feedback and learning dissemination: namely to implement technologies to determine error patterns 
from the reporting data by collating errors into categories based on type and impact. By analysing 
aggregate data, threat to group reputation is lowered and an opportunity emerges to engage 
clinicians to investigate error trends in their specialty. 
Error management systems can link the insights and corrective action taken to address issues 
highlighted in aggregate data to a system of ongoing monitoring and evaluation, so that users can 
measure the appropriateness of the action and make adaptations if required. Whilst monitoring of 
error trends is necessary at a local and more nuanced level, it is also important that, similar to the 
aviation model, monitoring occurs at a federal level so that learnings can be disseminated across the 
industry in the form of a knowledge repository (see 6.5.6). This level of ongoing feedback provides 
clinicians with confirmation that their input into analysis is being used to facilitate system 
improvement and is not looking for someone to blame. This would convey an impression that 
organisations are invested in protecting clinicians from being the ‘second victims’ of medical error, 
a perception that has been well documented in the literature (Seys et al., 2013; Wu & Steckelberg, 
2012). 
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6.5.6 A Knowledge Repository 
 
One of the main problems associated with a failure to learn from medical error that emerged 
from this research is that there is no effective infrastructure to capture the learnings in a centralised 
knowledge base that can be used as a platform for ongoing structural improvement to patient care. 
This would provide a core repository of knowledge from error analysis that could be utilised as a 
library of precedent knowledge of how error occurred, how errors were addressed and where 
implementations were successful. It is critical to translate both a nuanced level of local knowledge 
and learnings that have a broader application into a knowledge base that is continuously updated, 
easily accessible for users and sustained by the cultural framework instilled by the organisation’s 
leadership around safety. Currently there is no incentive or mechanism for healthcare professionals 
and organisations to share the knowledge that they gain through their experience of medical error, 
which only reinforces the socio historic conditioning of clinicians’ reluctance to share knowledge 
outside of their professional silos (Turner, 1995). By not having a central knowledge repository, not 
only is valuable error knowledge lost but also the opportunity to construct a new safety culture that 
unites all health professionals regardless of status or profession. 
6.5.7 The Role of Leadership in Safety 
 
What is apparent is that aviation has addressed this aspect of learning from error and built a 
just culture that facilitates pilots and aviation staff in providing and sharing their knowledge of 
lessons learned with error management systems, without hesitation and accessible by all (Bond, 
2008). This has been achieved through a focus on aviation staff understanding a human-factors 
approach to error that places the employee as a provider of knowledge, not a recipient of blame 
(Reason, 2000). What is apparent from these data is that in healthcare, the modelling of a culture 
that embraces learnings and growth from error is thwarted by a board focus on safety that is 
subservient to other key performance metrics on financial performance and capital expenditure. 
These data show that this conflict informs an organisational culture that is reactive around error 
occurrence, which creates an environment where sharing knowledge around error experience is 
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imbued with defensiveness and anxiety. 
 
This study reveals the potential power of the knowledge that sits within the key stakeholder 
groups of the hospital system but has hitherto been impeded by a lack of awareness of human 
factors and failure to elevate patient safety as a KPI. This is to some degree hindered by the 
hierarchical norms that have been embedded over time into hospital operating models. 
6.5.8 Limitations 
 
There limitations to this study deserve consideration when interpreting the results. One 
weakness is that only two CEOs were interviewed because of the difficulty in gaining access to 
participants at this level of seniority in healthcare organisations. While both CEOs led state-wide 
health services, they were not working in the Queensland context, which is where the incident 
analysis meetings were observed, and participants interviewed. Given the localisation of error 
management processes, this may limit the usefulness of the results. The perspective of Queensland 
health service leaders would have afforded a richer data source that was more specific to incident 
analysis in the Queensland public health context. 
The interviewee selection method afforded a broad inclusion of PSEs, all with different 
experience of national, regional and hospital error management systems, as either users, overseers 
or policy makers. However, no attempt was made to separate participants according to role or 
clinical experience because those PSEs who had previously practised as clinicians had ceased 
practice in some cases over 15 years previously. However, this could have provided a more nuanced 
understanding of data pertinent to their relevance in the error management continuum. 
A further weakness of this study is that there was only one person (EB) as the main 
interpreter of the data. However, informant checking was carried out with another researcher (AL) 
to seek feedback on EB's findings and conclusions. 
6.5.9 Conclusions 
 
Since the publication of the IOM’s 2000 report on the rate of medical error, there is little 
evidence to suggest that this investment has resulted in safer healthcare and research shows that the 
100  
rate of adverse events is stable (Landrigan et al., 2010; Shojania & Thomas, 2013; Wachter, 2010). 
The dialogue around patient safety in Australia has not been elevated to the same level of focus in 
the minds of the Australian public as in other high-risk industries such as mining and aviation 
context. 
These data support a call for governments and regulators to make organisations more 
accountable for error. The challenge for organisations and regulators is how to take what is 
currently in place and develop it to a more complete performance improvement system with a more 
balanced focus on learning from error and enacting those learnings in clinical practice. Thus, 
accreditation requirements need to extend to ensure the quality of the analysis process and 
mandating that appropriate actions ensue and are monitored for ongoing effectiveness. This would 
be an incentive for organisations to promote an understanding of human factors principles of the 
organisation. However given the entrenched nature of hierarchies and the psychological need to 
protect meaningful group identities, these data show that if healthcare organisations are to reap the 
rewards of their investment in incident analysis, analysis needs to move from a focus on individual 
cases to an investment in how better to address learning from aggregate data of error, thereby 
utilising clinician experience of error from a place of benefit rather than threat. 
6.6 Summary 
 
This chapter presented the results from interviews with 11 healthcare executives, paving the 
way for Study 2, which is an exploration of what the PSOs consider to be the barriers to incident 
analysis effectiveness, interpreted through an intergroup lens. 
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Chapter 7: Study 2—Unstructured Interviews with Three Patient 
Safety Officers to Explore Their Perceptions of Analysis Through an 
Intergroup Lens 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter 6, the findings from interviews with 11 senior healthcare executives were 
presented. In this chapter, I consider the conscious perceptions of those health professionals who 
work in the front line of incident analysis: namely the PSOs who run analysis meetings in 
Queensland hospitals. PSOs are the conduit between the health professionals who take part in 
HEAPS meetings and the hospital executive and Patient Safety Committees (PSCs) that ratify the 
recommendations, disseminate learnings and monitor the effectiveness of their implementation. 
Given that analysis teams are intergroup because members come from different professional groups 
and status levels, this study categorised the communication strategies PSOs said they used 
according to a CAT framework to understand whether they reduced intergroup divides. 
While the PSOs interviewed in this study did not conduct the HEAPS meetings observed in 
Study 3 they provide a wider organisational perspective of how meetings are influenced by 
intergroup factors. 
7.2 The Patient Safety Officer Role 
 
The PSO has a complex and difficult role in incident analysis: the PSO selects the team, 
coordinates the investigation activities and resources, liaises with relevant stakeholders and directs 
the analysis. Analysis teams are selected from the hospital where the error occurred but may also 
include personnel with subject matter expertise from another hospital. Before the analysis, the PSO 
assigns members roles such as the ‘so what’ person or the content expert. This is an important part 
of the process because inter-professional teams in healthcare have overlapping competencies, which 
could result in a level of uncertainty as to where the scope of one’s role begins and ends (Mariano, 
1999). Given that analysis team members are intergroup, the PSO needs to foster equality between 
team members to ensure effective collaboration and reduce the effect of members assuming 
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profession and status-specific roles. The PSO needs to create an environment where members 
identify and analyse error causes and reach mutual consensus on actions to reduce error recurrence, 
all tasks which they may not have had training for nor have experience in performing. Moreover, 
this involves team members understanding the expertise and practice of other clinicians’ roles, 
which is problematic in a siloed model of healthcare delivery (Hall, 2005; Reese & Sontag, 2001). 
Further, the PSO needs to establish a psychologically safe environment where members feel safe to 
openly disclose what they know about the error. This is important because clinicians report being 
fearful of blame in error analysis (Iedema et al., 2008) and may not understand the systems 
approach to error. Meetings take between 1 to 2 hours, and there is usually on one meeting, 
however in certain cases there may be two. After the meeting, the PSO prepares the analysis report, 
which contains recommendations to prevent error recurrence, nomination of person responsible to 
implement actions and means to monitor their effectiveness and sustainability. This is presented to 
the hospital Patient Safety Committee, who ratify the findings before the CEO signs it off. 
7.3 Aims 
 
• How do professional identity and intergroup relationships manifest in 
incident analysis? 
• How do PSOs manage intergroup relationships in the analysis process 
through accommodative and non-accommodative behaviours and 
strategies? 
7.4 Method 
 
I conducted three unstructured interviews with 3 PSOs from two hospitals in Queensland: one 
PSO from a metropolitan hospital and two PSOs from the same regional hospital. 
7.4.1 Participants 
 
Participants were recruited between March 2015 and August 2016. 
 
Demographic information is outlined in Table 7.1. PSO2 and PSO3 had experience in conducting 
RCAs and HEAPS analysis. PSO1 had only conducted HEAPS meetings: 
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• PSO1 was seconded to the role of PSO in the regional hospital (200 beds) for 
six months but had been in the role for only two months. He had conducted 
three HEAPS meetings but no RCA meetings. He had practised as a nurse 
previously. 
• PSO2 had worked for six years in the regional hospital (200 beds), 
having worked as a midwife. She had conducted RCA and HEAPS 
meetings. 
• PSO3 had worked as PSO for over 10 years at a metropolitan hospital 
(500 beds). She had previously worked as a nurse. She had conducted 
RCA and HEAPS meetings. This hospital had two PSOs on staff. 
Demographic information other than what is presented was not collected because of ethical 
concerns about participant confidentiality. Participants were given a pseudonym and categorised 
(Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1 
 
Characteristics of Participants in Study 2 
 
Characteristic Count Identifier Length of interview 
Gender (n1 = 3)    
Male 1   
Female 2   
Time in role (n1 = 3)    
<1 year 1* PSO1 20 minutes 
6 years 
>10 years 
1+ 
1^ 
PSO2 
PSO3 
69 minutes 
81 minutes 
Note: *male; ^tertiary hospital; +midwife 
 
7.4.2 Procedure 
 
Contact details for participants were provided by the clinical director of a regional 
Queensland hospital where two participants worked. I emailed participants to request an interview 
by phone or in person. The email contained the participant information and consent forms and 
explained that all data would be confidential and de-identified (see appendix 3). Of the four 
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contacted, three agreed to be interviewed in person at their place of work. I was not known to 
participants. 
7.4.3 Materials 
7.4.3.1 Unstructured interviews 
 
The literature about SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), CAT (Giles, 2016) and incident analysis 
informed the interview questions. Interviews consisted of open- ended elicited narrative and semi- 
structured interviews, focused on gaining PSOs’ conscious perceptions of how intergroup factors 
affect the incident analysis process. Interviews began with a review of the study aims and ethical 
considerations. The opening question was: ‘Can you tell me about your involvement in incident 
analysis?’ giving participants the opportunity to provide free answers and reflect on their personal 
experiences. Items from the interview script included: 
• What are your thoughts on analysis effectiveness? 
 
• Do you think this is an appropriate analysis model for healthcare? 
 
• How do you think the following factors impact? 
 
o Medical hierarchy 
o Organisational decisions and processes 
o Clinical factors 
o The role of the CGC 
o The regulatory environment 
• How do you manage team communication during meetings? 
 
7.4.4 Data Collection 
 
Participants were informed their names would be confidential, but hospital size and state would be 
revealed. Interviews lasted to the point where no new data emerged. The interviews were between 
20 and 81 minutes in duration, audio recorded on an iPhone 7 and professionally transcribed 
verbatim. 
7.4.5 Data Coding and Analysis 
 
A deductive content analysis approach was used to identify the intergroup themes according to SIT 
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and CAT that emerged from the PSOs’ responses (see section 5.5). 
 
7.4.5.1 Social identity theory coding 
 
Theory codes on professional identity, status, intergroup dynamic and intergroup conflict were 
defined before and during the data analysis. These were derived from SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1978) 
and research on how intergroup factors manifest in healthcare teams (Hewett, Watson, Gallois, 
Ward, & Leggett, 2009a and 2009b). The coding framework is shown in Table 7.2. 
7.4.5.2 Communication accommodation theory coding 
 
A CAT framework was used to categorise the communication strategies PSOs said they used based 
on Watson and Gallois’ (1999) statements and Jones et al.’s (1999) assessment tool, (Table 4.1) and 
coded according to the underlying accommodative stance. Strategies included interpersonal control, 
discourse management, emotional expression and interpretability. 
7.5 Results 
 
The data on how professional identity and intergroup dynamics influenced the analysis 
process are presented first, before the data on the communication strategies PSOs said they 
employed, these were categorised according to CAT. 
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Table 7.2 
 
Coding Rules and Definitions for Main Categories of Analysis: How Do Professional Identity and Intergroup Relationships Manifest in Incident Analysis from the 
 
Perspective of the PSOs? 
 
Category Unit of 
analysis 
Code Definition Coding rules 
C1: 
Professional 
identity 
Idea Professional 
identity of PSO 
Identity traits 
Which professional identities 
do the PSOs invoke? 
Which professional traits do 
they highlight about 
themselves during the 
process? 
Aspects of definition point to how PSOs identify themselves 
by their professional group memberships 
Identities that are salient for PSOs during stages of the 
meeting 
Define whether as PSO or as clinician (i.e., nurse or midwife) 
Define the professional traits they emphasise 
 Idea Professional 
identity of team 
members 
What do the PSOs say are the 
professional identities that 
analysis team members refer 
to during the analysis 
process? 
How do team members 
compare professional groups 
during the analysis process? 
Aspects of definition point to how participants identify 
themselves by their professional group memberships during 
the analysis meeting 
Which identity traits are highlighted during meeting? 
Aspects point towards how participants draw comparisons 
between groups that are meaningful in the analysis 
environment 
C2: 
Intergroup 
dynamic 
Idea  What do PSOs say about 
interactions between groups? 
How does intergroup 
dynamic influence 
effectiveness of process 
Aspects point to the salience of participants’ professional 
group memberships in terms of how they frame interactions 
with others and how this dynamic influences the 
effectiveness of the analysis process. If not about interaction, 
then C1; if about intergroup interaction that is conflictual, 
then C3 
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Category Unit of 
analysis 
Code Definition Coding rules 
C3: 
Intergroup 
conflict 
Idea Intergroup 
conflict 
How does previous conflict 
between groups play out in 
the analysis setting? 
Aspects point towards how either team members' or the 
PSO’s experience of conflict between professional groups 
affects the analysis process 
Aspects point towards how the status of team members or the 
PSO informs the analysis meeting or the effectiveness of the 
process 
C4: Power 
and status 
Idea  How do power and status 
influence the analysis 
process? 
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7.6 How Do Professional Identity and Intergroup Relationships Manifest in 
Incident Analysis? 
All PSOs’ responses suggested they perceived analysis as an intergroup environment. 
 
7.7 Theme 1: Professional Identity 
 
7.7.1 Overview 
 
Table 7.3 illustrates the sub themes of professional identity. 
 
Table 7.3 
 
Theme of Professional Identity and Subthemes 
 
Theme 1 Subtheme 
Professional identity • PSOs’ identity as clinicians 
• PSOs’ identity as PSOs 
• Status level 
• Analysis team members’ professional identity 
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7.7.2 Subtheme 1: Patient Safety Officers’ Professional Identity asClinicians 
 
While all PSOs expressed the salience of their identity as patient safety officers, their 
identity as clinicians was also meaningful as depicted in a comment from PSO2: 
‘I'm separate. I'm the patient safety officer. Although I'm a clinician, I 
don't do the day- to-day clinical work at the units’ [PSO2]. 
When they wanted to influence the analysis team, PSO 2 and 3 invoked their clinical identity. 
 
PSO2, speaks of referencing her midwife identity to help team members envision how the human 
factors approach worked: 
We remind them that we're looking at systems and processes. When you're 
doing a chain of events document, …you try and remind them is that you never 
finish on a person. …When you're looking at what's the actual incident, and 
then you look at the causes, you never stop…. As me, the midwife, it doesn't 
stop at me, ... What is it that led me, the midwife, to actually be at the pointy 
end of that clinical incident? [PSO2] 
PSO2 and 3 invoked their clinical experience to understand clinicians’ viewpoint on 
potential barriers to engagement, aware clinicians found analysis laborious and burdensome, as 
illustrated in this comment from PSO3: 
I find..., I’ve had to develop a way of working a way with clinicians to ensure I 
have a buy in to reviews. It’s all about communicating with clinicians … you 
have your go-to pool of clinicians. That pool expands over time and I find that 
word spreads that it is not a burdensome task for a start. [PSO3] 
PSO2 explained how her clinical knowledge helped her understand how to expedite the 
process for clinicians: 
I'm a clinician, so I can get in, do most of it, put it all together, and then I 
can send it to the team, … You can get it done a little bit quicker. [PSO2]. 
One reason healthcare appoints clinicians rather than an independent investigator as PSO is 
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that their clinical background affords them an awareness of clinical norms. Consistent with SIT, 
these data suggest that they referred to their clinical identity to increase the salience of their 
communication as ingroup members to clinicians on the analysis team and reduce intergroup 
divides between themselves and team members. From a CAT perspective this is categorised as 
accommodative interpretability to enhance clinician engagement and understanding of the process. 
However, it could also be argued that in their concern to reduce the ‘burden’ for clinicians, they 
avoid involving them in critical informational stages of the process that may ultimately hinder their 
ability to perform their role, making this a form of non- accommodative interpretability according 
to CAT, because it limits understanding of the error for members and thus heightens intergroup 
divides. 
7.7.3 Subtheme 2: Professional Identity as Patient Safety Officer 
 
The salience of the PSO identity for PSO2 and PSO3 was evident in the way they referred to 
their role, defined themselves as responsible for maintaining and promoting the safety culture of their 
hospital, and acting as liaison and advocate for patients and their families (consumers) as exemplified 
in this comment from PSO2: 
Because patient safety roles are becoming so much more diverse over the years. 
The roles have grown and grown. Now, with the new national standards, there 
is more being asked of us, and ... more work around the consumers. [PSO2] 
PSO2 and PSO3 saw their role as instilling patient safety awareness in staff, as 
 
in this comment from PSO3: 
I believe that... unless the people who touch the patients are aware of what 
causes error, what they can do to try to prevent it and minimise the harm, and 
this is all about communication … so I do a lot of training with staff who 
touch the patients and I use real scenarios … [PSO3] 
PSO2 and PSO3 identified as advocates for patients and their families and promoted a 
culture of open disclosure: 
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Sometimes people are left with a level of harm that impacts on them and their 
family for the rest of their lives, … We need to acknowledge that, and we can do 
that in open disclosure’ [PSO2], and later: ‘For me, (I’m) very comfortable in 
having conversations with consumers…. Clearly see myself as the advocate for 
patients and their families. As that open disclosure is the next step. [PSO2]. 
In this comment, PSO2 invokes an interpersonal identity to convey the salience of 
understanding the patient perspective in error. An awareness of the impact of medical error on 
patients also informed PSO3’s commitment to embedding safety awareness in clinicians. In the 
following example she invokes an interpersonal identity to enhance the salience of patient safety 
behaviours: 
The patient plummets and often dies due to the non-escalation of that 
deterioration … I give this scenario and they say, ‘I wouldn’t let that happen’. 
And I say, ‘what would you want to happen if that was your loved one in bed’, 
… And I just do it ad nauseum, because I find that this is the only thing that can 
trigger a response or action. [PSO3] 
These comments demonstrate the complexity of roles that the PSOs balance to heighten the 
salience of incident analysis to members. For instance, they invoke interpersonal references to 
“loved ones” in their communication with clinicians to support the creation of the HEAPS ingroup 
identity. These data also showed that when PSO2 and PSO3 engaged with other PSOs within their 
own safety and quality unit [PSO3] or at a regional level [PSO2], their identity as PSOs was salient. 
For instance, PSO2, who was the sole PSO in the regional hospital, spoke of the importance of 
sharing information on error methodologies with other PSOs across the region: 
We have this great network of patient safety officers, so any information, we 
can then pass amongst our colleagues and then get feedback from them. Or if 
I've got a question about something that's happened here, I can put it out there 
… I had an incident here regarding medication that's from Italy. I put it out as 
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a warning to all of the other patient safety officers because I don't know if 
they've come across it, or even if it's on their radar. [PSO2] 
Since there was only one PSO in smaller hospitals, the opportunity to share learnings and 
job strategies was limited. This comment suggests PSOs use the dissemination of learnings from 
analysis as a means of strengthening their group status and heightening the salience of their 
professional identity as PSOs, which is important as they often are the only PSO in a hospital. From 
a CAT perspective, this sharing of learnings is categorised as an accommodative interpretability 
strategy that attends to PSOs’ knowledge requirements and establishes common ground around 
pertinent topics (Giles & Coupland, 1991). 
7.7.4 Subtheme 3: Status Level 
 
When healthcare adopted the aviation method of analysis, they appointed clinicians to the 
role of PSO with the intention that this role would be outside of the traditional medical hierarchy; 
PSOs would be perceived as having legitimate authority to manage members of all status levels in 
the analysis process. These data showed PSO1 and PSO3 perceived themselves as within the 
medical hierarchy while PSO2 did not. Even though PSO1 and PSO3 had not worked as nurses for 
over three years, they referenced their status as congruent with that of a nurse’s status, positioning 
themselves as lower on the hierarchy than doctors. For instance, in the following comment, PSO1 
speaks of how he utilised higher-status doctors to compel other doctors to attend the HEAPS 
meetings, implying he was viewed as too low in status to enact this level of authority. This 
comment was made after he had arranged three HEAPS meetings but had to cancel the analysis 
because of non-attendance: 
As an ex-nurse, I don’t have the authority to insist doctors attend (HEAPS 
meetings). I elevate it up to X (Clinical Director). X as a doctor would be 
speaking doctor to doctor. If it was a nurse that hadn't turned up, I’d speak 
to the NUM [nursing unit manager]. [PSO1] 
PSO3 gave a vivid example of a senior clinician demanding another analysis. 
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This depicted the PSO’s lack of power in the organisational structure: 
 
And he [the senior clinician] just kicked up and down saying that I lied, I made 
this up, just the whole thing … and they [the PSC] all went ‘Oh yeah … that’s 
really bad’ and he said ‘I want it done again, and this is who I want on the 
review panel, I want who I want and this is the way it will go’… how do you 
feel as someone in my role when that is done to you. You feel undermined, 
unsupported, unheard, deceitful, …. And that’s a classic. [PSO3] 
This is a powerful example of non-accommodative interpersonal control where the PSC and 
the senior clinician are using communication strategies to emphasise status differences between 
themselves and the PSO, disempowering the PSO in her ability to perform her role. 
In contrast, PSO2’s comments suggested she considered herself as respected by clinicians of 
all status levels within the organisation: 
‘I have a lot of respect, and I'm not blowing my own whistle or anything like, 
but it is what it is. They respect me, so I am able to get that by. I treat them with 
respect’ [PSO2]. 
PSO2 distinguished herself in status from other PSOs, implying that gaining 
 
respect from clinicians was a challenge PSOs faced but did not always achieve. By choosing to 
draw a downward comparison with other PSOs along this socially mobile dimension, she derives a 
positive self-concept from identifying as someone that high- status clinicians respect. Given that she 
worked in a smaller hospital, she may have the opportunity to build interpersonal relationships with 
others. In accordance with SIT, this suggests that the establishment of interpersonal relationships 
between the PSO and clinicians reduces intergroup differences between PSOs and high-status 
clinicians. It could be argued that an interpersonal relationship is leverage for PSOs to gain 
clinicians’ engagement in the analysis process. 
However, PSO3 and PSO1 felt undermined by management’s lack of support for their role. 
 
PSO3 worked in a larger hospital, suggesting that opportunities to establish interpersonal 
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relationships with high-status staff may not be as accessible, maintaining status differentials. PSO1 
had recently been appointed as PSO and so may not have had the opportunity to build up 
interpersonal relationships in the same way as PSO2. 
Nonetheless PSO2 and PSO3 stated that they understood an important part of their role was 
to permeate professional and status barriers, to facilitate analysis information between the analysis 
team and management, as shown in these comments from PSO2: 
We ... are the conduit between the actual clinicians at the coal face who are 
having to action those recommendations back to Safety and Quality who take 
ownership and manage the process of getting them implemented … You have 
to have engagement and involvement of your clinicians at the coal face, at the 
ward level that are actually dealing with the patients and their families to 
actually have meaningful change. [PSO2] 
From a CAT perspective, the engagement with clinicians can be categorised as an 
accommodative interpersonal control strategy because it indicates that the PSO and clinicians are 
attending to their role relationships in the patient safety domain, rendering the interaction more 
equal. 
7.7.5 Subtheme 4: Professional Outgroup Professional Identity 
 
All PSOs referred to analysis team members by their professional group memberships 
(specialty, unit or hospital identity) suggesting that they viewed analysis through an intergroup lens. 
However, the PSOs differed as to which identities they referenced, and this was informed by 
previous intergroup interactions. PSO2 referred to clinicians as ingroup members of the hospital and 
she drew an ingroup bias in terms of their proactive approach to patient safety, as in the following 
comment about the hospital safety culture: 
We have a very strong culture of change, ...we've had a lot of change thrust 
upon us over the years, and our staff are very resilient and are able to step 
up and go, ‘Okay, move on with this new one’. [PSO2] 
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Concordant with SIT, this demonstration of ingroup favouritism suggests a need to maintain 
a positive self-identity around working for the hospital (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
In contrast, PSO1 and PSO3 were less positive about the clinicians in their hospital and 
made outgroup derogations in terms of attitudes towards patient welfare, as in this comment from 
PSO3 about a senior nurse: 
Anyway, when I walked into the first one, I was just chatting, and I said, ‘Oh 
so you obviously love your ED [Emergency Department] ’ and one of them 
who I knew was a nasty horrible nurse… and she said, ‘yeah its great working 
down there … but there’s only one problem … the patients’. 
PSO1 and PSO3 perceived that clinicians were not committed to enhancing patient safety 
outcomes by engaging in analysis processes. This was informed by previous experiences of high- 
status doctors disrupting the analysis process, either by not attending or by trying to manipulate 
findings to suit their agendas. PSO3 commented on a senior clinician: ‘He [high-status clinician] 
said “I want it done again, and this is who I want on the review panel, I want who I want, and this 
is the way it will go”’ [PSO3]. This comment illustrates the theme of clinicians using status to 
divert the analysis process as discussed in 7.7.4. 
PSO3 provided vivid examples of instances where units had shown a disregard for patient 
safety that contributed to patient harm. Consistent with SIT, by referring to patient harm being 
caused by a unit, PSO3 implied that patient harm was a trait of units rather than individuals. Here, 
PSO3 refers to dealings with clinicians from ‘ED’ saying: ‘This is how ED treat patients’ and 
describes a case where she perceived the unit culture contributed to medical error: 
Two of the patients were of non-English speaking background, but 
completely fluent in English, and one was an 18-year-old girl. Now they had 
absolute significant, potentially life or permanently disability threatening 
conditions presented to ED and they were just treated so badly … They just 
think it’s fun... [PSO3] 
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Doctors were defined as outgroup members by PSO1 and PSO3. PSO3 made outgroup 
derogations in terms of doctors’ unsafe behaviours towards patients, qualifying that these were 
perpetuated by an organisational culture of protecting high- status clinicians, indicating that she also 
saw hospital management as outgroup. This is exemplified in her comment about management 
turning a blind eye to clinicians’ lack of care for patient welfare: 
Doctors are like another group of people! … As I say there are two codes of 
conduct at X hospital, one for all and the rest of us and one for a little group 
and they can say whatever they like … Outrageous, and back to that modelling 
of behaviour, so down in ED whilst there was no leadership, people were just 
modelling off the other staff and it was tolerated. [PSO3] 
PSO1 categorised doctors as outgroup in terms of explaining their motivations in not 
attending the HEAPS meetings he had invited them to: 
‘They [doctors] are wired to answer patient needs, this [analysis] process is 
not part of what they find fulfilling,’ [PSO1]. 
The use of the third person pronoun 'they' explicitly signals outgroup status (us vs them). 
 
PSO1 and PSO3 also made outgroup derogations about nurses in terms of their willingness 
to challenge hierarchical and cultural norms when a patient deteriorates. Given their own nursing 
backgrounds, this implies they saw these traits as deviating from a valued ingroup norm of nursing 
in terms of caring for the patient, for example: 
[Nurses] who can tell that the patient is becoming more unwell and they get a 
doctor who sees them and says, ‘Oh it’s all good’, and this is a very common 
attitude that ‘the doctors say its ok so I’m ok about it’. I’m not going to go 
above them because ‘what would I know, the doctor’s ahead of me’ a multitude 
of factors, so then the patient plummets and often dies due to the non-escalation 
of that deterioration. [PSO3] 
This view was supported by PSO1 who implied that nurses lacked assertiveness to speak 
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against hierarchies in terms of asking their NUM if they could attend an incident analysis meeting. 
He stated this was because of socio-historical factors leading to senior nurses punishing junior 
nurses: 
‘It’s that thing of nurses eating their young. Treat them mean to discipline 
them. There’s not a great deal of positive feedback around here, you're 
more likely to be leapt on’ [PSO1]. 
As in the above example, the reference to nurses in the third person explicitly signals 
outgroup status. As both PSO1 and PSO3 had practised as nurses, this suggests that traits around 
challenging hierarchy and championing patient outcomes were salient for them in their identity as 
PSOs. By making downward derogations about nurses along this dimension, they defined nurses as 
outgroup in this unfavourable dimension, indicating they perceived this to be a threat to their self- 
esteem. They are working with their complex multiple professional identities, using their (prior) in 
group status as nurses as a resource for reinforcing their outgroup status as PSOs. 
7.8 Theme 2: Intergroup Dynamic 
 
The theme of intergroup dynamic had two subthemes: how intergroup relationships and 
conflict affected analysis effectiveness. PSOs’ references to the intergroup nature of the analysis 
team were mostly positive: the divergence in team members’ professional identity was considered 
to enhance the investigative process, in terms of adding a level of objectivity and stimulating new 
ways of considering error causation and devising solutions. 
Table 7.4 
 
Theme of Intergroup Dynamic and Sub Themes 
Theme 2 Subtheme 
Intergroup dynamic Intergroup relationships 
Intergroup conflict 
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7.8.1 Subtheme 1: Intergroup Relationships 
 
PSO2 and 3 discussed how members’ discipline-specific knowledge informed team 
interactions and the investigative approach, and considered this professional diversity lent 
objectivity and new perspective to the analysis process. Here, PSO2 explains how team diversity 
resulted in members questioning embedded practices: 
They've got specific roles. The ‘so what’ position on the team is somebody who 
is not their area of expertise. It might be a case where we're looking at 
something in maternity. We'll have someone come from mental health who has 
no knowledge of maternity. They look at it with these fresh eyes. They're 
saying, ‘Why are you doing it this way? ... They have no biases towards 
maternity. You need that external person looking at it. [PSO 2] 
However, PSO2, who worked in a regional hospital with a high proportion of overseas- 
trained doctors, perceived that the diversity that arose from an intercultural team was a barrier to the 
process, and referenced cultural aspects around blame and communication behaviours: 
We have a really large number of overseas medical staff and nursing staff, and 
that's very difficult because that is not the way they've been trained. A lot of 
them come still with the sense that we're going to blame this person and hang 
them out to dry … Yeah, cultural background, so we need to be aware of that. 
... You can't shut them down, but you just have to keep bringing them back and 
reminding them about… I let them go…But then we go back. ‘Okay, how 
come? Why did that happen?”. [PSO2] 
 
 
By using an accommodative communication strategy of discourse management, the PSO 
brought the ideational content of the discourse back to the topic of the investigation (Coupland et 
al., 1988). She used questions to increase members’ comprehension of the investigative process and 
facilitated the interactants’ next communicational step. 
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PSO1, who had only been in the role for two months, perceived that intergroup dynamics 
negatively affected HEAPS meetings in terms of clinicians (both doctors and nurses) preferring to 
deliver care to patients than to be involved in administration meetings. While he said this was 
because doctors experienced a greater reward from delivering patient care, he determined that 
nurses were more loyal to their NUM and this interrupted their motivation to attend organisational 
initiatives: 
 
‘Well it’s because clinicians get more immediate feedback from patients than 
they do from participating in admin meetings … and nurses have more 
allegiance to their NUM than an order from admin to attend, I get that’ 
[PSO1]. 
7.8.2 Subtheme 2: Intergroup Conflict 
 
Previous experiences of intergroup conflict between PSOs and clinicians, clinical groups 
and hospital management were a source of tension for PSO1 and PSO3. 
7.8.2.1 Intergroup conflict with management 
PSO3 perceived that hospital management did not value patient safety, stating that 
management were more motivated to keep high-status clinicians in the organisation than address 
their role in medical error. PSO3 described a situation where she felt that management actively 
undermined the analysis process to protect high-status clinicians: 
So I did the review and the recommendations were not at all about anyone’s 
performance but were about ‘here’s the vulnerabilities in your system’; a lot of 
this were mix ups where they document decisions and process issues where 
they report what goes to our Patient Safety Committee to be ratified before it 
gets sent out, they all agreed ‘yes fine’. I then sent it to the ED with attached 
memo about it, it was all systems stuff. And the clinical director of ED DID 
NOT LIKE the findings! … Management was so weak … and they all went ‘Oh 
yeah … that’s really bad. [PSO3] 
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This interaction is a non-accommodative interpersonal communication strategy because it 
emphasises the power differences between the PSO and the clinical director. It places the PSO in a 
lower-status role, emphasising situational norms about management prioritising the motivations of 
higher-status members over patient safety. PSO3 gave further examples of management white- 
washing the analysis findings to protect the hospital. In this example she implies that they were 
reluctant to examine systems factors, preferring an outcome that did not implicate the hospital: 
Often, they miss the big points. I’ll go the M and M (Morbidity and Mortality) 
 
meeting when it is a case that we are reviewing as well … it happened to be 
an ED one, tragic case ... it wasn’t just so much that anyone was bad to the 
patient or did the wrong thing, there were a multitude of factors and system 
problems. In the meeting there were just huge things that needed to be done to 
try and prevent it from happening again and they had done a great case 
review, this is what happened from woe to go and then at the end 
recommendations, so the patient died right, and the recommendations were 
that the patient should have come to the hospital earlier! [PSO3] 
These comments demonstrate that an important component of PSOs feeling empowered to 
perform their role in an embedded hierarchy is through the visible and consistent support of 
management. The findings suggest that organisations are conflicted with the need to minimise 
liability for error and protect high status staff and the need to support patient safety work. 
Organisational ambivalence demoralises PSOs: they feel it disempowers them to perform their role 
and reduces their credibility in the eyes of other hospital personnel. 
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7.9 How Do PSOs Manage Intergroup Relationships in the Analysis Process 
Using Accommodative and Non-Accommodative Behaviours and 
Strategies? 
Table 7.5 categorises PSOs’ conscious perceptions of the communication strategies they 
used according to CAT. 
Table 7.5 
 
Themes of Communication Strategies according to CAT and Subthemes 
Theme Subtheme 
Interpersonal control • Team selection 
• Team role 
• Communication of status 
Interpretability • Understand aspects of error 
• Walk around 
• Documentation 
Discourse management • Mode and tenor 
• : Approximation 
• Listening skills 
Emotional expression • Reduction of fear of blame 
• Member confidentiality 
 
CAT proposes that interactants’ social and personal identities inform their communicative 
moves (Giles, 2016). I analysed PSOs’ reported communication strategies according to CAT to 
understand whether they reduced intergroup differences in analysis teams. However, given this is 
reported data, analysis is therefore limited to descriptions of communicative strategies oriented to 
by the participants at the level of conscious awareness and these may or may not be observable in 
practice in actual meeting interactions. It was not unexpected to find that the communication 
strategies theysaid they used were accommodative and involved reassurance; provision of 
information; enabling equal participation in the meetings; and re-iterating a human-factors approach 
to error analysis. 
According to CAT, these can be categorised as interpersonal control, interpretability, 
emotional expression and discourse management, with discourse management and interpretability 
being the most commonly used. This is reflective of analysis teams often not having participated in 
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analysis processes and the fact that teams are professionally and hierarchically diverse. These 
strategies are discussed below. 
7.9.1 Theme 1: Interpersonal Control 
 
Interpersonal control refers to the assignation of roles in communication interactions and is 
concerned with how individuals use their power or status to gain a level of social or professional 
control in their communicative interactions with others (Coupland et al., 1988). These data showed 
that PSOs used accommodative interpersonal control strategies to facilitate equal status among 
members in different ways. 
7.9.1.1 Subtheme 1: Team selection 
 
PSO2 and PSO3 said they selected team members based on their willingness to engage in 
the analysis process, their attitude towards patient safety and their capacity to work collaboratively 
with others. Given that this is a team environment where intergroup differences prevail, this team 
selection method can be categorised as a type of accommodative interpersonal control to facilitate 
equality among team members. PSO3 spoke of inviting clinicians with good attitudes and PSO2 
spoke of inviting clinicians who would not dominate communication. PSO3, who had previously 
given examples of high-status members disrupting analysis processes, explains how she selected 
clinicians for the analysis team that were committed to the process: 
I’ve had to develop a way of working a way with clinicians to ensure I have a 
buy in to reviews. It’s all about communicating with clinicians. So, for a start 
you try not to pick a known psychopath to go into the review. You tend to try 
and pick a really good clinician to go into it who is clinically sound and is 
willing to think about things, you have your go-to pool of clinicians that you go 
to. That pool expands over time and I find that word spreads that it is not a 
burdensome task. [PSO2] 
This is a demonstration of how an inherent knowledge of interpersonal factors is used to facilitate 
the analysis team dynamic, knowledge that an independent investigator would not be privy to. 
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7.9.1.2 Subtheme 2: Role of team member 
 
Research suggests clinicians feel ill equipped to take up an investigative role in analysis 
teams (Iedema, Jorm, Long, Braithwaite, Travaglia, & Westbrook, 2006). Therefore, it is critical 
members understand their role in the analysis meeting and what is expected of them. PSO2 and 
PSO3 understood that status and profession impacted members’ ability to assume their roles and 
participate effectively. Analysis of their responses around this aspect revealed they used 
accommodative interpersonal control strategies to facilitate equal roles for members and increase 
the engagement of lower status members. In this comment, PSO3 explains how she does this 
through using accommodative emotional expression strategies of reassurance and appealing to their 
need to enhance their group identity around their expertise: 
Knowing that we are talking about the case and the systems, I say to them 
that we are here, and they are here, only for their clinical opinion and I stress 
that they are experts in their clinical field, and it is their clinical opinions and 
thoughts that we want. [PSO3] 
7.9.1.3 Subtheme 3: Communication of status 
 
An accommodative communication strategy used by PSOs to ensure equality and reduce 
intergroup differences was the use of ‘ground rules’. The PSOs said lower- status members’ 
uncertainty about the process resulted in a reluctance to give their input during the meeting and this 
created inequality in the team. PSO2 and PSO3 said they used ground rules to inform members of 
rules of conduct and equal status, forexample: 
The next thing I do is when we have the meeting, …I go through the 
ground rules, they are laminated, and everyone has a copy … 
and it's really very short, succinct: ... Part of it is 
 
being respectful to the rest of the team. Everybody's idea is just as 
important. The ‘so what’ person is just as important as the content expert. 
That sort of thing. [PSO2] 
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While these data show that PSO1 and PSO3 thought that high-status members and 
management perceived them as lower status, they also suggest that PSO2 and PSO3 understood that 
lower-status members and other members may perceive them as higher status in their role as PSO 
and this could be a deterrent to them giving input in the meeting. Using a CAT framework, their 
responses suggested that they employed accommodative emotional expression strategies to reduce 
team members’ fears around getting it "wrong” and interpersonal control strategies to reduce power 
differentials between themselves and members. This is concordant with Ng and Bradac's (1993) 
definition of types of power within organisations as "power to". "Power to" relates to the PSOs 
attempts to empower members to participate meaningfully in the meeting as illustrated in this 
comment from PSO3: 
I try to not be dictatorial; I don’t want them to see me as running it, but I try 
and get them to see me as a coordinator or a facilitator ... I try to very clearly 
show them, and I don’t articulate it, but I probably show it by saying that there 
is no right or wrong, you’re the expert, not me, about me not knowing. [PSO3] 
Interestingly, PSO3 did this by positioning team members as superior; thus, 
employing under-accommodative interpersonal control strategies. She spoke of deliberately 
adjusting her communication style to downplay her status to reduce intergroup status differences by 
acting as the ‘so what’ person who asks inane questions to encourage low-status members (nurses) 
to discuss challenging aspects of the error: 
I tell them in the beginning as well, I am the ‘so what’ person on the panel. And 
I am going to ask a lot of dumb questions because I have to understand it all to 
be able to put it into the written word. Sometimes I ask a question that is going 
to challenge them, and I put it into and now a ‘dumb question’. … they haven’t 
raised the ‘elephant’ that we have discussed that day, that no one has raised 
the gut points that are really the hard stuff. So Dumby goes. [PSO3] 
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7.9.2 Theme 2: Interpretability 
 
Interpretability was a prevalent communication strategy evident in these data. All PSOs 
recognised the importance of clear communication in the analysis process, in terms of providing 
written, verbal and procedural information to facilitate members’ understanding of error factors, 
cognisant members focused on their area of specific clinical expertise and had a reduced awareness 
of other areas of practice. These are detailed below. 
7.9.2.1 Subtheme 1: Understanding of aspects of error 
 
PSO2 and PSO3 employed accommodative interpretability communication strategies to 
enhance members’ understanding of the stages leading to the error and error context. They did this 
in two ways: 
7.9.2.2 Walk around 
 
PSO2 employed an accommodative interpretability strategy in a procedural form, taking 
members on tours of the area where the error occurred to enhance understanding of error context 
and circumstance, as illustrated in the following comment [Conducting a site review for members is 
not a part of the HEAPS procedural guideline]: 
Yeah, we would take the team out and go and have a look at things. In the 
emergency department, we looked at an incident around giving of a 
medication that a patient was allergic to. But it wasn't until we actually went 
down and walked through that we realised the processes involved to get to that 
patient of identifying that there's analogy. A whole lot of things have been able 
to be changed down there as a result of that walk-around that was done, so it 
is very important. [PSO2] 
7.9.2.3 Documentation 
 
All PSOs said they sent participants error documentation (case notes, patient charts and 
review notes) prior to the analysis meeting. PSO2 and PSO3 said this ensured members had the 
same understanding of the error thereby reducing intergroup differences based on knowledge of the 
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case. PSO2 and PSO3 also stated that they invited members to talk to them prior to the meeting if 
they had questions, thereby employing accommodative interpretability to ensure members 
understood the case and what was required of them. In the following example, PSO3 describes how 
she prepared members by providing documentation and outlining the process: 
Because I carefully ensure that before a meeting when I ask somebody, if they 
haven’t done one before, I talk to them about what it’s about first, and then I 
always have them prepped in that I send them out a week before, every review, 
a copy of the chart… [PSO3] 
 
7.9.3 Theme 3: Discourse Management 
 
Discourse management in these data was concerned with how PSOs manage the 
communication process to ensure effective communication between team members and how they 
attend to members’ conversational needs. This was the most prevalent communication strategy 
PSOs said they used. Accommodative discourse management included informing members of the 
analysis process in terms of topics covered; encouraging member input and appropriate turn taking; 
and ensuring that members listened to others’ input. 
PSO3 described how she outlined to members the way the meeting would progress at the 
beginning and emphasised the need for a conscientious approach: ‘I say this is how the two hours 
will go, we need to go through everything from the beginning methodically’ [PSO3]. 
7.9.3.1 Subtheme 1: Mode 
Coupland et al. (1991) described mode as a subcategory of discourse management whereby 
an interlocutor outlines the procedures for the discourse structure in terms of turn allocation. PSO2 
and PSO3 both stated that one of the most challenging aspects of managing mode in terms of turn 
allocation was when members dominated the discourse, and this was a barrier to other members 
having input and decreased analysis effectiveness: 
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‘You don't want anyone who's going to dominate the rest of the team. 
 
Sometimes that happens, and it's really difficult to pull those people back and 
stop them doing that’ [PSO2]. 
PSO2 and PSO3 spoke of using mode accommodative discourse management strategies to 
encourage member input. They said members felt apprehensive about speaking up because analysis 
was a new environment and they were worried that they might say the wrong thing. PSO3 stated 
that lower status members (nurses) feared being singled out. She facilitated the discourse by asking 
for their input in areas pertinent to their expertise and used their Christian names. She tried to avoid 
members feeling targeted by using a summing-up process directed to the whole team: 
So that during the meetings if someone is not talking up, I will say ‘Brown, 
what do you think of this? Have you got any thoughts on this? Let us know’. So, 
I ask them in a hopefully non-threatening way and sometimes you can see that 
people want to say something, and so I try and encourage them without putting 
them on the spot or I might in terms of so … I do up a little sum up of each 
section. ‘So, we’ve thought about this, anything else to add…’. You know we’ve 
got no right or wrong answers, there must be something we can add to this. 
[PSO3] 
Coupland et al. (1988) distinguished tenor as a subcategory of discourse management, which 
includes instances where an interlocutor tries to reduce face threat to a recipient. Analysis shows 
that the above comment from PSO3 can be categorised as a tenor-accommodative discourse 
management strategy to facilitate lower-status team members’ conversational needs. PSO2 
employed tenor strategies to address counter- accommodative communication behaviours. Whilst 
this was partly achieved by stating the ground rules around behaviour expectations, she also 
specified that she addressed these behaviours outside of the analysis room to avoid humiliating 
members in front of the analysis team: 
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I would never do it in front of the team. But certainly, if I thought somebody, the 
people, I would certainly speak to them about it. But that's one of the reasons 
I put out the information at the start so that it reminds them it's very much 
 
about that, not speaking over the top of other people within the team. Not 
demeaning their ideas. [PSO2] 
7.9.3.2 Subtheme 2: Listening skills 
 
From a CAT perspective, effective listening facilitates the discourse as members feel that 
their input is heard; however, PSO2 and PSO3 said this was challenging in analysis meetings. PSO2 
spoke of the importance of encouraging members to listen to other members: 
So that is my most hardest [sic] part, getting them to communicate, to be free 
flowing. That’s a real high energy for me in getting all the different players to listen 
up. [PSO2]. 
PSO2 perceived that having senior clinicians and external experts on the team enhanced 
members’ listening. In the following example, she emphasises that listening carefully to member 
input is critical to members feeling respected and implies that this reduces fear of blame and 
reduces intergroup differences: 
We had a maternity case... we had great expert external to us. 
 
... definitely there was respect amongst the team. Every single one of them was 
listening and taking on board what the others had to say. There was no need 
to lay blame, which was very strong in that meeting. [PSO2] 
7.9.4 Theme 4: Emotional Expression 
 
Emotional expression strategies are communication behaviours that demonstrate an 
interlocutor’s desire to reassure others and express a level of care for their emotional needs. In 
healthcare, emotional expression in the patient–provider dyad has been found to arise from a health 
provider’s desire to reduce patient tension and anxiety and express warmth (Watson & Gallois, 
1998). These data indicate that PSOs perceived team members were anxious that the analysis 
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process was about finding an individual to blame, and they spoke of using communication strategies 
to reduce this anxiety. Indeed, the PSO (PSO4) observed in study 3 used communication strategies 
to allay participants' concerns that incident analysis was about blame. 
 
7.9.4.1 Subtheme 1: Reduction of fear of blame 
 
PSO2 and PSO3 used accommodative emotional expression strategies to reduce members’ 
fear that the analysis process was about blame and recrimination and they inferred that this was 
heightened by the intergroup nature of the team, as exemplified in this example from PSO3, who 
speaks of using accommodative strategies to reduce intergroup divides: 
Everyone is a bit stiff, in the beginning I had several clinicians from ED, 
cardiology, nurses and medicos from all different levels, a lot didn’t know 
each other and hadn’t been to an RCA before, and they all came along, not 
knowing who to blame, it was all a bit of a stud up [assigning blame to others 
for error]. In the beginning it’s the most difficult time, getting them to warm 
up, getting them to know each other. [PSO3] 
In the following example, PSO3 speaks of reassuring members that the analysis process was 
not about finding someone to blame by clarifying that analysis uses a systems-based approach, 
qualifying that cases of malpractice would have already been dealt with by human resources: 
I suppose ensuring that we are not here on a witch hunt, that we are looking at 
 
system vulnerabilities and I assure them that generally by the time we get to 
these meetings, if there is a performance issue that has generally been 
identified beforehand and has been dealt with via a HR method and I say ..we 
are not looking at people, but we are looking at what has happened. How did 
it happen, why did it happen, how the hell could they have done this? [PSO3] 
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By referencing organisational processes around how human resources deal with 
 
performance issues in error, the PSO tries to reassure members that incident analysis is not focused 
on finding someone to blame. By acknowledging their emotional response using accommodative 
emotional expression, the PSO responded to what she supposed were team members’ cognised 
emotional needs and this conveyed her intention to reduce their anxiety. 
7.9.4.2 Subtheme 2: Member confidentiality 
 
PSO2 and PSO3 used accommodative emotional expression communication strategies of 
reassurance and an option to withdraw from the process to reduce clinicians’ concern that they 
would be subject to legal repercussions from giving their input, as exemplified in this comment 
from PSO2: 
It could be because what we're doing in RCA is, we're talking to the key 
stakeholders in the incident itself. We're going to interview them. We're going 
to ask them questions. They need to know that it's privileged. They can answer 
and it's privileged...sometimes they don't want to speak to you, and that's their 
right, really. [PSO2] 
Similarly, PSO3 used expressions of reassurance to reduce members’ concerns that the 
analysis process was informed by agendas other than a patient safety one. She also used 
accommodative interpersonal control by informing members their opinion was valued to overcome 
their preconceived beliefs that other agendas influenced the process: ‘I do this by spending time on 
the confidentiality that no one knows their names, reassuring them, I think. You know “you are not 
here with anyone else’s opinions, we only want your opinions, there are no agendas”’ [PSO3]. 
7.9.5 Theme 5: Approximation 
 
Approximation refers to the way in which an interlocutor alters their speech to be like their 
speech partner (Coupland et al., 1988; Giles, Gasiorek & Soliz, 2015). Only one PSO (PSO3) spoke 
of using a strategy that was categorised as approximation. In this example she speaks of adjusting 
her language and communication patterns to be more like the nurse or doctor (medico): 
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I find that when I’d started, I would be stuffing myself and it didn’t work, 
because it didn’t relax anyone… The more formal you are, the less open, 
honest and forthright they are going to be, the less they might say. So, 
you sort adjust your communication style to each individual, so I 
mightn’t say to a medico, ‘spit it out’, but I’ll commonly say it to a nurse 
off the floor that is nervous. [PSO2] 
These findings suggest the PSO was motivated to reduce intergroup divides informed by 
role differences. Gallois et al. (1988) contended that individuals approximate on different 
behaviours contingent on whether interpersonal or intergroup issues are salient. Because the PSO 
invoked professional group stereotypes around communication style (medico v. nurse), this 
indicates that intergroup concerns were more salient for her than interpersonal ones. Given that 
healthcare is strongly role bound (Watson et al., 2012), the use of accommodative approximation 
strategies is salient to overcome subtle language barriers informed by profession. However, given 
the analysis team contains both nurses and doctors, the PSO’s use of approximation tailored to 
profession may be perceived by the recipient nurse or doctor as non- accommodative and de- 
personalising. 
7.10 Discussion 
 
The first aim of this study was to explore how professional identity and intergroup dynamics 
manifested in the analysis setting from the perspective of the PSOs. The second aim was to explore 
the communication strategies PSOs said they used to minimise intergroup differences to enhance 
the effectiveness of the analysis process. Analysis revealed that intergroup differences around 
profession and status level were a concern for the PSOs. 
7.10.1 The Influence of Intergroup Dynamics 
 
These data indicate that the capacity of incident analysis to ameliorate patient 
 
safety is affected by the intergroup nature of the team. In particular, the siloed model of training and 
delivery of patient care creates significant limitations for the analysis team members’ ability to 
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assume their investigative role in the analysis team: the PSOs’ comments suggest that their 
behaviour in the analysis setting was determined by implicit norms around speaking out against 
high-status members as well as providing input in an area that was outside their domain of 
professional expertise. This reflects the nature of multidisciplinary teams in healthcare where team 
members only focus on their actions related to their profession or specialty, and research that 
indicates that low-status members refrain from speaking up against high-status members 
(Rosenstein, 2002) and clinicians are reluctant to comment on the work of others outside of their 
professional expertise (O’Daniel & Rosenstein, 2008). This demonstrates the importance of 
accommodative interpersonal control communication strategies for ensuring members have an equal 
voice in the analysis team. It also demonstrates the importance of accommodative interpretability 
strategies to enhance cross-disciplinary knowledge sharing and learning within the short time frame 
of the analysismeeting. 
7.10.2 Status 
 
These data reveal that two PSOs perceived that status and intergroup conflict were 
sometimes invoked by high-status members to manipulate analysis outcomes, indicating that 
analysis processes and outcomes were considered a bargaining tool between them and hospital 
management. Intergroup conflict with the organisation and high-status doctors was found to impact 
PSOs’ morale and belief in organisational commitment to analysis. Given their training as nurses, 
these perceptions need to be considered in the light of a history of intergroup tension between 
nurses and doctors (Kreindler et al., 2012) and the position of nurses in the medical hierarchy. 
These data suggest that the original assumption that PSOs have a level of authority to enact 
incident analysis regardless of status or clinical training ignores the pervasive influence of the 
hospital hierarchical culture. PSOs spoke of feeling diminished by the disregard shown towards 
them by high-status clinicians and demoralised by management's unwillingness to address their 
behaviours, expressing concern that this reduced their credibility with other clinicians and groups. 
This type of power is concordant with Ng and Bradac (1993) definition of "power over". This is an 
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important finding as it demonstrates that organisational leadership and support of patient safety 
work is critical to PSOs being able to conduct the process with legitimate authority. 
The impact of intergroup conflict with management and high-status members influenced 
PSO’s stereotypes of which professional groups have something to contribute to the analysis 
environment. These data showed that they focused their efforts on professional groups receptive to 
patient safety work, thus potentially limiting the access to a level of expertise and insight into 
understanding of error cause. Moreover, stereotyping around clinician mindset led PSOs to assume 
the level of work clinicians are prepared to invest in, often protecting them from knowledge 
gathering stages of the process. This may prevent clinicians from having access to valid sources of 
knowledge. 
These data suggest that an important part of PSOs' professional identity is their sense of 
purpose around patient safety, in particular as a safety advocate for patients who have no voice. 
This demonstrates the importance of understanding how PSOs construct meaning in their roles in a 
challenging environment. 
7.10.3 Blame 
 
PSOs described members’ scepticism that analysis was not about blame as a barrier to 
analysis effectiveness, impacting member engagement in the process. PSOs used accommodative 
communication strategies of interpersonal control, emotional expression and discourse management 
to reduce member fear and create a more equal and collaborative environment. Of note was the 
finding that they employed accommodative interpretative strategies to promote an understanding of 
a systems approach to error analysis, indicating that clinicians are generally unaware of this 
approach. 
This echoes the findings of study one. This suggests that training in analysis methods is 
lacking for clinicians who participate, leaving PSOs to fill this gap in the process itself. Given 
analysis meetings are only an hour to an hour and half long, this uses up time and effort that could 
be more efficiently employed in the investigative process. This is supported by findings from 
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research by Braithwaite et al. (2006) who found that health professionals had a more positive view 
of RCA and its capacity to improve patient safety outcomes after participating in a safety 
improvement programme. 
7.10.4 Interpersonal Dynamics 
 
PSOs invoked interpersonal salience to reduce intergroup difference and promote a salient 
analysis team identity. This was about building up relationships with clinicians prior to the meeting; 
thereby breaking down professional and status informed stereotypes; and invoking interpersonal 
references to the human side of the error under examination. Future research needs to integrate an 
understanding of where in the analysis process the introduction of interpersonal salience would 
have maximum effect and to what audience. 
7.10.5 Intergroup Differences 
 
PSOs welcomed the diversity of analysis teams, saying it was a catalyst to questioning 
embedded ways of practice. It follows that is important to facilitate collaboration between members 
from groups. This could be done prior to analysis meetings in the form of walk arounds of where 
the error occurred, to establish a superordinate team identity as soon as possible to maximise 
performance in the analysis team. This also indicates the importance of clearly defining members 
roles at the start of the meeting to convey to other members why each person is there and the 
function they will perform during the meeting. 
7.10.6 Recommendations 
 
This study demonstrates the relevance of an intergroup theoretical lens in 
 
understanding PSOs’ perceptions of how professional identity and status affect the analysis process. 
Although previous research has shown that communication in intergroup teams in healthcare is 
challenging (Pronovost & Vohr, 2010), it was not known how this would manifest in the intergroup 
incident analysis team or how the interdisciplinary nature of the team would have an effect. An 
intergroup lens provides a means of categorising the ways in which professional identity and status 
are enacted from the perspective of the PSOs who bridge the divide between the members that 
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attend and the hospital executive that have the capacity to transform the learnings to improve 
patient safety. Further, CAT provides a means of understanding the gradations of intergroup 
interactions through the categorisation of non-accommodative communication behaviours and the 
salience of how accommodative communication behaviours can be employed to lessen their adverse 
effects. 
The findings from this study provide a hitherto unexplored understanding of how intergroup 
factors influence incident analysis. Therefore, a recommendation is that PSOs receive training in 
intergroup communication and the use of accommodative communication strategies to reduce 
intergroup differences and build a superordinate team identity. This will enhance equal participation 
from members and thereby ensure incident analysis benefits from the perspectives and knowledge 
of all those who participate. 
The findings also suggest that human factors training in the hospitals studied have not been 
effective. As suggested in study one, a recommendation is that training initiatives about the error 
analysis approach need to be disseminated more widely to reduce fear of blame in the analysis 
setting. 
7.11 Limitations 
 
This study had clear limitations in terms of the small number of PSOs interviewed, and that 
I was unable to observe any analysis meetings conducted by the PSOs interviewed. There would 
have been considerable benefit in doing so to understand whether the implementation of 
accommodative communication strategies by the PSOs resulted in a reduction in intergroup 
differences. It is also acknowledged as a limitation that I was not able to interview the PSO who 
conducted the HEAPS meetings observed in Study Three. 
7.12 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, these findings indicate that intergroup behaviours can have an adverse 
influence on the effectiveness of analysis processes if not mitigated during HEAPs meetings. 
Behaviours by individual clinicians or groups of clinicians are exacerbated by the hierarchical 
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culture of hospitals and the discipline-specific model of training and practice. The current model of 
analysis assumes that PSOs—themselves trained clinicians—are immune to the effect of the siloed 
culture and hierarchy and as such ignores the influence of professional group identity in this 
context. As such SIT and CAT place analysis team members’ psychological motivations as areas of 
interest in the broad-ranging examination of why incident analysis teams do not appear to be 
delivering the reduction in error rates originally hoped for by the IOM in 2000. 
Given that analysis teams are tasked with processing and communicating complex 
information in a short time (90-minute meeting), it is essential that communication strategies are 
developed to assist teams and the PSO to manage the intergroup dynamic of the team to enhance 
communication, decision making and judgement in this setting. 
Research shows that effective communication can result in more effective interventions, 
improved safety, enhanced team morale and quality of outcomes (Shortell, Zimmerman, Rousseau, 
Gillies, Wagner, et al., 1994). 
Overall, this study provides an understanding of PSOs’ practice in analysis teams. Although 
SIT and CAT have been used to aid this analysis, the emphasis of the research is on implications for 
practice in terms of human factors awareness training, communication tools and awareness of how 
hierarchical tensions disrupt the effectiveness of patient safety measures and disempower the 
capacity of patient safety and quality units to enact meaningful change. 
7.13 Summary 
 
This chapter presented the results of interviews with PSOs and an examination of how 
intergroup factors manifest. In chapter 8, I present the results of the observation of three HEAPS 
analysis meetings. The results are analysed using a CAT framework. 
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Chapter 8: Study 3—Observation of Communication in Three HEAPS 
Analysis Meetings, Interpreted Through a Communication 
Accommodation Theory Lens 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 7 the results from interviews with three PSOs were presented and interpreted 
through an intergroup lens. In this chapter, I present the findings from an observation study of three 
HEAPS incident analysis meetings conducted in a medium- sized (200-bed) regional hospital in 
Queensland to triangulate the findings from studies one and two. I had originally planned to go to 
more sites, but this had to be reduced to one site owing to the sensitivity of the data. The 
communication I observed was interpreted using CAT to understand how intergroup and 
interpersonal factors impact the analysis meeting. 
8.2 Aims 
 
The study had the following aims: 
 
• How are intergroup relationships reflected in accommodative and 
non- accommodative communication strategies in the HEAPS 
process? 
• How do intergroup communication strategies differ between analysis meetings? 
 
8.3 Method 
 
8.3.1 Participants 
 
I observed three HEAPS meetings with five or more participants per meeting over a seven- 
week period at a single 200-bed hospital. See Table 8.1 for the breakdown of participants for each 
meeting. All participants worked at the hospital except for one NUM who worked in another 
regional hospital. Participants (n = 18) included a single PSO who convened all three HEAPS 
meetings, four doctors (including two senior consultants), seven NUMs (as noted, two from other 
hospitals brought in as content experts), two AHPs, one communications officer (coded as 
administration), one security manager (coded as administration) and three nurses. 
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Table 8.1 
 
Characteristics of Participants According to HEAPS Attendance (Figures 
in Parentheses are Percentages) 
Characteristics HEAPS1 HEAPS2 HEAPS3 
Severity rating SAC1 SAC2 
 
Newborn baby 
given wrong 
mother’s 
expressed 
breast milk 
 
(n = 7) 
0 (00.0 
7 (100.0 
 
0 (0.0 
5 (71.4 
1 (14.3+ 
1 (14.3) 
 
5(57.1) 
2(42.9) 
SAC1 
 
 
Type of adverse event 
Mental health 
patient 
absconded 
from hospital, 
later found 
dead 
Patient died as 
a result of 
stroke; 
concerns 
raised around 
care 
Gender (n1 = 17) (n = 6) (n = 4) 
Male 3 (50.0) 2 (50.0) 
Female 3 (50.0) 2 (50.0) 
Profession   
Doctor 3 (50.0) 1 (25.0) 
Nurse 2 (33.3) 2 (50.0) 
AHP 0 (00.0) 1 (25.0)# 
Administration 1 (16.6) 0 (00.0) 
Status level   
High* 6 (100.0) 3 (75.0) 
Medium to low** 0 (00.0) 1 (25.0) 
Note. * Managerial level (NUM, Head of security, AHP department head, doctor or consultant); ** 
Below managerial level (nurse, research officer); + Dietician; # Pharmacist 
 
 
8.3.2 Procedure 
 
Having arranged a meeting with the executive clinical director of the hospital to explain the 
aims of the study and request permission to observe HEAPS analysis meetings, I contacted the in- 
house PSO from the regional hospital by email and explained the nature of the research and 
included consent forms and participant information (Appendix 3). I asked to observe HEAPS 
meetings. The PSO agreed to the observation of three meetings. These are detailed in appendix 
11.4.5. 
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8.3.2.1 Nature of HEAPS Meetings 
At the start of the meeting, I was introduced by the PSO to the team. Having explained the 
details and aims of the study to participants and given each information and consent forms, consent 
to record and observe was obtained. This was granted unanimously. Only information about 
profession, position and gender was collected, due to ethical concerns about participant 
confidentiality. 
8.3.2 Observation and Data Collection 
 
The meetings lasted between 70 and 106 minutes each. The HEAPS analysis meetings took 
place in the same hospital where the medical error had occurred. A total of 4 hours and 16 minutes 
of activity was observed. The meetings were audio taped using an Apple iPhone 7 and recordings 
professionally transcribed. I made observation notes that included non-verbal behaviours, 
descriptions, timings and a log of my feelings as observer (Jehn, 1997). During the observation, I 
sat at the meeting table with participants and was silent. I had no prior knowledge of participants or 
the case under examination. 
8.3.3 Data Analysis 
 
Please see section 5.5 for details of analysis methods. Results were then analysed according 
to each HEAPS meeting to understand how communication strategies differed according to the 
professional and status divergence of team members. 
8.3.4 Communication Accommodation Theory 
 
As explained in Chapter 2, CAT explores the attitudes, motivations and communication 
strategies that inform communicative interactions and posits that people adopt interpersonal and 
intergroup goals in these interactions. Watson and Gallois (1998) and later Hewett et al. (2009a) 
proposed that this is informed by intergroup histories between the interactants. The aim in this study 
was to observe and record specific CAT strategies during the HEAPS incident analysis meetings. 
Items that reflected specific CAT strategies from an earlier questionnaire were adapted from 
Watson and Gallois (1999) (Please see Table 4.1 and section 4.4 for descriptions and exemplars of 
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communication strategies). 
 
8.4 Results 
 
8.4.1 How Are Intergroup Relationships Reflected Through the Use of Accommodative and 
Non-Accommodative Communication Strategies in Meetings? 
8.4.1.1 Overall findings 
 
The themes that emerged from the analysis of the transcripts are presented in Table 8.3. 
 
Themes reflected the CAT strategies of interpersonal control, interpretability, emotional expression 
and discourse management. Characteristic exemplars of each of the themes are provided and 
interpreted in terms of how CAT manifests in the analysis setting and then analysed in terms of how 
they differ between meetings and the role of the interlocutor. 
Given that HEAPS team members did not all know one another well and were discussing 
discipline-specific aspects of the error being investigated, the use of accommodative interpretative 
strategies was prevalent. Given that the PSO who ran the meetings was inexperienced (these were 
the first three HEAPS meetings she had conducted), the use of discourse management strategies 
was low. 
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Table 8.3 
 
Main Themes in the Coding Categorised Using CAT 
 
Theme Accommodative strategies Non-Accommodative strategies 
Interpersonal 
control 
Equal status between 
members 
Ingroup references 
Out-of-role references 
Interruptions 
Outgroup references 
Patronising terms 
Praise 
Non-assignation of team role 
Jargon 
 
 
 
 
 
PSO seeking reassurance 
 
 
 
 
Unequal input 
Directives 
Rapid questions 
 
Interpretability 
 
Clarifying terms 
 
 
 
 
 
Emotional 
expression 
Checking understanding of 
error stage 
Power and status 
 
Support around resource 
deficit 
Emotional support around 
error involvement 
Praise 
 
Adherence to analysis Process 
Inviting input 
 
Discourse 
management 
 
8.4.2 Theme 1: Interpersonal Control 
 
8.4.2.1 Accommodative interpersonal control 
 
8.4.2.1.1 Subtheme 1: Equal status between members 
 
The theme of equal status between members and the PSO was apparent across all the 
HEAPS meetings. This was evoked by the PSO at the beginning of the meetings 
and expressed as members working together towards reducing error to enhance patient safety. The 
following excerpt depicts this theme: 
PSO: we could have done better for this gentleman and then I will write the 
 
report and we all look at it and as a group, even though the report is what 
we discussed 
NUM7 and Nurse2: Mm. 
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PSO: And then we come up with recommendations of how we can help the 
next Mr X (patient’s surname) that turns up and what have we learnt from this 
case basically. [HEAPS3, NUM7 and Nurse 2] 
This interaction was accommodative in nature: the PSO emphasised the importance of all 
the members working together to reduce the possibility of the error happening with another patient. 
By emphasising the importance of members perceiving one another as ingroup members of the 
analysis team rather than by their status or position in the hospital hierarchy, the PSO aims to 
reduce power differentials between members. 
8.4.2.1.2 Subtheme 2: Ingroup references 
 
Ingroup status was a prevalent theme in these data and took the form of members expressing 
their membership of similar groups (either by unit, profession or status level). CAT proposes that 
expressing similarities with others across a meaningful dimension is one of the core communication 
strategies that informs accommodative communication (Giles, 1973), and reduces intergroup 
divides. This concept is drawn from similarity attraction theory (Byrne, 1971). This occurred in the 
following ways: 
• Caring for patients 
 
Team members invoked ingroup status as clinicians in terms of their role caring for patients, 
and explaining the decisions they make around patient care, as in the following example from two 
doctors discussing how they categorised mental health patients as being without capacity: 
 
PSO: What do we have to do to say that they're without 
capacity? Doctor 1: It's just the clinical judgement. 
Doctor 2: It's a clinical judgement. You write in the chart with some 
reasons why you decide that they don't have capacity. [HEAPS1, Dr1, Dr2] 
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This was accommodative communication as it communicated shared ingroup identity as 
clinical experts and pointed towards an implicit attempt to reduce status differentials between the 
two doctors. 
• Clinicians in an Unfavourable Organisational Environment 
 
These data showed that when participants perceived that organisational decisions around 
resourcing and staffing had contributed to the error occurrence, they invoked their ingroup 
membership as clinicians, suggesting that this identity strengthened. Concordant with SIT, when 
individuals determine that their group is under threat, group identity strengthens (Branscombe et al., 
1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Whilst this invocation of shared identity as clinicians working in 
unsupportive organisational conditions reduced intergroup differences in terms of belonging to 
different professional groups or units or having different status levels, and thus was accommodative 
in nature, it can also be categorised as non-accommodative because it positions management as 
responsible for the error and heightens the intergroup divide between clinicians and management. 
Thus, it could be argued the invocation of this communication strategy limits members’ motivation 
to investigate further and undermines the purpose of the analysis. In this excerpt from HEAPS2, the 
NUM from a paediatric unit in the same hospital validates the concerns about poor resourcing by 
the NUM in whose unit the error occurred [NUM3]: 
I find it astonishing that you don't get funding for under four hours, because we 
 
have walk-ins that get tubes put down, we have to admit them, put that time 
in and we get that half hour to fifteen minutes. [HEAPS2 NUM6, HEAPS2] 
Later, another NUM [NUM5] offered her own experience of resource deficit endorse the 
first NUM’s defence: 
NUM5: We don't have enough to cover all the shifts. 
 
NUM3: And I’ve been fighting to get some more core staff members, I have 
 
asked for two core staff members to cover each shift and I have been told ‘no’, 
so we don't have a core capability framework, I am just patching with 
maternity 
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… So, let me show you this week’s admissions, that's what I’m saying, OK, we 
show this to people, who don't work on the nurseries, don't understand what 
we are doing. [HEAPS2: NUM3, NUM5] 
8.4.2.1.3 Subtheme 3: Out-of-role references 
 
• PSO as clinician 
 
The theme of members invoking a role other than their professional one was salient in these 
data. For instance, the PSO regularly invoked her identity as a clinician across all the HEAPS 
meetings, referring to her experience working in different wards across the hospital. This suggested 
she was motivated to demonstrate ingroup status to reduce intergroup differences between herself 
and the team. In the following extract, the PSO’s invocation of her identity as a clinician, when she 
refers to her time working in ‘recovery’, invokes both ingroup identity and interpersonal salience 
with the NUM [NUM1] in whose unit the error occurred, thus reducing intergroup differences 
between them and making this an accommodative strategy: 
PSO: Has this ever been audited where you look at the walk-ins and how often 
it occurs? 
NUM3: I have been asking for this to occur since I started here. So, I have 
been saying, you know the walk-ins, when we are busy, they floor us, they just 
tip us over the edge. 
PSO: When I worked in recovery in the past, when we tried to say something is 
occurring, we just had a book and we would write down timing, how long we 
spent, time out of the nursery and then if you added up all those hours to 
present and then say, this is how many hours that aren't being reflected. 
[HEAPS2: PSO, NUM3, H2] 
By referring to nursing practice, the PSO accommodates the NUM in an ingroup context and 
communicates interpersonal salience in terms of understanding the nurse’s concerns about under- 
staffing. This level of ingroup salience could inform the PSO's understanding of future strategies to 
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prevent error recurrence. 
 
• Personal Role 
 
In other cases, members invoked roles in an interpersonal context that were outside their 
role as clinician or analysis team member. This was associated with their identities as human beings 
and emphasised the humanity of the patient. In the following example, a nurse speaks of her role as 
a daughter in terms of the concern she would feel if it was her father who had absconded from the 
ward: 
But I fessed up because I came back onto a ward environment, and I was 
horrified. I think it was my first couple of weeks, we had the man who left the 
ward and wasn't restrained and wasn't—I was like, ‘Oh, if that was my dad 
I'd be really upset. Or my mom, you know. I'd be really upset about that. I 
want them kept safe. [HEAPS1, NUM1] 
The emphasis on human identity positions members as having roles and responsibilities 
outside their professional role and has the potential to neutralize status differences in the 
professional sphere. It is accommodative because it reduces the perceptions of professional and 
status differentials between members and opens a new and arguably more compassionate approach 
to the patient’s plight. 
8.4.2.2 Non-accommodative interpersonal control 
 
8.4.2.2.1 Subtheme 1: Interruptions 
 
• Fragmentation of process 
 
This was the most prevalent form of non-accommodative interpersonal control across all the 
HEAPS meetings. Interruptions consisted of members talking over other members or engaging in 
separate conversations at the same time as the main discourse. For instance, in HEAPS1, 
interruptions occurred 427 times (an average of 17 times a minute). The following excerpt 
illustrates the effect of the interruptions on the clarity of members’ input: 
NUM1: (directs question to security guard) So for this gentleman, that he'd 
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been coming and going. If we had the bands, the alarm when he goes out of the 
ward, he may not have had one on. He may not have… 
Security guard:(interrupts NUM1) he may not have 
 
Dr 1: (interrupts security guard) He may not have but it’s really hard to say 
what we could have done differently. I think [crosstalk Dr 2 and NUM2 and 
security guard talk over him] 
NUM1: Because we hadn't documented that we didn't want him to leave 
the ward, or he didn't have capacity or…. 
Dr 2: (interrupts her) I think it was 
documented. NUM1: So, you got the… 
Dr 3: Yeah, yeah, 
NUM1: Before or afterwards? 
Dr 3: Before. I think just about 
PSO: (interrupts) He was coming out to write but couldn't find 
him…. Dr2 : (interrupts) Yeah, and that's when he got ... 
PSO: (talks over Dr 2) 10.45. Here. 
 
Dr 3: (interrupts) So it is , Yeah. He absconded. [HEAPS1: Dr1, Dr2, 
Dr3, Security Guard, PSO, NUM1] 
The above interaction occurred 25 minutes into the meeting and shows how interruptions 
reduced the PSO’s ability to make sense of the conditions preceding the patient’s absconding from 
the ward. The frequent interruptions had an adverse effect on the investigative process: members’ 
responses were fragmented; turns were brief and the PSO was not able to explore their responses in 
enough depth to gain clear understandings of the stages leading to the error. There was no evidence 
of the PSO attempting to summarise and check back with the group on her understanding of what 
occurred. 
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• Hierarchy of interruptions 
 
Power and status were expressed implicitly in these data through high-status members’ use 
of non-accommodative interpersonal control strategies. This took the form of them interrupting 
lower-status members and the PSO. In the following example from HEAPS3, interruptions occurred 
every minute. Interruptions consisted of members talking over one another. The direction of 
interruptions was correlated with members’ status levels: the high-status consultant regularly 
interrupted the AHP; the AHP did not interrupt the consultant but frequently interrupted the nurses 
and the PSO, and the nurses rarely interrupted anyone: 
 
NUM7: Did he have bloods before… 
 
Doctor 4: [interrupts NUM] No my personal feeling would be, no my personal 
 
feeling would be that if someone was at 1.7 and if I give prothrombinex and 
FXP (inaudible) …. 
Pharmacist1: OK...OK 
 
Doctor4: Good enough agency to have given, and then we don’t need to bring 
it down to 1. 
Pharmacist1: Yep. 
 
Doctor4: Although normally it’s up to 
 
1.2. Pharmacist1: My question… 
 
Doctor4: [interrupts AHP] I’m not questioning 
that. Pharmacist1: …Ok 
Doctor4: So, it’s pretty reasonable that it would come down. [HEAPS3:NUM7, 
Pharmacist 1, Dr 4] 
This is a non-accommodative strategy because the interruptions heightened status 
differences between members, resulting in the NUM and junior nurse not being given the 
opportunity to retain or take back the ‘floor’, as much as the pharmacist, doctor and PSO. 
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8.4.2.2.2 Subtheme 2: Outgroup references 
 
A non-accommodative interpersonal control strategy employed by members in these data 
was the use of outgroup references. Consistent with SIT, this was often made in the context of a 
downward comparison about someone along a meaningful group norm dimension. For instance, in 
the following excerpt from HEAPS 2, NUM3 speaks of the unit manager as ‘that person’, 
suggesting that a motivation to assign outgroup status is when an ingroup member has deviated 
from meaningful group norms around supporting unit staff. This was pertinent in this meeting 
because NUM3 had inferred that the reason the error had occurred was because the nursery staff 
were not supported by the organisation: 
It’s a very busy little unit, but those girls want education, they are very, very 
supportive of each other. They have not felt the last guy there, the unit 
manager, support them at all … that person usually comes in, gets their 
numbers and that's it. That's when they feel unsupported. [HEAPS2: NUM3] 
In hospitals, NUMs define their roles in terms of feeling a level of responsibility 
 
for their nursing staff, making unit identity particularly salient. While NUM3 positioned unit staff 
as ingroup members, she treated the previous manager as outgroup, emphasising that ingroup 
membership is defined by ingroup support. This is important because this suggested that she was 
motivated to communicate to other team members who were also nurses (n = 4, that the trait of 
ingroup supportiveness was a criterion of belonging. Given that incident analysis is about the 
examination of the actions of team members involved in an error, this example once again 
illustrates the paradoxical relationship between members’ roles as investigators and as members of 
their professional group. This renders this communication strategy non-accommodative in nature. 
8.4.2.2.3 Subtheme 3: Patronising terms 
 
Using patronising terms is considered an over-accommodative interpersonal control strategy 
in CAT (Jones, Gallois, Callan & Barker, 1995 and as such is non- accommodating, serving to 
heighten power differentials. In this example, NUM refers to her junior nursing staff as ‘girls’ in her 
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description of their roles and responsibilities: 
I have asked for two core staff members to cover each shift and I have been told 
‘no’, so we don't have a core capability framework, I am just patching with 
maternity. Because not only do the girls look after this but they may also have 
to birth suite that night. … It’s easy if I’m here, Monday to Friday, and I'll say 
to the casuals if they are going for a section, if they want someone to be on call 
for them, and I’ll do that. But these other births outside Monday to Friday 
hours will take one of our girls away from looking after the babies on the floor. 
[HEAPS2: NUM3] 
In the present study, members’ use of terms such as ‘the girls’ or ‘the boys’ when referring 
to their staff invoked both an interpersonal affiliation and an ingroup 
identity as unit staff. However, since the junior staff referred to as ‘girls’ or ‘boys’ were not present 
at the meeting, this highlighted intergroup divides, positioning analysis team members not from the 
unit as outgroup, thus making this a non-accommodative communication strategy. 
8.4.2.2.4 Subtheme 4: Praise 
 
While praise was accommodating at times in these data, there were occasions where it came 
across as patronising. In the following extract, NUM1 directly praises Dr2 for taking note of the job 
number for the missing patient and PSO indirectly praises him. Given the power disparity between 
NUM1 and Dr2, this may have come across as ingratiating. 
PSO: Yeah. He was an in-patient with us, and by that day, on the 24th or 23rd, 
he was starting to get really agitated and wanting to leave. We were trying to 
get a review to say he was without capacity to leave. When the doctor came to 
do that, to write in his notes he was without capacity, was when we found that 
he was actually missing from the ward. So, he was there at 10.45 in the 
morning, and he couldn't find him. Then I see, thank goodness that he called the 
police, and there is a job number in the chart. I spoke to the policemen, he said 
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that we didn't report it, but the son reported him missing, but we have a job 
number. We'll be able to clarify with the police that that's not the case, because 
they thought that was appalling that we didn't notify them. Because the lead on 
the case, it all came to this gentleman, was saying, "I just can't believe you 
didn't tell us that this, because we might have had more of a chance to find 
him." So, what happened to him- 
NUM1: (interrupts) well done providing the job number. (to the doctor (doctor 
 
2) who reported the patient missing to the police) the fact that you provided 
the job number is pretty good [HEAPS1: NUM1, PSO] 
8.4.2.2.5 Subtheme 5: Non-assignation of roles 
 
What was noteworthy about these data was that the PSO used a non- accommodative 
interpersonal control strategy of not assigning an investigative role to members in the analysis team. 
As stated in Chapter 3, a critical part of the analysis process is for the PSO to assign each member a 
team role as either team leader, content expert, front line staff member from the relevant clinical 
area or the ‘so what’ person from an unrelated area. These data show that because no investigative 
roles were assigned to team members, the ‘so what’ person for instance, lower-status members in 
HEAPS 2 and HEAPS 3 made no contribution or reduced contribution to the meeting process, 
suggesting that they were unsure about how to speak across hierarchical and professional divides. 
Given that research suggests that when health professionals interact in teams, salient hierarchies 
prevent health professionals speaking up across disciplinary and status boundaries (Edmondson, 
2003a), this was a meaningful omission and served to heighten intergroup differences and mitigate 
the PSO’s opportunity to build a team identity. Whilst this could be attributable to the relative 
inexperience of this PSO, it serves to highlight the importance of role allocation. 
8.4.3 Theme 2: Interpretability 
 
8.4.3.1 Accommodative Interpretability 
 
These data reveal that interpretability was an accommodative communication strategy in the 
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HEAPS analysis meetings. Given that team members were professionally diverse and included 
clinicians and non-clinicians (security officer and research officer), members would have had 
limited understanding of another members’ work. Therefore, accommodative interpretability 
strategies reduced intergroup differences based on professional knowledge and expertise. 
8.4.3.1.1 Subtheme 1: Clarification of terms 
 
Where members used jargon or acronyms, the PSO asked questions of the interlocutor to 
clarify their answers to enhance team understanding: 
Pharmacist1: He was an AF [Atrial Fibrillation] patient with a CHAD 
score from what I could see from the anaesthetic review was about 1… 
PSO: What’s a CHAD score? 
Doctor4: It’s a score that we do that shows how the high risk is of 
thrombonic alemelum. [HEAPS3: Pharmacist 1, Doctor 4, PSO] 
8.4.3.1.2 Subtheme 2: Clarification of error stages 
 
These data showed that the PSO employed accommodative interpretability strategies to 
clarify understanding of the stages leading to the error by asking members to clarify their responses, 
with questions such as: 
So, the higher the risk, the higher the numbers? … So, she will be in that room 
on her own on that day? … So, I don't understand the process, to get a 
qualified baby, do they have to...? [HEAPS2, PSO] 
This is important as team members may be unfamiliar with the domain within which the 
error occurred. In these examples, the PSO acknowledged she was unfamiliar with process aspects 
to elicit further details. This clarified error factors for members and saved them from asking in the 
team setting, which may be challenging where there are status differentials, thus making this an 
accommodative process. 
8.4.3.1.3 Subtheme 3: Understanding of error remedy 
 
The PSO also asked questions to check understanding of possible remedies to prevent error 
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recurrence. This is an accommodative interpretability strategy because by asking, the PSO opened 
consideration of solution to all team members, thus minimising intergroup differences. In this 
example, the PSO asks the consultant surgeon about a potential recommendation to prevent the 
error recurring: 
PSO: But could we have postponed this surgery, in hindsight, which is 
a wonderful thing? 
Doctor4: Well he has got a malignancy, so it needed to happen. 
 
PSO: So, is that something that we could learn from this that in the future 
going forward you’ve got a tumour, then you should be put on oral potassium 
and brought forward, on oral … err … umm? [HEAPS3: PSO, Dr 4] 
8.4.3.1.4 Subtheme 4: Power and status 
 
What was noteworthy about these data was that, other than the PSO, it was the high-status 
members who employed accommodative interpretability strategies by explaining terms to the group. 
This was found in both HEAPS1 and HEAPS3 where high-status consultants participated. For 
instance, in HEAPS3, which was attended by a high-status doctor (consultant), a pharmacist and 
two nurses, it was the consultant who was mindful of ensuring the two nurses and the PSO had a 
clear understanding of the discussion. In the following example, the doctor interrupts the pharmacist 
who is using jargon, to rephrase what he is saying in clearer terms to the nurses: 
PSO: Sorry, say that again… 
 
Pharmacist1: For prothrombinex [PTB] is actually… [only making eye 
contact with PSO and Doctor 4] 
PSO: Yeah. 
 
Pharmacist1: The contra-indication is a patient with active 
malignancy. PSO and Nurse1: Err… ok. 
Pharmacist: And the use of PTB would only be for patients that are acutely 
bleeding; so, for him, he probably just could have got away with FFP 
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[fresh frozen plasma] according to the guidelines. 
Nurse1: Err, mmm. 
PSO: Why is it a contra-indication, could you send a clot? 
Pharmacist1: [interrupts] because you become more pro- 
thrombotic. 
Doctor4: [Looks in direction of nurses] When somebody has got a 
malignancy, that in itself is the discovery of a blood clot, and someone was 
blood thin, a combination of this at that time, reverses the blood clot. 
[HEAPS3: Nurse 1, Pharmacist1, Dr 4, PSO] 
By using easily understood terms, Doctor 4’s communication was accommodative in nature 
because it ensured all team members had a clear understanding of the conditions for the clotting of 
the patient’s blood to occur, regardless of whether this was their expertise or not. This raises the 
possibility that lower-status members may be too intimidated by the power gap to ask higher-status 
members to clarify points in the meeting. This data suggests higher-status members are aware of 
this and proactively seek to diminish this power gap through interpretability strategies. 
8.4.3.2 Non-accommodative interpretability 
 
While there was minimal use of non-accommodative interpretability strategies by team 
members across all the meetings, where it did occur was when members used acronyms or 
jargonistic terms to discuss discipline-specific aspects and the PSO often interjected to gain clarity 
and reduce intergroup differences. 
8.4.4 Theme 3: Emotional Expression 
 
8.4.4.1 Accommodative emotional expression 
 
8.4.4.1.1 Subtheme 1: Resource deficit 
 
Accommodative emotional expression was used by both PSO and team members to provide 
reassurance and support to those members involved in an error. Often this was around members’ 
perceptions that inadequate resources and staffing had contributed to the error. In this example a 
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security guard communicates accommodative emotional expression of sympathising with the 
nurse’s working conditions: 
 
PSO: How many staff do you have on a morning shift for 20 [crosstalk] 
 
NUM1: We have one nurse per four 
patients. PSO: That's good. 
Security Guard1: Still hard. 
 
NUM1: It's still hard, because then that and you've got to go in the 
shower, medications, you're out of the room. 
Security Guard1: Then you could be tied up with one single patient [crosstalk] 
NUM1: You might take someone down to x-ray, which makes your eight 
patients to one nurse. You've got only one nurse when you've got breaks. 
Security Guard1: It's hard. 
 
NUM1: It is hard. [HEAPS1: NUM1, PSO, Security Guard1] 
 
While the above excerpt is accommodative because it demonstrates that the security guard 
understands the challenges the nurse faces of managing patient care with limited staff, and as such 
builds ingroup salience, it also points towards the security guard’s claim of ingroup status. This is 
meaningful as he was the only non-clinician in the team. 
8.4.4.1.2 Subtheme 2: Emotional challenges associated with error involvement 
 
Across all HEAPS meetings, the PSO demonstrated accommodative emotional expression at 
the relational level, to show support of team members and communicate an awareness of the 
emotional challenges they face as clinicians associated with the error. In this example, the PSO 
expresses an awareness of the challenges clinicians face in keeping mental health patients from 
absconding from the ward when the ward is not adequately staffed: 
Dr1: Nowadays they're saying that, "No, if you want to go out, you can go 
wave your hand there." Anyone could have waved that hand. Just opened up 
and get out but now, no. You've got to swipe, as in we have disabled the exit. 
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PSO: (interrupts Dr 1 in loud voice) Are you finding that really difficult 
as clinicians now? 
Dr2: Well someone needs to … 
 
Dr 1: (interrupts) only if he’s ….(laughs) , because you’re stuck. But you 
can get around it, particularly if you’re … 
PSO: (interrupts) yes 
 
(Dr 1 and Dr2 talk between themselves, PSO talks directly to NUM1) 
 
PSO: That's good, okay. 
 
NUM1: Because I suppose overnight, when there's less nurses, that's a 
really good system, because they can't get out. 
PSO: Mmmmm that’s right, yes. 
 
Dr 1: Because sometimes you know, one could be on a break and the other two 
are caught up with a patient. There's actually no one else to keep an eye on who 
goes out and who goes in. 
PSO: That's good. So, I guess the staff feel more safe as well that no 
one is going to come in on the ward. Mm [HEAPS1] 
These data show that the PSO’s use of emotional expression strategies was often 
followed up with accommodative discourse management strategies to facilitate open 
communication, rendering this an ingroup context that facilitates more open communication (Graen 
& Uhl-Bien, 1998. This illustrates the importance of establishing support and rapport to encourage 
members to engage openly in the discussion. 
These data show that professional (i.e.: nurse) and unit ingroup identity (i.e.: mental health 
ward) was a predictor of when accommodative emotional expression strategies were used by 
members. For instance, across all the meetings, it was members from the same profession or unit as 
the member who had been involved in the error that used accommodative emotional expression 
strategies, rather than outgroup members. This often included the PSO (a trained nurse) when 
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addressing other nurses in the analysis team, thus affirming her ingroup status. In the following 
example the content expert, who was a nursery NUM from another hospital, used emotional 
expression to demonstrate her empathy for NUM3, in whose nursery a baby had been given the 
wrong mother’s expressed breast milk: 
‘My heart goes out to you, it’s horrible, it’s horrible for everyone involved … 
 
We are incredibly fortunate, we are very conscious of that, but we still 
make errors, we are still human’ [NUM4, HEAPS2]. 
The expression of accommodative emotional expression in this excerpt placed a focus 
 
on the inevitability of error and normalised it as part of clinicians’ experience. By 
including herself in the statement, the content expert invoked her identity as a clinician 
who has made errors and implied her understanding of the psychological distress, she 
perceived NUM3 was feeling. This demonstrates affiliation and thus is accommodative in 
nature. Given that HEAPS involve those members associated with the error occurrence, it 
could be argued that the use of this strategy allowed NUM3 to maintain a positive self- 
image and may also serve to deflect criticism for the error from other team members, who 
were also clinicians and thus also vulnerable to error occurrence. 
8.4.4.1.3 Subtheme 3: Praise 
 
Across all the HEAPS meetings, the PSO used praise to build rapport, positioning this as an 
accommodative strategy. Praise is typically expressed more by lower than higher-status members 
(Morand, 1996). In the following example from HEAPS3, the PSO positioned the members as 
valued experts of the team, thus reducing intergroup differences based on professional and status 
identities: ‘So I guess … emm … because I am not the expert here, I am just looking for your 
expertise of what you feel…’. Later, the PSO was effusive in her praise of members’ efforts in the 
meeting: ‘That was thorough, thank you. That was fantastic!’ 
8.4.4.2 Non-accommodative emotional expression 
 
Instances of non-accommodative emotional expression were rare in these data, only 
occurring in HEAPS3. This is discussed in the meeting-specific section 8.7.3. 
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8.4.5 Theme 4: Discourse Management 
 
8.4.5.1 Accommodative discourse management 
 
8.4.5.1.1 Subtheme 1: Process 
 
Discourse management is one of the broadest CAT categories (Coupland et al., 1988. These 
data revealed that the PSO employed minimal accommodative discourse management strategies in 
all the HEAPS meetings. What was noteworthy was that it was instead the higher-status doctors 
who adopted accommodative discourse management strategies, and this was manifested at a process 
level. For instance, the pharmacist in HEAPS3 and the senior doctor in HEAPS1 initiated the 
investigative discourse at the beginning of the meetings after the PSO had been joking with team 
members. The following example depicts the senior doctor taking the lead in an accommodative 
manner by offering the PSO the choice of deciding where to start with the meeting process: 
PSO: How good is this 
room? Dr1: It's kind of 
interesting. 
PSO: Hidden. I'm excited. 
 
Dr1: This is the naughty room for 
this? PSO: Yes. 
Dr1: ‘You go in there and you stay there. Don't come out until you can 
behave” Anyway, I suppose we better get on with it. [HEAPS1: Dr1, PSO] 
8.4.5.1.2 Subtheme 2: Inviting member input 
 
Similarly, these data show that the high-status members in HEAPS1 and HEAPS3 employed 
discourse management as an accommodative strategy. They used items such as asking lower-status 
members for their opinions in a manner that was respectful of professional expertise, asking 
members to reflect on how unit processes may have contributed to error occurrence, and listening to 
the statements of others. In HEAPS3, asking questions of members was pertinent because the 
member had not contributed at that point such as in this example, where Dr4 invites the opinion of 
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the junior nurse: ‘X [name], you spent a lot of time with this patient, what do you think was 
happening there?’. 
Hospitals are hierarchical environments where power differentials are salient for clinicians, 
either explicitly or implicitly, which means that the invitation from the high- status consultant for 
the lower-status nurse to speak is accommodative. By treating the nurse as an equal colleague with 
valued insight into the patient’s condition, the doctor refers to her in ingroup terms. This is 
supportive of Edmondson’s (2003a) findings that high-status clinicians in a leadership role can 
reduce status differences by inviting members to speak, and this reduces self-censorship by team 
members. However, this could also be viewed as an asymmetric (non-reciprocal) discourse 
management resource - the junior nurse could not invite the senior clinician to speak, nor could she 
have refused to answer his question. 
8.4.5.2 Non-accommodative discourse management 
 
8.4.5.2.1 Subtheme 1: Unequal turn taking 
 
An important aspect of discourse management is how interactants navigate communication 
breakdowns (Chen & Cegala, 1994). Analysis showed that the most prevalent form of 
communication breakdown in all the HEAPS meetings was members never or rarely giving input. 
In HEAPS2, two of the lower-status nurses rarely spoke and the PSO did not facilitate their 
contribution by inviting their input or asking them questions. Similarly, in HEAPS3, the NUM and 
junior nurse spoke significantly less than the pharmacist and consultant, even though they had spent 
more time caring for the patient. The lack of equal turn taking may have been attributable to the 
inexperience of the PSO who was new to the role. This may also have prompted Dr4 in HEAPS 3 to 
intervene to elicit input from lower status members. This is non accommodative towards the PSO as 
it undermines her status as chair of the meeting but may have been more pronounced in this 
instance due to her inexperience. 
These data also showed that the PSO failed to gain member input on which 
recommendations were final and included in the report. Given analysis requires team members to 
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collaborate on recommendations to reduce error recurrence, this was a non- accommodative 
discourse management strategy. In the following example, the PSO articulates the corrective action 
to be tabled in the final report to management. Even though these are points that have emerged from 
prior discussion, and she uses some certainty-reducing hedges (such as "I note", "I think", "maybe", 
"we could"), she fails to give a direct invitation to members as to whether they agree these should 
be the final 
‘I think the recommendation that we're gonna put forward is that the slide 
access, which you've already put into place, that that came out of this incident. 
Then maybe we could look into dementia bracelets’ [HEAPS1: PSO]. 
8.4.5.2.2 Subtheme 2: Rapid, short questions 
 
In the meeting (HEAPS2) where a member was highly emotional (the error occurred 
in the nursery she managed), the PSO diverged from NUM3’s communication style of long 
verbose answers by using short, direct questions and speaking over NUM3 to direct the focus 
of the discourse from her grievances on staffing to establish an understanding of error 
circumstances: 
NUM3: For example, not last weekend, but the weekend before, um, it was 14 
 
babies in the nursery. No it was 13 babies in the nursery, it was a clinical 
midwife and a core staff member who would not be a primary staff member and 
doesn't ever want to be a primary staff member, she's got no neonatal training, 
she’s just got experience on the ward, uhm so they called the clinical midwife 
out of the nursery to be our hospital coordinator, so therefore then the core 
nursery staff member who never wants to be the primary person with two 
people from maternity services with 13 babies. There was a fitting baby and she 
rang the clinical midwife and said, ‘I’ve seen a baby fit once and I’m not sure 
of what I’m doing in such procedures, can you please come and support me’ 
and she said ‘yes’. THAT'S what happens to our staff. Because unfortunately 
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it’s a specialty area and like I said, it’s not always staffed like one. 
 
PSO: So, there was no core staff member that 
day? NUM3: There was one and one that was…. 
PSO: So, she was there with two midwives and the 
clinical midwife was asked to go up there to cover 
the sick leave? 
NUM3: Mm, so with thirteen babies in and one fitting… [HEAPS2: PSO, 
NUM3] 
 
While this could be considered non-accommodative in nature, because the PSO did not 
accommodate NUM3, this is an example of how non- accommodative communication can be 
positive in terms of moving the process forward at times when members are dominating the 
discourse. 
However, during another HEAPS meeting where the PSO asked questions of a security 
guard about the environment in which the error occurred, her use of a non- accommodative 
discourse management strategy of asking rapid, short questions was divergent and prevented him 
from elaborating on his answers: 
PSO: How many cameras do we have throughout the 
facility? Security guard1: 45. 
PSO: Are any on the 
wards? Security guard1: No. 
PSO: Any at the lifts? 
Security guard1: No. The only ones that are on this on the ground floor, 
but where in the wards I don't know. Only the ground floor has got a... 
Dr1: [interrupting] Yeah, got that one outside [crosstalk 00:47:57]. 
PSO: On the both sides? Because you know [crosstalk 00:48:00] when you can 
go out that way or that way? 
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Security guard1: Yeah, that's how we found him. We found [inaudible 00:48:03] 
 
in the lift. 
 
PSO: Right. There's one on both sides, is it?? 
 
[HEAPS: Dr1, PSO, Security Guard 1] 
 
 
This non-accommodative strategy served to emphasise the security guard’s outgroup status as 
a non-clinician. Since it minimised his input, it was a non- accommodative discourse management 
strategy. However, as the PSO asked mainly closed questions of the guard, it also served to 
heighten the status differential between them, suggesting that she was not interested in his opinion 
or insight, making this a non- accommodative interpersonal control strategy. Since the security 
guard was the only non- clinician in the meeting and had not had prior experience of a HEAPS 
meeting, this strategy prevented the overcoming of the outgroup barrier. 
8.4.6 Examination of Intergroup Findings According to Human Error and Patient Safety 
Meetings 
Analysis of the HEAPS meeting transcripts revealed differences among the meetings in 
terms of which CAT strategies were employed. Whilst the meetings were ran by the same PSO, 
they were attended by different teams with divergent status and professional backgrounds. The 
HEAPS meetings are compared in terms of how the CAT strategies used differ according to the 
intergroup dynamic and status and profession of the interactants in the teams. Table 8.4 illustrates 
the CAT themes according to the meeting. The information provided in this summary table will 
then be expanded on / discussed meeting by meeting in the following 3 sections: 8.5; 8.6; and 8.7. 
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Table 8.4 
 
Main Themes Emerging in the Coding Categorised According to CAT and Meeting 
 
Meeting HEAPS1 HEAPS2 HEAPS3 
Team composition 3 doctors, 2 nurses, 1 security guard 5 nurses, 1 dietician, 1 research 
officer 
1 senior consultant, 1 pharmacist, 1 
NUM, 1 junior nurse 
Patient died from stroke; concern 
raised about gaps in care (SAC1) 
The ways in which participants 
referred to ingroup identities: 
• Shared purpose around 
completing HEAPS process after 
first meeting was aborted 
Error type Mental patient absconded (SAC1) Baby given wrong breast milk 
 
Accommodative 
interpersonal control 
strategies 
 
The ways in which participants 
referred to ingroup identities: 
(SAC2) 
The ways in which participants 
referred to ingroup identities: 
• As NUMs working in special 
care nursery unit and 
experience of being vulnerable 
to error as clinicians 
• Shared identity as 
hospital employees (see 
8.4.2.1.2) 
 •  Shared responsibility for staff 
•  Shared responsibility for error 
•  Shared experience of 
intergroup conflict with other 
groups 
•  Organisational 
decisions impact care 
•  How organisational 
decisions impact   clinician’s 
capacity to provide safe care 
Non-Accommodative 
interpersonal control 
The ways in which participants 
inferred outgroup status: 
• Emphasis on members not 
working for same hospital 
Power and status—how members 
asserted their higher status: 
• Frequent interruptions of nurses 
and PSO by doctor and 
pharmacist 
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Meeting HEAPS1 HEAPS2 HEAPS3 
 • Frequent interruptions and side 
conversations by ward 
members 
 • Questions directed to doctor not 
nurses about aspects to do with 
patient condition 
 
Accommodative 
interpretability 
strategies 
 
Clarification of error stages 
 
 
 
Abbreviated input caused by 
frequent interruptions 
Rapid Questions resulting in 
brief unexplored answers 
 
Empathy towards staff 
predicament when involved in 
error / security guard 
empathises with nurse’s 
workload 
 
Not Observed 
 
PSO defined analysis process 
at beginning of meeting 
 
Clarification of error stages and 
circumstances 
 
High-status doctor defined terms for 
nurses and PSO 
Non-Accommodative 
interpretability 
strategies 
  
 
Accommodative 
emotional expression 
 
NUM4 (content expert) 
empathised with NUM3 over 
distress she felt at error occurring 
in her unit. 
 
NUM offered support to doctor 
around frustrations 
Non-Accommodative 
emotional expression 
  
Pharmacist failed to reassure PSO 
that error was not hospital’s fault 
Accommodative 
discourse management 
PSO defined analysis process at 
beginning of meeting 
PSO defined analysis process at 
beginning of meeting 
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Meeting HEAPS1 HEAPS2 HEAPS3 
 
 
 
 
Non-Accommodative 
discourse management 
Doctor initiated investigative 
process when PSO did not. 
 
PSO failed to assign team roles 
to members 
Unequal turn taking (members 
dominated discourse) 
Short questions to NUM3to reduce 
her domination of discourse and 
facilitate equal turn taking 
 
PSO failed to assign team roles to 
members 
Unequal turn taking (2 lower- 
status members did not contribute 
to discourse) 
 
 
 
 
Pharmacist initiated investigative 
process when PSO telling jokes 
High-status doctor asked low- 
status members for input 
 
165  
8.5 HEAPS1: Mental Health Patient Absconded from Hospital 
 
HEAPS1 involved three doctors, the NUM [NUM1] from the mental health ward where the 
patient absconded from, the manager of security at the hospital and a NUM [NUM2] from a mental 
health ward in another hospital. 
8.5.1 Interpersonal Control 
 
8.5.1.1 Accommodative interpersonal control 
 
Subtheme 1: Responsibility for staff 
Team members invoked an accommodative interpersonal control strategy of invoking a 
shared identity around a sense of responsibility for staff involved in the error. Since 4 out of the 6 
analysis team members worked on the same mental health ward, ward identity was salient and this 
created a sense of superordinate analysis team purpose around ensuring staff from the ward were 
informed about the analysis outcomes, therefore heightening team identity. Dr 2, NUM1 and the 
security guard spoke of supporting staff and highlighting the need for feedback: 
NUM1: I think we need to let the staff know who were on that morning, we've 
had this meeting [crosstalk 01:37:28] Are you okay? Would you like to speak 
to anybody? Blah blah blah. Because it was an extended period afterwards... 
It’s all sort of horrible. We all feel badly, but it wasn't in the acute moment 
when we were all thinking about him a lot, because it kind of went quiet, and 
then we were asked not to call the police…. 
Dr 2: They said "we will ring you if we find him"… 
 
Security Guard1: Feedback from QPS [Queensland Police Service] on 
anything is pretty poor. 
Security Guard: I don't think they feed back to any of us. My department has a 
lot of dealings with them, they never feedback anything 
PSO: That's bad in a way, because she said to me [crosstalk 01:38:19] 
Security Guard : That is bad, Sort of gives them a little bit of closure on their 
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job to know what happened. 
 
This theme points towards the social psychological process of seeing staff as 
individuals, rather than as outgroup members (Hogg & Terry, 2000), and positions the staff as 
having distinct emotional needs around the distress caused by the error occurring in their unit. 
Intergroup divides are reduced between team members because they share a concern for ward staff 
where the error occurred. Team members construct their unit identity in terms of collaboratively 
building an "outgroup" orientation to their shared concern by invoking interpersonal references. As 
such, this example shows how pre-existing ingroup (ward staff, clinicians) and outgroup 
roles/identities (non-clinicians, non-ward staff) can be strategically deployed in the creation of a 
new, locally constituted ingroup around sharing a level of distress that the error occurred and the 
patient died (i.e. "we might be members of different groups, but this is something we all have in 
common") 
Subtheme 2: Responsibility for error 
 
The issue of responsibility for error was salient in HEAPS1 and members explicitly 
reflected on this in terms in terms of what they could have done better to avoid the error occurrence, 
as illustrated in this excerpt: 
NUM1: He wasn't on a close patient observation, but he was moved into that 
bay specifically because there was a nurse in there who'd be able to keep an eye. 
(cross talk as Dr2 takes a phone call) But it wasn't planned very well, was it, that 
they hadn't seen him? So that's maybe a nursing communication patient on the 
ward, that, how well are we communicating that this man needed an eye- 
keeping.NUM1: We all knew that he'd gone off and come back, so it wasn't a 
concern. But how did we monitor when he went – 
NUM2: (finishes NUM1’s sentence) And when he came back. 
NUM1: And when he came back. [HEAPS1: NUM1, NUM2, Dr1] 
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This open disclosure process engaged in by the nurses and doctor is an important aspect of 
an effective analysis process. Given that four of the analysis team were from the ward where the 
error occurred, this may have facilitated a level of trust and support pertinent to an ingroup context 
(ward members) and engendered a dynamic where they felt able to explore the concept of their 
responsibility for the error in the analysis setting (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1998). Furthermore, the fact 
that this was two high-status members modelling open disclosure suggests that this created a group 
norm for the analysis team of open communication at the relational level. 
Subtheme 3: Intergroup conflict 
 
These data revealed that when analysis team members referenced cases of intergroup 
conflict, in terms of how the action of other groups had made aspects of the error more challenging, 
their group identity as health professionals involved in the error heightened, and this served to 
enhance analysis team identity. This was associated with members’ sense that other groups had 
failed to take shared responsibility for error. For instance, in the following comment Dr2 speaks of 
how the unit staff discovered that the absconding patient had died through a police Facebook page, 
implying that the organisation was remiss in not informing them directly: ‘We need to support the 
staff, we found out on the QPS [Queensland Police Service] Facebook page that he (patient) was 
deceased’ [HEAPS1: Dr 2]. 
Dr3 made outgroup references about a psychologist who had seen the patient and perceived 
that this had unsettled him, implying this was a precursor to his leaving 
the hospital: 
 
‘They brought him in for a mental health assessment, and he was fully 
assessed at that time as not having a mental illness’; later stating, ‘Yeah. He 
was unsettled ... Then he was seen by the psychologist. It may have provoked 
that further, because it’s once again talking about his cognitive impairment’ 
[HEAPS1: Dr3]. 
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The use of the passive voice and indefinite 'it' serves to distance the mental health ward staff 
from the psychologist. By invoking a downward intergroup comparison towards the psychologist, 
the doctor enhances the ingroup status of the mental health ward staff, suggesting he wants to 
mitigate criticism towards his ingroup members (ward staff) and imply a level of shared 
responsibility for the error. This demonstrates that a strategy of invoking downward comparisons 
between groups may be used by members to protect ingroup members, when they have been 
involved in the error. 
Subtheme 4: Organisation versus clinician 
 
Ingroup identity, as clinicians working in unfavourable organisational conditions, was 
invoked by team members in HEAPS1 around shared frustration at management’s decisions and 
there was a sense that latent systems factors had created the situation where the patient was able to 
abscond (see 8.4.2.1.2 for how this impacted across the HEAPS meetings). For instance, in this 
extract, Dr 2 explains how administration had failed to arrange for a door to be fixed: ‘Because we 
had a patient who was breaking the exit. He got to the door, and he had kept the thing, and opened 
the door and got out. Then we kept on asking admin to fix it.’ [HEAPS1: Dr 2]. 
Doctors construed responsibility for patient care as being affected by the hospital culture 
and referred to occasions where hospital policy and processes disrupted clinical responsibility. For 
instance, Dr1 spoke of responsibility for a patient being detached when a patient left the environs of 
the ward, assigning it to the wider culture around how guardianship and restraint are handled within 
the organisation: ‘Nowadays 
they're saying that, “No, if you want to go out, you can go wave your hand there”. Anyone could 
have waved that hand. Just opened’ [HEAPS1; Dr 1] 
While these references to latent factors heightened ingroup membership as hospital 
employees working in difficult circumstances and thus were accommodative in nature, they also 
heightened a sense of intergroup threat from the organisation and a diminished sense of shared 
responsibility. Given that analysis is an organisational directive, it could be argued that this 
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disrupted the faith the members had that the outcomes of the analysis would be taken seriously and 
thus were strategically employed by members to undermine the formation of a superordinate 
analysis team identity. Whilst it is important to consider how systems failures contribute to error in 
the analysis process, this comment shows how this must be handled skilfully by the PSO to mitigate 
intergroup differences between team members and the organisation. 
8.5.1.2 Non-Accommodative Interpersonal Control 
 
Sub Theme 1: Organisation Vs Clinician 
 
The example in 8.5.1.1.4 also illustrates an orientation to 'systems factors', as opposed to 
focusing on individual or unit-level responsibility or blame, as required by error analysis 
methodology. From a critical analysis perspective, the focus on 'system- level factors' provides a 
discursive resource for strengthening the divide between clinicians/local unit/ department and the 
wider organisation, thus, it can be argued subverting the philosophy of the HEAPS methodology . 
Sub Theme 2: Interruptions 
Interruptions were more frequent in HEAPS 1 than the other meetings (see 8.4.2.2.1 
for example and discussion). As discussed in 8.5.1.1.1, the fact that 4 out of 6 analysis members 
were from the same mental health ward (three doctors, one NUM) suggests that interruptions may 
have been informed by the ward culture rather than used as a power display (Ziimmerman & 
West,1975). This contrasts with HEAPS2 and HEAPS3 where members were from different wards 
and departments and interruptions were less prevalent. The use of interruptions began shortly into 
the meeting and continued throughout. Whilst the PSO failed to manage this through 
accommodative discourse management strategies, and this may have been due to her inexperience, 
her own use of interruptions suggests that she was accommodating to the cultural communication 
style of the ward members (Giles & Johnson,1987). 
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8.5.2 Interpretability 
 
8.5.2.1 Accommodative Interpretability 
 
In HEAPS 1, the use of accommodative interpretability strategies was limited to members 
clarifying the stages that led to the error (see 8.4.3.1.2). 
Subtheme 1: Clarification of factors that led to error 
 
Members used the accommodative interpretability strategy of clarifying the stages leading to 
the error more often in HEAPS1 than the other HEAPS meetings (see 8.4.3.1.2 for example and 
discussion). For instance, both the security guard , Dr2 and NUM1 clarified the stages that led to  
the patient absconding by referring to current safety and security policies relevant to their role 
(camera placement for the security guard, door access and ward processes for NUM1 and Dr2). 
This may have been due to the professional diversity on the team and an understanding between 
members that other professional groups would have limited knowledge of their systems and 
processes. This was an accommodative interpretability strategy, as it enhanced team members' 
exploration of system level vulnerabilities . This is an essential component of the HEAPS process 
as this understanding is required so recommendations can be made to management to address those 
vulnerabilities. 
8.5.2.2 Non-Accommodative Interpretability 
 
Subtheme 1: Abbreviated Input 
 
As discussed in 8.4.2.2.1, the impact of frequent interruptions by members and 
 
cross talk resulted in members giving abbreviated input . This limited the team's understanding of 
the points raised by members and was a barrier to members' ability to expand on points raised or 
explore the answers of others. In HEAPS, the PSO would be expected to manage this through 
accommodative discourse management strategies, but she did not do this which may have been due 
to her inexperience in the role. 
Subtheme 2: Rapid Questions 
 
As discussed in 8.4.5.2.2 , the PSO asked brief rapid questions of the security guard, 
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limiting his capacity to expand on his answers nor allow other members to explore the information 
given. This may have been a power display by the PSO, reflective of her perception of his outgroup 
status as a non-clinician as she did not employ this non accommodative strategy with clinicians in 
the team. 
8.5.3 Emotional Expression 
 
8.5.3.1 Accommodative Emotional Expression 
 
Subtheme 1: Empathy towards staff predicament when involved in error 
 
Accommodative emotional expression was observed in HEAPS1. As discussed in 8.5.1.1.1, 
members demonstrated accommodative emotional expression by demonstrating empathy towards 
staff impacted by the patient's death. Further, the PSO employed emotional expression to empathise 
with staff around the challenges associated with their role working in a mental health ward (see 
8.4.4.1.2). This appeared to enhance member engagement (as evidenced by all members giving 
input) and thus it could be argued increased team identity and commitment to achieving the goals of 
the analysis. 
8.5.3.1 Non-Accommodative Emotional Expression 
 
This was not noted in HEAPS 1. 
 
8.5.4 Discourse Management 
 
8.5.4.1 Accommodative Discourse Management 
 
Subtheme 1: High status member directs discourse 
 
Whilst there were some instances of accommodative discourse management in this meeting 
(see 8.4.5.1.1), these were used by a high status doctor (Dr1) in terms of moving the analysis 
discourse forward, saying "Anyway, I suppose we better get on with it" when the PSO was telling 
jokes, or inviting member input (see 8.4.5.1.2) and as such were non accommodative of the PSO. 
Other than defining the meeting process at the beginning, the PSO did not use accommodative 
discourse management strategies in HEAPS1, this resulted in members employing non 
accommodative discourse management strategies such as crosstalk and interruptions. 
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8.5.4.2 Non-Accommodative Discourse Management 
 
Subtheme 1: Failure to Assign Roles 
 
In HEAPS1, the PSO failed to assign roles to members. This was pertinent because the team 
included both a content expert from another hospital, who ran a mental health ward. This resulted in 
the content expert restricting her input and thus the value of her input was muted. 
Subtheme 2: Unequal Turn Taking 
 
Consistent interruptions and side conversations by members (see 8.4.2.2.1 for example) 
resulted in unequal turn taking by members. Members from the ward where the error occurred 
dominated the discourse (see 8.4.5.2.1) whilst the NUM from the other hospital and the security 
guard gave significantly less input. This highlights the importance of having member diversity on 
the analysis team to ensure that embedded group communication norms (in this case, the mental 
health unit) do not disrupt the analysis team communication and mitigate the formation of a 
superordinate team identity. 
The failure of the PSO to use accommodative discourse management strategies to 
 
enable equal member input and to manage the interruptions and side conversations of members, 
meant that the meeting had come to an end before the team could collaborate on devising 
recommendations to mitigate the possibility of another patient absconding in similar circumstances. 
Thus, at the end of the meeting the PSO was directive and appeared rushed in error 
recommendations, as in the following excerpt, where she requests input without having flagged that 
members should consider this aspect. It was only the security guard who answered: 
PSO: Do you have anything else to add anyone? Anything else to add (name)? 
you think we could improve. Anything? 
Security guard1: No. 
 
PSO: I think that's pretty good recommendations, and if we actually get those 
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cameras put in and everything, and the photo idea, I think, will be very helpful. 
 
[HEAPS1: PSO, Security Guard1] 
The failure to involve all members at this critical stage of the process meant that the 
recommendations did not benefit from the expertise and insight of the members and thus may lack 
rigour. This suggests that the intergroup dynamic was disruptive in the analysis process and a 
failure to reduce intergroup differences and accommodate members through effective discourse 
management directly influenced the quality of the recommendations that emerged. 
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8.6 HEAPS2: Newborn Baby Given Wrong Mother’s Expressed Breast Milk 
 
HEAPS2 involved two NUMs who managed the special care nursery, a NUM who 
managed the special care nursery in a neighbouring regional hospital (the content expert), a NUM 
of a paediatric ward, a paediatric nurse, one dietician, and one research officer. 
8.6.1 Interpersonal Control 
 
8.6.1.1 Accommodative Interpersonal Control 
 
Subtheme 1: Shared Identity as NUMs of Special Care Nursery Unit 
 
In HEAPS2, there were two staff from the unit where the error occurred, and unit identity 
was found to be salient for these members. In the following example, by referencing unit identity 
implicitly, NUM6 positions herself as an ingroup member with NUM3 in terms of understanding 
their experience of challenges associated with running a special care unit: 
NUM 3: I mean every shift, we don't have those resources and because we fall 
under the umbrella of maternity which is at full time equivalent numbers … too 
bad, too sad. That's what it is, so and it puts an incredible amount for these girls 
to manage. 
NUM 6: because it’s not as if you can say ‘sorry, we are full, we can’t take any 
more admissions, we are to capacity and we don't have the staff’. [HEAPS2: 
NUM3, NUM6] 
Whilst this was accommodating for other unit members, it also served to heighten intergroup 
divides between non unit members in the team and was thus non accommodating, creating a level of 
intergroup divergence between members. 
8.6.1.2 Non-accommodative interpersonal control 
 
Subtheme 1: Emphasis on outgroup status of team members 
 
Interpersonal control was mostly non-accommodative in this HEAPS meeting and 
this involved the two NUMs in whose unit the error occurred emphasising the outgroup 
status of other members. For instance, NUM3 invoked hospital identity when she inferred 
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that staff were overwhelmed with patients: 
 
Unless we are busting at the seams, will they stop the inductions to go, look 
these girls have only got 15 members in the nursery so let’s not induce this 
woman for this reason … we are a busy nursery in a medium-sized hospital. 
[HEAPS2: NUM3]. 
While this communicated ingroup identity with team members from the same hospital and 
was thus a form of accommodation, it also pointed to a desire to communicate that the expert from 
the neighbouring hospital was an outgroup member, even though she was from the same profession 
and speciality, and thus was non- accommodating. 
This is consistent with SIT’s assertion that group membership becomes more salient when 
there is competition for resources. In the following exchange NUM3 communicates her perception 
of resource inequity between the two hospitals to the content expert (NUM4) from the neighbouring 
hospital, thus emphasising intergroup differences: 
NUM4: there will be still be three staff providing direct care to the babies, there 
will be a team leader coordinating. 
NUM 3: plus? 
 
NUM4: And that's not even talking about our educator, our nurse practitioner. 
NUM3: Yes! That's the difference they have got a 0.5 FTE [full-time equivalent], 
Can you PLEASE [PSO’s name] please? 
NUM4: Its ok, but the reality of what we’ve got is not going to change. 
 
[HEAPS2, NUM3, NUM4] 
 
8.6.2 Interpretability 
 
8.6.2.1 Accommodative interpretability strategies 
 
Subtheme 1: Clarification of error stages and circumstances 
 
In the meeting, the use of interpretability strategies was low because the majority of 
members were nurses and had a clear understanding of the stages leading to the error. Non 
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accommodative interpretability strategies were not used .Where non- nurse members required 
clarity around process, they asked succinct clear questions that were answered promptly, indicating 
the use of accommodative interpretability strategies by members and the PSO—as in this example 
where the dietician asks about staffing resources, an aspect highlighted by NUM3 as a reason for 
the error: 
Dietician1: Would there have been someone available to call in from outside? 
NUM3: We’ve got a small pool of neonatal nurses—a very small pool, uhm but 
I don't know whether or not. 
Dietician1: There may have been another option other than someone from 
maternity? 
PSO: You'd think you'd have the midwife, if she was the nurse manager, 
wouldn’t she have the ability to call in one of your core people, so that was an 
option? 
NUM3: They are so scared to call staff in, they are so pushed from above, like 
you know , petrified to call people. [HEAPS2: PSO, NUM3, Dietician] 
8.6.2 Emotional Expression 
 
8.6.3.1 Accommodative emotional expression 
 
Subtheme 1: Expression of empathy towards NUM in whose unit error occurred 
 
In HEAPS2, non-accommodative emotional expression was not noted. This may have been 
because 5 out of 7 members were nurses and appeared motivated to provide support to the visible 
distress expressed by NUM3 in whose unit the error occurred. Accommodative emotional 
expression consisted of members (nurses) using supportive communication to signal ingroup status 
as fellow nurses and reduce intergroup divides. The following exchange illustrates the importance 
of communicating an appropriate level of emotional response for a less hostile interaction. In this 
example, NUM4 from the neighbouring hospital (content expert) expresses her empathy for the 
distress that NUM3 involved in the error is feeling: 
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NUM3: How long have you been in your current nurseries? Which is the new 
nursery, it is a beautiful nursery. It’s not like, I mean, the space that they have 
for one baby, we cram three into… 
NUM4: My heart goes out to you, it’s horrible, it’s horrible for everyone 
involved. [HEAPS2: NUM3, NUM4] 
NUM4’s expression of emotional support emphasises her attempt to reduce intergroup 
divides based on hospital of employment. Interestingly, this was done after NUM3 had highlighted 
NUM4’s outgroup status, so it could be argued that this was motivated by NUM4's desire to reclaim 
ingroup status as fellow nursery managers and clinicians. 
8.6.4 Discourse Management 
 
8.6.4.1 Accommodative Discourse Management 
 
As discussed in the overall findings, the PSO used short questions to reduce the dominance of 
the discourse by NUM3, (see 8.4.5.2.2) however this was not effective, with NUM3 continuing to 
dominate the discussion. This may have been due to the PSO's inexperience, it may also have been 
due to lower status members not wishing to speak up when a higher status NUM was dominating 
the discourse. 
8.6.4.2 Non-Accommodative Discourse Management 
 
Subtheme 1:PSO fails to assign team roles to members 
 
As discussed in 8.4.2.2.5, the PSO failed to assign analysis team roles to members 
during the meeting. This resulted in NUM4, Nurse 2 and the AHP either failing to give 
input or feeling unsure about when to give their input as in this excerpt from the individual 
interviews with NUM4: 
"It's hard when you are bringing together a group of people and other 
clinicians that don't know each other...I felt that to begin with, you know, I felt 
I wasn't too sure of what to say." [NUM4, HEAPS2] 
178  
Subtheme 2: Unequal turn taking 
 
Please see 8.4.5.2.1 for examples and discussion. This was non accommodative because it 
resulted in two members having minimal or no input. Given they were lower status than the NUMs 
present, this suggests that accommodative discourse management in terms of managing member 
input is a critical part of incident analysis teams where there is unequal status amongst members. 
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8.6 HEAPS3: Patient Died as a result of blood clot, concerns around care 
 
8.7.1 Interpersonal Control 
 
8.7.1.1 Accommodative interpersonal control 
 
Subtheme 1: Shared purpose 
 
This meeting involved two nurses (NUM and nurse), one pharmacist and one senior 
consultant. All but the pharmacist had been directly involved in the patient’s care. Three members 
were involved in a previous HEAPS meeting that was aborted when two consultants left dismissing 
the process. The following example illustrates the PSO’s reference to the previous meeting and her 
emphasis on the importance of members’ contributions to the current meeting: 
PSO: I do think that what we come up with as good recommendations will be 
implemented by the surgical team, but I felt that when we were telling him our 
concerns that he sort of was fixated that the coroner had… 
NUM7: had already … done it 
 
PSO: had already come up with the finding and that his care wasn’t related to 
this patient’s demise so he couldn’t see the big changes needed but I think if we 
could come up with as what we see as correct, because I think even J [name] 
ummm, he wrote a response letter, and the medical team requested that he give 
the risonium to lower the potassium level. Pharmacist1: Ahemmm 
PSO: He would probably enjoy the feedback of knowing what your opinions are 
regarding risonium. [HEAPS3: PSO, NUM7, Pharmacist] 
These data show that the experience of having participated in a previous HEAPS heightened 
ingroup identity and the PSO’s explicit reference to this and the importance of members working 
together to complete the process heightened a sense of belonging to the analysis team and reduced 
intergroup differences. This may have also pre- empted a perceived possibility of reluctance to 
provide unwanted feedback to a senior high-status colleague. 
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8.7.1.2 Non-Accommodative Interpersonal Control 
8.7.1.2.1 Power and Status 
 
Power and status differentials were especially salient in this meeting compared to HEAPS 1 
and 2. The data show that this informed the direction of interruptions, with high-status members 
(doctor and pharmacist) interrupting lower-status members (nurses) (see 8.4.2.2.1) 
Further, the majority of questions regarding the decisions around the appropriate care of the 
patient were addressed to the doctor and not the nurses who took care of the patient, as in the 
following extract where the pharmacist questions the doctor about patient condition despite the 
nurse having documented and monitored the urine output of the patient: 
Pharmacist1: Full doc care or just escalation in general? 
NUM7: No just escalation in general. 
PSO: he’s in there as recognising and responding, he just didn’t to the patient, 
but I think they are doing it as part of the… 
Pharmacist1: So, err there’s an issue with urine output, not necessarily 
escalated quickly enough (turning to doctor); is that what you’d say? 
Dr4: We don’t know whether escalated is not documented so I don’t know that. 
Nurse1: I know verbally that everyone has said that, two hours if there’s no 
urine output, then at three hours, we are definitely ringing the doctor about the 
patient, so it does happen but there’s just lack of… [HEAPS3: Dr4, Pharmacist, 
NUM7, Nurse1] 
 
The pharmacist’s direction of his questions towards the doctor suggests a level of social 
mobility (Weatherall & Gallois, 2003), which is explained in SIT as an attempt by lower-status 
members to join a higher-status group. This heightens the power differential between the nurses 
and the pharmacist and doctor, and thus is non- accommodative in nature. However, an alternative 
interpretation may be that the pharmacist attributes greater 'expert authority' to the doctor than to 
the nurse, and this may have been perceived by the nurses as non-accommodating. 
181  
8.7.1 Interpretability 
 
8.7.1.2 Accommodative Interpretability 
 
Subtheme 1: Definition of Terms 
 
In HEAPS3, the high-status doctor (a consultant) made a point of defining pharmacological 
and medical terms for the nurses present and the PSO. This is detailed in 8.4.3.1.1. Whilst this type 
of interpretability strategy was more prevalent in HEAPS3 than the other meetings, this may have 
been due to the nature of the event, where there was concern that a failure to administer the correct 
drugs may have resulted in the patient's death. 
8.7.3 Emotional Expression 
 
8.7.3.1 Accommodative emotional expression 
 
Subtheme 1: Empathy around frustrations of role 
 
Members in this meeting frequently showed support to one another: the PSO, 
 
nurses and Dr4 expressed an understanding of the stresses of one another’s roles. In this example, 
NUM7 empathizes with the doctor’s frustration with the time taken to get ‘bloods’ back from the 
laboratory: 
Dr 4: most of the working people want to have their bloods done; you are 
 
waiting there for hours and hours. 
NUM7: …mmm and then no one would look at the results … it’s useless. 
[HEAPS3: NUM7, Dr 4] 
Because the NUM and the doctor both work in the same hospital, this serves to enhance the 
ingroup identity of clinicians’ experiences and demonstrates the NUM’s orientation towards the 
doctor's grievance around waiting for blood results. 
8.7.3.1  Non-accommodative emotional expression 
 
While non-accommodative emotional expression was rare across all the meetings, in this 
HEAPS meeting, the pharmacist used a form of non-accommodative emotional expression by not 
expressing reassurance to the PSO when she repeatedly asked for confirmation that the patient’s 
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death was not the hospital’s fault: 
 
PSO: so, the medication chart, when they got to the ward you were 
saying post op, we did the correct thing, we gave heparin in a timely 
manner, the cleaxaine dose was… 
Dr4: yep. 
 
PSO: err post op so… 
 
Pharmacist1: So, he wasn’t one that you would bridge, so the recommendation is 
for low-risk patients that you would start walking 24 hours after, or when they are 
in stasis, with bridging heparin or PT (Prothrombin Time). 
 
PSO: yes. 
 
Pharmacist1: so that’s a… 
 
PSO: [interrupting] so we did the right thing. Dr4: He had the prophylaxis, 
he restarted. 
Pharmacist1: Yep, so he started at his baseline dose, so you don’t reload 
again so that would have, that was all fine the post op management of that. 
Dr4: [interrupts her] On the day it 
was 2.9 PSO: Was it? 
Pharmacist1: So that was the potassium. 
 
Dr4: …and liver function, so everything done right, so maybe there was 
some potential for haemolysis and a few other. [HEAPS3: Dr4, PSO, 
Pharmacist1] 
This exchange illustrates how the high-status doctor was more attuned to providing the 
explicit reassurance the PSO was seeking that the patient had been treated appropriately than the 
pharmacist who was more implicit in his review. This suggests that the doctor appears to align more 
closely with the PSO's stance (summative assessment) 'so we did the right thing', whilst the 
pharmacist focused on a mutual understanding of technical information. 
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8.7.4 Discourse Management 
 
8.7.4.1 Accommodative Discourse Management 
 
8.7.4.1.1 PSO defined analysis process 
 
As with all of the HEAPS meetings, the PSO began with explaining the process of the 
meeting. This was important in HEAP3 because an earlier HEAPS on the same case had been 
aborted, and so this accommodative discourse management strategy would have clarified for 
members what the process would entail and their role in being there: 
We could all have done better for this gentleman, and then I will 
write the report and we will all look at it and as a group and 
agree, even though the report (coroner's report) is what we 
discussed...and then we come up with recommendations of how 
we can help the next Mr (patient name) that turns up and what we 
have learnt from this case basically. [PSO, HEAPS3] 
8.7.4.2 Non-Accommodative Discourse Management 
 
Subtheme 1: Pharmacist directs process 
 
As discussed in 8.4.5.1.1, the pharmacist initiated the analysis process when the PSO 
was joking with the nurses present, by saying "So how do we proceed? Do we...?" Whilst this 
could be considered accommodative because it moved the analysis discourse, it could also be 
considered non accommodative towards the PSO, because it undermined her role of managing 
the communication process. 
Subtheme 2: High status doctor asks nurses for input 
 
As discussed in 8.4.5.1.1, the high-status consultant (Dr4) asked lower status 
members for their input. As in the above example, whilst this facilitated the analysis 
discourse, it served to undermine the PSO's role and was therefore 
non accommodative. 
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8.8 Discussion 
 
This study integrated CAT to explore the communicative processes strategies that inform the 
HEAPS analysis process. Accommodative communication strategies enhanced the communication 
dynamic across the disciplinary and hierarchical boundaries in the three analysis teams, served to 
reduce intergroup differences, heighten team identity and facilitate members’ engagement in the 
process. 
However, these data also showed that non-accommodative communication processes were a 
barrier to analysis effectiveness across all meetings: resulting in members failing to have input; 
high-status members dominating the discourse; and unequal status among members. Consequently, 
the investigation process became fragmented and diverged from the key steps of the HEAPS 
methodology. This served to heighten intergroup divides and reduce the formation of an analysis 
team identity. 
The main accommodative strategy employed by team members was interpretability. This was 
associated with clarifying understanding around error causation and the chain of events leading to 
the error. This is important in the multidisciplinary analysis setting as research shows that sharing of 
knowledge among professional communities of practice is problematic (Currie & Suhomlinova, 
2006). This was most prevalent in HEAPS 3 which had more professional diversification of 
members. This suggests that high ingroup membership in teams reduces members’ motivation to 
explain aspects of the error, due to assumptions of ingroup understanding. Interestingly, 
interpretability was used by the PSO and the high-status doctor but not low status members, 
suggesting that part of how high-status doctors identify themselves is to impart understanding to 
others. 
However, when it came to devising recommendations in all three meetings, the PSO failed 
to use accommodative interpretability strategies to enhance members’ understanding of 
recommendations to reduce error, instead presenting them as a “fait accompli”. Whilst this may 
have been due to her inexperience, this is a concerning finding as the final third of the analysis 
185  
process requires the analysis team to determine a series of corrective actions/recommendations and 
outcome measures. 
The use of emotional expression by members was accommodative in these data and focused 
on providing reassurance around error being inevitable and a normalisation of error. However, it 
was also non accommodative because it created a focus on the role of the organisation in creating 
the latent conditions for error to occur which tended to heighten members’ expression of clinician 
identity and heighten intergroup divides between themselves as clinicians and management. 
The most prevalent form of non-accommodative communicative strategy was interpersonal 
control, and this centred on high-status members’ interruption of others. This had an adverse effect 
on the analysis process, resulting in lower-status members either refraining from giving their input 
or not being able to elaborate on a point. Research has demonstrated that group members who 
interrupt the most have the greatest influence (Ng & Reid, 2000). These data showed that 
interruptions thwarted the PSO’s capacity to ask investigative questions of members and as such led 
to the high-status member gaining control of the meeting. What was noteworthy was that non- 
accommodative strategies were particularly prevalent in those meetings where there was a 
disproportionately high number of members from the same unit or profession present (HEAPS1 and 
2) suggesting that status was more meaningful for members when ingroup salience was high. 
 
Moreover, these data show that where a member involved in an error had a heightened 
psychological response to the error, there was a higher prevalence of non- accommodative 
communication behaviours such as unequal turn taking, interruptions of others, and divergence 
from the stages of the analysis to talk about grievances. 
Consistent with SIT’s assertion that perception of group threat heightens ingroup 
defensiveness, these data suggest that members involved in error experience a level of 
psychological threat in incident analysis and this informs communication that heightens intergroup 
differences. This supports previous research which suggest clinicians approach analysis with a 
sense of psychological threat (Nicolini, Waring & Mengis, 2011; Peerally et al., 2017). CAT 
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provides a framework of communication strategies for the PSO to enhance members’ psychological 
states, including accommodative discourse management and emotional expression. This is 
especially relevant for the HEAPS setting which includes members involved in the error. 
It was clear from these data that the PSO struggled to manage the discourse when non- 
accommodative communication behaviours occurred among team members. The PSO avoided 
addressing the dominant communication behaviours of high-status members. Given she trained as a 
nurse, her lower clinical status may have influenced her reluctance to address these behaviours 
(Edmondson, 2003a). as well as her lack of experience in the PSO role. The PSOs’ limited 
discourse management skills are an area that needs to be addressed in the HEAPS analysis setting in 
healthcare as research shows that members refrain from disclosing what they know in the analysis 
setting because of a fear of blame and repercussion from members higher in the hierarchy (Iedema 
et al., 2006). 
A further non-accommodative discourse management strategy was the failure to provide 
members with a clear understanding of their roles in all the HEAPS meetings. This created fertile 
ground for dominant communication behaviours to flourish and reduced the sense of team cohesion. 
This is pertinent because research suggests clinicians struggle with role identity in the analysis 
setting, unsure of what is required of them or how to do it (Cassin & Barach, 2012; Iedema et al., 
2008; Wu et al., 2002). 
This is a critical finding, as the effectiveness of the analysis process is dependent on team 
members offering their clinical expertise to prompt discussion about how systems factors 
contributed to the error occurring and determine means to prevent such error recurring (Patient 
Safety Centre, QLD Health, 2016). Further, given that Edmondson and Roloff (2009) found that 
effective communication across disciplinary and hierarchical boundaries is challenging for health 
professionals when they face uncertain conditions, these data show that non-accommodative 
communication strategies heightened intergroup divides and restrained members in roles informed 
by their status in the hospital hierarchy. 
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An important finding this data provides is observational evidence of the practical 
consequences of organisational support in the way the meetings proceeded and outcomes, 
particularly in terms of the lack of organisational support for the PSO. Even though the three 
HEAPS meetings observed were the first three meetings the PSO had conducted, she did this 
without the support of an experienced PSO to guide her. She was required to be up to speed quickly 
to conduct the analysis meeting. Her inexperience was evident in the failure to follow an analysis 
framework and manage the communication breakdowns in the team or facilitate equal turn taking, 
suggesting that prior training had been superficial. Whilst this finding may not be generalisable to 
other hospitals, it is reflective of a lack of organisational commitment on behalf of the hospital 
studied to incident analysis. To increase the salience of analysis for clinicians, this is an area that 
could be addressed through the provision of mentors, support staff and more comprehensive 
training. 
8.9 Limitations 
 
A limitation of this study was the small number of HEAPS meetings observed; however, the 
professional diversity of members and the divergent nature of the teams provided a rich 
interpretative analysis of four main CAT communication themes. The overall tone of the meetings 
was representative of the PSO’s inexperience in running incident analysis meetings and as such 
there was limited opportunity to understand how the invocation of accommodative discourse 
management strategies by a more experienced PSO might reduce intergroup divides. This could be 
a topic for future research. Further, given that the interactants were aware that they were being 
observed and recorded, they may have employed positive impression management strategies to 
display more accommodative communication strategies. 
8.10 Conclusions 
 
Overall, these data show that CAT provides a framework to analyse and interpret the 
communication strategies used by PSOs and members in HEAPS meetings to understand the ways 
in which they invoke ingroup identities and reduce intergroup divides. This work also demonstrates 
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the extension of CAT to incident analysis teams in high-risk organisations. A suggestion for future 
research is to develop an intergroup- informed communication tool for PSOs to enhance members’ 
engagement in the process and reduce intergroup differences. This work demonstrates the 
usefulness of an intergroup approach to the effectiveness of the HEAPS process, which is a 
sensitive environment where members may fear blame or recrimination for their role in error. 
8.11 Summary 
 
This chapter concludes the methodology and results of Study 3 where communication 
between HEAPS analysis team members was categorised according to CAT. This sets the scene for 
Study 4a where the participants were interviewed to understand their perceptions of participating in 
the incident analysis process. Their responses were analysed using a SIT lens to understand how 
intergroup factors affect the process. 
189  
Chapter 9: Study 4a—Examining Participants’ Perceptions of Human 
Error and Patient Safety Analysis Within an Intergroup 
Framework 
 
The previous chapter described the communication observed during three HEAPS meetings 
through an intergroup lens using CAT and SIT. In this chapter, the results of unstructured 
interviews with six of the participants who took part in the observed HEAPS meetings are presented 
and interpreted through an intergroup lens to understand how intergroup factors inform their 
motivations, cognitions and behaviours in this setting. This is the first study (4a) involving the data 
from these interviews. The second study employing these data (Study 4b) is presented in Chapter 
10. 
9.1 Aim 
 
How do professional identity, status and intergroup relationships influence the HEAPS analysis 
setting from the perspective of the participants? 
9.2 Methods 
 
9.2.1 Research Context 
 
In this study, hospital personnel who had participated in at least one of the three HEAPS 
meetings observed in Study 3 were interviewed. Participants worked in one of 
two regional public hospitals in Queensland. The face to face interviews were conducted in the 
same hospital the errors had occurred, enhancing the salience of organisational context. 
9.2.2 Sampling Method and Data Collection 
 
An invitation to participate in the interview phase was extended to Study 3 participants (n = 
15), making it a purposive non-probability sample (Oppenheim, 2000. Of the 15 participants, 7 
were nurses (47%), 4 were doctors (27%), 2 were AHPs (13%), 1 a research officer (7%) and 1 a 
security guard (7% ) (Table 9.1). 7 consented to be interviewed (47% response rate). 
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Table 9.1 
 
Number of Each Type of HEAPS Participant by Meeting 
 
HEAPS 
meeting 
 Nurses Doctors Allied health 
professionals 
Non-clinical 
staff 
 
SAC1 event 
 
HEAPS1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
0 
 
1 (Security 
Guard) 
SAC2 event HEAPS2 4 0 1 1(Research 
Officer) 
SAC1 event HEAPS3 2 1 1 0 
 
 
9.2.3 Participants 
 
Participants were recruited between October 2015 and January 2017. Of the seven 
participants who were interviewed, two were AHPs (a dietician and a pharmacist, holding 
management positions); three nurses (all nurses were NUMs); one was a doctor and one was a 
research officer. All but one participant were from the hospital where the medical errors occurred. 
The other NUM was from a regional hospital and managed a special care nursery. Because of 
technical difficulties, the quality of the audio recording of the interview with the doctor was too 
poor for transcription. This meant the data from just six interviews were analysed. The omission of 
doctors from the sample is acknowledged as a limitation given the dominance of doctors in 
healthcare. 
Participant demographic information is outlined in Table 9.2. Participants ranged in age 
from 26 to 52 years. Four participants (Dietician1, Pharmacist1, NUM3, Research Officer1) had 
never taken part in an incident analysis meeting. Two NUMs (NUM4, NUM7) had participated in 
both an RCA and a HEAPS meeting. Two NUMs (NUM3, NUM7) were involved in the incidents 
being investigated: in the SAC2 incident, a baby had been given the wrong mother’s expressed 
breast milk by a junior nurse in the nursery managed by NUM3; in a SAC1 incident, an elderly 
gentleman had died as a result of being given an overdose of potassium while under the care of 
NUM7. Demographic information other than profession, age, gender and level of seniority was not 
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collected because of ethical concerns about participant confidentiality and anonymity. This was 
because the study was conducted in a medium-sized regional hospital where it would be easy for 
participants to be identified. To ensure confidentiality, the participants were given a code according 
to their profession and a number (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2013). 
Table 9.2 
 
Characteristics of Participants in Study 4a in Absolute Numbers and Percentages 
 
Characteristic Count (%) 
Gender (n1 = 6)  
Male [Pharmacist1] 1 (16.0) 
Female 5 (83.3) 
Profession (n1 = 6)  
AHP [Pharmacist1 and Dietician1] 2 (33.3) 
Researcher [Research Officer1] 1 (16.6) 
Nurse [NUM3, NUM4, NUM7] 3 (50.0) 
Seniority (n = 6)  
Management position 5 (83.3) 
Non-management position [Research 
Officer1] 
1 (16.7) 
 
9.2.4 Procedure 
 
Contact details for participants were provided by the PSO who convened the HEAPS 
meetings observed in Study 3. I emailed participants to request an interview, the email 
contained participant information and consent forms and explained that all data would be 
confidential and de-identified (See Appendix 3 - 11.4.3). I conducted the unstructured 
interviews. I was not known to the participants. Five interviews were conducted by 
telephone and two were in person. Interviews took between 25 and 90 minutes with the 
average time being 45 minutes. 
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9.2.5 Semi structured interviews 
 
The literature on incident analysis, human factors and patient safety informed the interview 
questions (Reason, 1997; Reason & Hobbs, 2003). Interviews followed a broad thematic guide 
focused on gaining participants’ accounts of their attitudes and goals in the incident analysis process 
and perceptions of the enablers and barriers to analysis effectiveness. Each interview began with a 
review of the aims of the study and ethical considerations. Interviews continued to the point where 
no new data emerged. Interviews were recorded using an iphone7 and transcribed verbatim using a 
professional transcribing service. The interview began with the opening question ‘Can you tell me 
about your experience of taking part in the HEAPS incident analysis meeting?’ This gave 
participants the opportunity to provide free answers and maximised the opportunity for them to 
reflect on their personal experiences. Items from the interview script included: 
• Can you tell me about your experience of participating in the HEAPS analysis 
meeting? 
• Why was it important for you to participate? 
 
• What are the enablers and barriers to effective analysis? 
• What role does communication play in analysis effectiveness? 
 
9.2.6 Data Coding and Analysis 
 
I conducted initial analysis of the transcripts using Braun and Clarke’s deductive thematic 
analysis technique (see Chapter 5) and developed a thematic coding framework based on SIT. 
Transcripts were reviewed to determine whether themes emerged aligned with SIT. 
9.3 Results 
Table 9.3 depicts the 8 coding strategies used. Definitions, coding rules and examples 
are depicted in table 9.4. 
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Table 9.3 
 
Themes and Subthemes by Category 
 
 
 
 
Theme Subtheme 
1. Professional identity Identity type 
Identity traits 
Intergroup comparisons 
Superordinate patient safety identity 
2. Intergroup dynamic Intergroup relations 
Intergroup conflict 
Siloed ways of working 
Power and status 
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Table 9.4 
 
Coding Rules, Examples and Frequencies for Main Categories of Analysis 
 
Category Code Definition Coding rules Example Average number of times a 
member of the profession 
invoked this theme 
      
AHP NUM 
Research 
officer 
     9.5 4.6 5 
Category 1: 
Professional 
Identity 
      
 
Identity type 
Identity traits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intergroup 
Comparisons 
What are the 
salient 
professional 
identities for 
participants 
during the 
analysis 
process? 
Which 
professional 
traits do they 
highlight about 
themselves 
during the 
process? 
How do they 
compare 
  groups  
Aspects of definition point 
to how participants 
identify themselves by 
their professional group 
memberships 
Which identities are most 
salient for them? 
Which identity traits do 
they highlight in the 
analysis meeting? 
 
 
 
 
 
Aspects point towards how 
participants draw 
‘I needed someone (at the 
HEAPS meeting) who was 
understanding of what I do... 
We have a lot of admissions 
per annum. We are a busy 
little unit. We are incredibly 
busy for a non- tertiary 
facility’ [HEAPS2: NUM3] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Within a healthcare 
environment that HEAPS 
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Superordinate 
Patient Safety 
Identity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How do 
participants 
apply salience 
to a 
superordinate 
patient safety 
identity that 
engenders a 
sense of 
purpose in the 
HEAPS 
process? 
comparisons between groups 
that are meaningful in the 
analysis environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aspects point towards 
high identification with 
patient safety goal 
analysis, it needs to be- 
everyone needs to be equal, 
and I think the HEAPS we 
did that day, no one chipped 
in, no one over-stood their 
mark, but obviously people 
within the group, probably 
myself and Dr X who were 
probably a little bit more 
confident in saying what we 
were saying’ [HEAPS3: 
Pharmacist1] 
 
‘Considering we were there 
for the patient and future 
patients’ [HEAPS3: NUM7] 
 
196  
Category 2: Intergroup 
interaction 
Intergroup 
dynamic 
What do 
participants 
say about 
interactions 
between 
groups? 
Aspects point to the 
salience of participants’ 
professional group 
memberships in terms of 
how they frame 
interactions with others; if 
not about interaction, then 
C1 
‘I think it just, again, brings 
the importance of the risks the 
clinicians are facing here at to 
the attention of the executives’ 
[HEAPS3: Pharmacist1] 
Intergroup 
conflict 
How does 
previous 
conflict 
between 
groups play 
out in the 
analysis 
 ‘It is a battle with the 
resistance by staff, constantly, 
and for speech pathology 
there is active hostility’ 
[HEAPS2: Dietician1] 
 setting?   
Siloed ways How does a Aspects point towards 
the challenges in 
members not 
understanding others 
practice and 
"(Name of dietician) 
wouldn’t understand know 
the process involved in 
getting milk 
ready ...she wouldn't know how 
we install our milk, the food 
of working siloed model 
 of practice 
 affect the 
 analysis 
process? 
How do 
power and 
status affect 
the analysis 
process? 
 
 
Power and 
status 
 
 
Aspects point towards 
how power 
differentials impact 
the analysis process, 
in terms of 
engagement 
safety processes" HEAPS2: 
NUM3 
"There is a struggle to communicate 
between streams, especially when the 
communication involves speaking up 
to a senior staff member"HEAPS2: 
RO1 
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9.5 How Do Professional Identity and Intergroup Relationships Affect the 
Human Error and Patient Safety Analysis Setting from the Perspective of the 
Participants? 
9.5.1 Subtheme 1: Professional Identity 
 
9.5.1.2 Types of identity 
 
Professional identity was apparent in the HEAPS setting. All participants had a strong sense 
of identity informed by their disciplinary and unit group memberships. In the context of the 
interview about a specific adverse event, the identity of unit manager was more salient for the 
nurses interviewed (the three nurses interviewed were all NUMs) than their identity as nurse or 
midwife, suggesting a bias towards foregrounding a managerial identity in the context of error 
analysis, The AHPs identified themselves by their specialty as dietician and pharmacist and as 
members of the allied health profession and multidisciplinary teams. The research officer identified 
herself by her research specialty and as hospital employee. 
Unit identity 
 
In accordance with SIT’s premise that identity salience strengthens when there is a 
perception of group threat, unit identity was strong for nurses in whose units the errors had 
occurred. In their role as unit managers, they oversaw all aspects of unit operation. Their comments 
implied protectiveness towards unit staff and they wanted to advocate for them and defend them in 
the analysis process. In the following example, NUM7 invokes her unit identity when she speaks of 
her motivation to attend the meeting to protect her staff from the perception they had done 
something wrong: 
You don't take on anything that might make you feel like oh, have 
we done something wrong... I think from a nurse unit manager's 
perspective that was what I was going for…I mean, I thought, ‘I'm 
going to go’, because this was a gentleman that was in my ward. 
My staff were looking after him. [HEAPS3: NUM7]. 
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This comment suggests that the analysis process was perceived as threatening to this nurse’s 
unit group identity, so she was motivated to participate in the meeting to protect it. Similarly, 
NUM3 invoked unit identity when discussing how inadequate resources affected her staff: 
We are a nursery and like I said we don't have the resources of 
staff to adequately staff two shifts, I mean every shift, ... and 
because we fall under the umbrella of maternity which is at full 
time equivalent numbers … too bad, too sad…it puts an 
incredible amount for these girls to manage. [HEAPS2: NUM3] 
From a SIT perspective, NUM 3’s emphasis on resource deficit heightened the salience of 
her unit identity. She felt a level of protectiveness towards her staff as well as implying positive 
evaluations about their capacity to manage challenging circumstances. Given that the actions of the 
unit staff were being examined, the NUM bolstered the group against perceived threat by positively 
evaluating group members in the hospital context. 
These data show that the expression of unit identity when positioned in terms of resource 
inequity had an inhibitory effect on other members’ engagement in the analysis process. In the 
following comment, NUM4 who was from another hospital explains she did not want to elaborate 
on the resources (staff and facilities) she had in her unit (a special care nursery) so as to not create 
resentment in NUM3. This is an interesting finding as mentioning this would have been an 
accommodative strategy in terms of highlighting shared understanding of practice. 
It certainly wouldn’t have been my intention to say … oh we have 
this... to have that superior sort of position because it’s not who I am 
and how I feel but it could be perceived that way. They could be 
thinking ‘oh that’s Y hospital, they’ve got all this stuff, and they’ve got 
no idea what we have to deal with’. So, I was conscious of not wanting 
to talk too much about the resources we have as I don’t think that 
would have helped their situation at all. [HEAPS2: NUM4]. 
199  
SIT contends when there is competition for resources between groups, identity salience is 
heightened, and this results in defensive behaviours. NUM4’s desire to refrain from expressing 
information suggests she was motivated to protect her ingroup status as a fellow nurse and not 
create an intergroup divide by highlighting resource inequity, even though this information was 
salient to the investigation. This suggests her NUM identity was more salient than her role as 
content expert. This is concordant with Agama’s (1997) contention that people are less willing to 
share information when they perceive that the intergroup relationship is competitive rather than 
cooperative and support Haslam’s (2004) argument that the salience of group membership affects 
members’ motivation to engage in organisational initiatives and is a barrier to group performance. 
Professional identity 
• Nurse identity 
 
Nurse identity was heightened when there was a high proportion of nurses at a meeting (e.g., 
five of the seven participants in HEAPS2 were nurses). Here the dietician (an outgroup member) 
describes how NUM 3’s communication of the effect of the error on her team affected the other 
nurses at the meeting: 
I think it is down to wanting to support each other and the 
collegiate nature of that unit … And the fact that a staff member 
had admitted a mistake and that an error had occurred. It was 
uncomfortable … Her body language was passionately supporting 
her team and really strong language around the staff member 
being devastated and giving the whole background about that 
person who has made that mistake … and that the unit is 
particularly close knit…I think that had a big influence over some 
of the other nurses. [HEAPS2: Dietician1] 
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Concordant with SIT, the dietician defined the response of the nurses in outgroup terms and 
applied a level of homogeneity to their cognitions that may have belied their interpersonal response. 
The SIT approach would argue that the dynamic between the nurses described by the dietician 
(sharing information and acting attentively) was socially motivated and heightened intergroup 
divides between nurses and other professions in the team. 
• Allied health professional identity 
 
Both the dietician and the pharmacist expressed their professional identity in terms of the 
specialist expertise they brought to the analysis process, as in this comment from the pharmacist: 
I guess bringing a drug knowledge to that HEAPS was quite powerful, 
because people hadn't questioned that stuff before in that incident’; and 
later, ‘As a HEAPS review, patients have received drugs and have died. 
You would expect that a pharmacist would probably be important to be on 
that HEAPS team. [HEAPS3: Pharmacist1]. 
The salience Pharmacist1 attached to the value of his profession in the analysis team 
suggests a motivation to enhance his professional identity within this interdisciplinary context. This 
is reflective of the work of Baker et al. (2011) who found that AHPs view inter-professional settings 
as a pathway to professional empowerment. 
The pharmacist also expressed his professional identity in terms of his role in 
multidisciplinary teams. Here, he refers to his ability to work in an interdisciplinary manner, across 
hierarchical and professional divides, cognisant of how his expertise and patient care affects other 
professional groups: 
So, all the medical imaging, all the nursing requirements for this, 
all that sort of stuff, so I understand what everyone else is going 
on around the place, which makes my communication with senior 
positions a lot easier because I know the implications for everyone 
else on that team, based on my recommendation … But I think a lot 
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of allied health, not pharmacy, but people get siloed into ‘The only 
issues this patient has are medication-related issues’; well no they 
don't, they've got all these other things going on in the 
background. We have one part to play in this patient's treatment, I 
think people forget that occasionally. [HEAPS3: Pharmacist1] 
The focus on working with other professional groups is concordant with research that has 
shown that AHPs strive to position themselves in a position of power and relevance in an embedded 
medical hierarchy informed by socio-historical influences (Baker et al., 2011; Freidson, 1970). 
According to SIT, the pharmacist’s positive evaluation of his ability to permeate professional and 
hierarchical divides suggests he was motivated to advance his ingroup status. This is categorised as 
a social mobility strategy, whereby he associated himself with a more positively distinct group as a 
member of a multidisciplinary team to enhance his self-concept. Self-enhancement is further 
bolstered by making outgroup derogations with relevant outgroups, suggesting that the concept of 
his professional identity was embedded within a broader context of hospital intergroup relationships 
(Postmus & Smith, 2009). 
9.5.3 Subtheme 2: Identity Traits 
 
Nurses 
 
Participants highlighted professional traits relevant to the analysis process. These were a 
motivating factor for them to participate. For NUM7 this was about interpersonal relationships with 
patients and staff as exemplified in this comment: 
The process … didn't actually take into account all the other 
circumstances that were surrounding this poor person and the nurse’; and 
later, ‘I said, “You know, I know that you're a good nurse, and I know that 
you would have just been so careful about looking after this gentleman. 
[HEAPS3: NUM7]. 
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These comments suggest that the nurse deemed the analysis as a platform to share 
information to protect her ingroup member (nurse 1 and resolve the uncertainties about the patient’s 
care. A key component of the SIT approach to organisational communication is that group 
boundaries inform the flow of information (Peters et al., 2008. In this example, the nurse defined her 
knowledge in a social context and expressed a motivation to share information across group 
boundaries to gain their understanding to translate the information into effective decision making to 
prevent similar errors recurring. 
Allied health professionals 
 
The AHPs and the research officer positively evaluated themselves on the expertise they 
brought to the analysis process, as in the following comments from the dietician and pharmacist, 
where they highlight their analysis and discourse management skills: 
And I’ve got a background in running food safety plans in my unit 
and the hazard analysis and control plan is where I come from. 
It’s about where are all the places that it could go wrong, and I 
don’t think there was enough analysis around that. [HEAPS 2: 
Dietician1] 
And that's where this HEAPS, having myself and Dr X there, we 
don't mind talking about whatever we need to talk about in an 
open forum, ...so that probably helped the PSO as well to get 
more information out of the situation. [HEAPS3: Pharmacist1] 
From a SIT perspective, the emphasis on traits pertinent to moving the investigative process 
forward suggests that the analysis context provided an opportunity for the AHPs' to construct part of 
their professional identity in terms that were about their usefulness to the analysis team, thus 
enhancing their team membership. Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) suggested that this adoption of 
team group membership results in behaviours that are conducive to respecting other group 
members. 
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9.5.4 Subtheme 3: Intergroup Comparisons 
 
Participants’ intergroup comparisons focused on the performance and motivations of other 
professional groups in the HEAPS process. In line with SIT, these data reveal that professional 
identity became more salient when comparisons were drawn between relevant outgroups. 
Intergroup comparisons around performance in HEAPS 
 
Both Dietician 1 and Pharmacist1(AHPs) , NUM7 and NUM4 and RO1 viewed the 
behaviours of other groups as disruptive to the HEAPS process. The AHPs and RO1 made negative 
comparisons about nurses’ and PSO’s communication style, stereotyping them as verbose, 
unassertive and lacking objectivity. In this comment the pharmacist compares himself with other 
groups in terms of being more focused and logical: 
So, I guess I'm used to doing that, redirecting people back to logic, 
because we have a lot of—dare I say—‘talkers’, that really like the 
sound of their own voice, that do talk about and get off-topic and 
we need to bring them back. You sit in a number of meetings and 
we never resolve anything, so I always try to be the one that says, 
‘We just talked for that 15 minutes, but back to the original topic, 
what are we going to do about this?’ …you do need a facilitator in 
that meeting that is confident to bring it back. [HEAPS3: 
Pharmacist1] 
In terms of SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), this suggests the pharmacist was seeking positive 
distinctiveness through downward comparisons with other groups in meetings. Outgroup 
derogations were made about the motivations of high-status members in the analysis meeting. The 
pharmacist and NUM7 from HEAPS3 inferred that surgeons are not invested in the patient but are 
only protecting their professional reputations as in the following comment from a pharmacist: 
Working with surgeons in the past, they're a very cut-and-dry 
discipline, that once the surgery is over, they don't want to 
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necessarily take control of the medical issues of a patient. So, if 
they've got a cause of death that says, ‘They died from the result of 
a risk of surgery which was on their consent form, I'm no longer 
liable, so this is my story, and this is what we're going by, we don't 
need to look into the rest of it because this isn't this reason’. 
[HEAPS3: Pharmacist1] 
Participants extended intergroup comparisons to the PSO. Dietician1 perceived that the 
PSO’s identification with the other nurses in the meeting (the PSO is a nurse) adversely affected her 
ability to conduct the investigative process: 
I think it inhibited her ability (being a nurse), her allegiance to 
the profession and her understanding of how busy it can be as a 
nurse, and it would get in the way of her ability to analyse to the 
extent that was required. [HEAPS2: Dietician1] 
From a SIT perspective, this perception positions the PSO as more motivated to demonstrate 
ingroup support than assume her role as PSO, suggesting that nurse ingroup norms are about 
ingroup loyalty and empathy for challenging work conditions. However, the dietician’s outgroup 
derogation of the PSO as neglecting the investigative process implies this display of ingroup 
support heightened her outgroup status and magnified intergroup differences. Dietician1 drew a 
comparison about the motivations of the nurse. She speaks of NUM3’s argument that organisational 
decisions around resources caused the error: 
It was really more a question of looking at it [the HEAPS] as an 
opportunity to demonstrate that the resources weren’t adequate. 
They were hard done by compared to other places… there was a 
perception that they were under attack... Poor resources, almost 
like it was very defensive. [HEAPS2: Dietician1] 
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The dietician made an outward derogation about NUM3 in terms of her defensive 
behaviours in the analysis setting and implied that this disrupted the investigative process. This 
attenuated features of the intergroup relationship within the analysis team in terms of members’ 
motivations in the analysis setting. 
9.5.5 Subtheme 4: Superordinate Patient Safety Identity 
 
These findings suggest that a superordinate team identity of working towards patient safety 
outcomes was salient for participants. This is an important aspect of the patient safety culture as 
research suggests that when a superordinate team identity is salient and seen as compatible with 
professional identities, team performance is optimised (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & 
Rust, 1993; Jetten, O’Brien & Trindall, 2002. The dietician and pharmacist were motivated to 
address patient safety issues to enhance patient outcomes, as in this excerpt from the interview with 
the dietician: 
Dietician1: It would be my expectation to get this, to close the 
loop to seeing if you had made a difference and to actually know 
what had actually happened if you know it is going to make a 
difference you would be willing to put your hand up. The feeling 
in the process that you need to be as probing as possible and try 
as hard as possible to get to the bottom, [HEAPS2, Ditaician1] 
Responses from two nurses and the pharmacist suggested that they were motivated to 
engage in patient safety measures to advocate for their patients. In this comment Pharmacist1 
determined that his role was to advocate for the patient by examining what happened: 
I think it's something that you have to take on [participating in 
HEAPS] if you want to look after and be and advocate to your 
patient, you need to be comfortable to say, ‘This is wrong, I 
need to look there’. [HEAPS3: Pharmacist1] 
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For NUM4, the catalyst to engaging in the analysis process and overcoming a fear of 
disclosure of error was a desire to demonstrate to the patient and their family a willingness to 
learn from error: 
I think we are far better at it than we used to be, you know we 
are far better at being open, you know the whole open disclosure 
thing. Yet we’ve made this 
mistake, we are really sorry this has happened, and this is what 
we are going to do about it. [HEAPS2: NUM4] 
Contested responsibility for patient care was a motivation for one nurse to engage in the 
analysis process. NUM7 implied that contested responsibility for care gave her the confidence to 
offer her input. This was meaningful as she had previously stated that she was fearful of speaking 
up because of a fear of blame and feeling intimidated by others: 
When I keep saying to myself ultimately it is the nurse who's at the 
bedside 24 hours a day, seven days a week … Physio's see our 
patients for 10 minutes once a day three times a week. We see our 
patients 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Who better to tell or 
inform anyone of how a patient's going? [HEAPS3: NUM7] 
The SIT approach argues that group membership is an important means of self- definition 
and relation to others; however, context determines which aspect of self is salient (Morton et al., 
2012; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Participants’ descriptions of the factors that motivated their 
engagement in the analysis process provide an understanding of those values that are salient for 
analysis team identity. A desire to advocate for patients and improve patient safety outcomes are 
shared group norms that transcend intergroup divides and allow team members to define themselves 
in terms of common group membership. 
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9.6 Theme 2: Intergroup Relations 
 
An intergroup dynamic influenced the HEAPS process negatively. While most participants 
perceived that having members from multiple medical disciplines and status levels lent objectivity 
to the process, they all gave examples of how it negatively influenced proceedings because of 
existing intergroup conflict, fear of blame, the siloed model of training and practice, and power 
disparities. The research officer commented on how the intergroup dynamic resulted in lower-status 
members refraining from giving their input and spoke of the ways nurses circumvented the need to 
give their input during the meeting: 
There is a degree of impact when you’re putting everyone in a 
room, especially when you have different streams, different 
experiences and levels…you notice that some staff will come up 
afterwards and say, ‘Oh well we should have thought about this 
and this and this, this, this’. And when you do ask them, well why 
didn't you and they will say ‘oh well we felt silly or we didn't want 
to say anything’ and so I still think there is definitely a degree of 
it within incident analysis” [HEAPS2: Research Officer1] 
9.6.1 Subtheme 1: Intergroup Conflict 
 
Intergroup conflict refers to disagreements between two or more groups and their members. 
SIT proposes that social context affects intergroup relationships (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and these 
data show that this was informed by fundamental differences in the ways different professional 
groups conceptualise best practice. Participants gave examples of how previous intergroup conflict 
had caused ongoing intergroup tensions; their responses indicate that transferred to the analysis 
setting. Intergroup tension was evidenced by NUM4 and NUM7’s and the dietician’s apprehension 
about how their input would be received in the meeting. In the following comment, the 
categorisation of stereotypical intergroup behaviours by the dietician suggests that she was primed 
for resistance from the midwives: 
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It is extremely stressful for staff members, dietetics is in, but you 
are still treading on eggshells the whole way. You’ll go up and 
your advice won’t be followed …It is a battle with the resistance 
staff. [HEAPS2: Dietician1] 
In line with SIT’s premise that when groups feel their position in the hierarchy is unstable, 
they are prone to negative appraisals of other groups (Hornsey, Spears, Cremers & Hogg, 2003; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979 ). Both the dietician and pharmacist drew downward intergroup comparisons 
when referencing previous intergroup conflicts, as evidenced in the comment from the dietician 
about tension between the nursery and AHPs: 
Before [NUM3] arrived here it wasn’t possible to even get a look 
in there because the previous unit manager wouldn’t even accept 
allied health in there ...l. They wouldn’t even call you to say ‘look 
there’s someone at risk’ … It’s only by having the dietician brave 
enough to get in there, that’s come from another area that has 
provided audits on pathways when allied health needs to be 
involved. [HEAPS2: Dietician1] 
9.6.2 Subtheme 2: Fear of Blame 
 
Intergroup relationships informed how participants conceived of blame in this process. 
 
These data suggest that fear of blame was more salient for nurses than AHPs or the research officer. 
This was informed by socio-historical factors. In the following comment RO1 speaks of how 
nurses’ previous experiences of negative repercussions from speaking up against the hierarchy 
resulted in their failure to speak up in meetings: 
They [nurses] are more worried about the backlash they will 
receive... Previously when you speak up to a senior staff member... 
they would have been in trouble and they would have received 
some sort of punishment from their management or someone from 
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their stream who is more senior. [HEAPS2: RO1] 
 
NUM7 explicitly stated that a fear of being blamed unfairly because of their profession 
resulted in them feeling guarded about their input: 
 
I had to watch what I said, because I didn't really want to be the 
target of, no, that's not right ..... That's not the way it went, or that 
shouldn't have happened. The nurse should have done this. I felt 
targeted because I was the nurse. [NUM7] 
Referencing socio-historical traditions around protecting professional reputation, NUM4 
explained that the analysis process was confronting because nurses were fearful of organisational 
backlash, and they had historically minimised this fear by working through errors in house: 
Well we still like to do that within our own comfortable group. 
You know we don’t want the hospital down the road knowing 
that we’ve done whatever .... It’s too raw and too vulnerable … 
But when you are looking at smaller incidents like that, you 
kind of want to manage it in house, and I 
think it is really brave to involve outside people of your unit to 
work through it. [HEAPS2: NUM4] 
These comments indicate that the analysis setting caused participants to activate group 
stereotypes around blame accorded to nurses within medicine and that they approached the analysis 
setting with intergroup anxiety informed by expectations of negative consequences. 
9.6.3 Subtheme 3: Siloed Ways of Working 
 
Collaboration among professional groups in medicine has proved challenging because of the 
disciplinary, sectoral and institutional ‘siloed’ culture of healthcare delivery (Kreindler et al., 2012). 
These data show that the pharmacist, the dietician and NUM4 welcomed the opportunity the 
analysis gave them to permeate these disciplinary boundaries and understand how the work of 
others influences patients, as in this comment: 
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It [inter-professional HEAPS team] certainly does give you 
that broader perspective and makes you think about you 
know different areas, because different people will 
obviously come at it from a different perspective. [HEAPS2: 
NUM4] 
However, the dietician and the pharmacist expressed the belief that a siloed approach 
contributed to poor patient outcomes. In this example, the dietician speaks of midwives being 
wedded to discipline-specific ways of practice and that this limited their willingness to accept the 
advice of other professional groups: 
There is a perception that midwives have been doing this for 20 
years and we don’t need you to tell us that you as a speech 
pathologist can tell if a baby is safe to swallow, we can just tell. 
That kind of perception. These are the frictions that currently 
exist. [HEAPS2: Dietician1] 
The pharmacist perceived that a siloed model of practice reduced high-status clinicians’ 
willingness to collaborate with other professional groups in the analysis process, resulting in the 
lack of their expertise in the meetings: 
I mean you lose what they (the surgeons) actually know, 
because they're all very skilled in what they do, … but they 
don't often work with the team to try and make sure the 
patient's okay necessarily or have an avid concern for patients 
that are deteriorating. [HEAPS3: Pharmacist1] 
These findings point towards the opportunity that analysis gave members to cross intergroup 
divides and reduce intergroup stereotypes. This is concordant with Allport’s (1954) contention that 
contact improves attitudes towards outgroups by providing a more accurate understanding of 
outgroups. However, these findings also suggest that members cognitions in the analysis context 
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were informed by outgroup stereotypes and if they perceived outgroup behaviour negatively in the 
analysis setting, (such as reluctance to participate, refusal to listen to input this strengthened the 
negative stereotypes. 
9.6.4 Subtheme 4: Power and Status 
 
Assertions of power and authority were clear in these data. Participants acknowledged that 
power affected the analysis process adversely in two ways: first, it affected communication flow; 
and second, members illegitimately assumed a level of power to divert proceedings to meet their 
professional agendas. 
Communication 
 
Both AHPs and the research officer perceived that lower-status members remained silent 
during the meeting because of power disparities, stating that this was due to prevailing hierarchies, 
as in this comment from the research officer: 
‘They still feel … that they can’t speak up to those that have been 
there longer or are at a higher level’.[HEAPS2: Research 
Officer1] 
The pharmacist commented on the importance of equal status for the team to give their full 
input and this was informed by his perception that lower-status members found this challenging: 
‘Why people down the food chain aren't speaking up. Within a 
healthcare environment that HEAPS analysis, it needs to be— 
everyone needs to be equal’ [HEAPS3: Pharmacist1]. 
Member status was perceived by the pharmacist to adversely affect proceedings. Here, he 
comments on how the PSO was reluctant to question high-status members because of power 
imbalances: 
I guess she didn't feel very comfortable with the first HEAPS ... she 
found it very dismissive and she couldn't progress with that. But I 
think with experience, she'll probably learn to say, ‘Sorry surgeon, 
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but you need to need into this further, I know you've got a cause of 
death, but we need to look into what care happened in hospital,’ 
[HEAPS3: Pharmacist1] 
These findings demonstrate asymmetry in intergroup communication based on power 
differentials (Harwood & Joyce, 2012. This is pertinent to the analysis process, which is dependent 
on members having equal input and indicates the reach of hierarchical norms into the analysis 
setting. 
Clinical versus administrative power 
 
These data reveal that participants differentiated between clinical and non- clinical 
professionals in terms of how they assigned power. For instance, one AHP and one nurse implied 
that clinicians assigned more salience to the medical hierarchy than the organisational hierarchy. In 
the analysis setting this would result in administrative staff not having the same legitimacy to 
question clinicians as high-status doctors, as exemplified by this statement: 
I think there is a pecking order in terms of status in this type of 
facility, and I think I wonder if someone with an administrative 
background or high-status 
corporate background would feel comfortable challenging 
someone in the same way as a clinician in clinical incidents. 
[HEAPS2: Dietician1] 
Agendas 
 
NUM7, research officer1 and dietician1 and the pharmacist1 spoke of their perception that 
high-status members manipulated the analysis process to suit their agendas, seeking to control 
proceedings by asserting that their decision on error cause was final. In this example, NUM7 speaks 
of how the behaviours of high-status members adversely influenced the engagement of lower-status 
members: 
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No, he [consultant] was very convincing. He's like, ‘We found 
the cause. Everything we would have done would have been 
routine, so the potassium didn't kill him. It was the thrombus’. 
That just stopped any other fruitful or productive conversation 
after that. He's like, ‘Why are we discussing any further?’ The 
two consultants had already heard the preliminary report, and 
that was it. [HEAPS3: NUM7] 
However, these data also suggest that when clinicians felt powerless in the medical 
hierarchy, they were motivated to grasp illegitimate power in the analysis setting. Tajfel explained 
that when groups have low status, they garner a sense of positive social identity through engaging in 
social change to destabilise existing status hierarchies (Hornsey et al., 2008; Tajfel, 1981). Here the 
pharmacist speaks of incident analysis being used as a platform to air grievances and lobby for more 
resources: 
Someone has a grievance about how much work they're having to 
do, and underpaid, and we need more resources, and they use that, 
... as a platform to voice their concerns, because they probably 
don't know any other ways of doing that. Or, have tried other ways 
and don't hear it, but they think ‘This is an incident analysis, we 
might get some funding out of this if we tell that we should've had 
more staff and we wouldn't have killed this person’; not 
necessarily in this case, but I've seen that happen before. 
[HEAPS3: Pharmacist1] 
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9.7 Discussion 
 
The aim of this study was to understand how professional identity, status and intergroup 
dynamics manifest in the analysis setting. The findings point to the salience of professional 
identity and status in analysis processes and suggest that the benefit of team members’ 
involvement in the analysis is mitigated by professional and hierarchical boundaries and historic 
intergroup tensions. These factors interrupted the formation of a superordinate team identity and 
disrupted the capacity of the team to perform the analysis investigation. 
These data reveal a number of stages where the effect of intergroup tensions manifested 
most for participants. This included the initial stages of the meeting when participants were trying 
to establish their role and authority in the analysis process and at times of perceptions of group 
threat around error involvement. This was evident for all nurses regardless of their involvement in 
the error, which highlights the salience of socio-historical influences around blame being a 
function of hierarchy. 
Fear of blame was found to have heightened intergroup differences and resulted in ingroup 
defensiveness and distrust about the motivations of other groups. This resulted in a resistance to 
engaging with outgroup members in the analysis setting and a dismissal of their input. This 
supports Nicolini et al.’s (2011b) findings that clinicians directly involved in adverse events 
express emotions of anger and conflict in analysis processes, which mutes the participation of 
other clinicians. 
However, these data also reveal that when there was no perception of threat, members still 
engaged in intergroup behaviours and drew positive self-evaluations and downward comparisons 
with other groups around their performance in the analysis meeting and dimensions of patient 
care. The analysis provided a catalyst for them to reflect on the ways in which other groups 
created conditions for errors to occur through a siloed approach to patient care, a reluctance to 
work collaboratively with other groups, and a guarding of professional knowledge boundaries— 
and as such, accentuated intergroup stereotypes and divides. This influenced how they navigated 
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their identities, for the AHPs, this was about establishing their credibility as experts in the 
interdisciplinary environment. 
What was apparent from these results was that members perceived that the PSO 
experienced a level of identity conflict between her profession as a clinician and more nascent 
identity as PSO and this disrupted the investigative process. These data also suggest that the 
medical hierarchy negatively influenced the legitimacy of the PSO’s power in this setting. 
Members perceived the PSO’s status level as a barrier to the analysis process based on their 
observations that she was reluctant to manage the adverse behaviours of high-status clinicians or 
question them about aspects to do with error. This finding is in concordance with the 
recommendations of Nicolini et al. (2011a) who suggested that the status of the PSO needs to be 
as high as that of the highest team member to negotiate with high-status clinicians and groups. 
Finally, although HEAPS provides a valuable tool for informing learning in hospitals, its 
use has the effect of highlighting perceived transgressions of clinician support by the organisation. 
The findings of this study suggest that this heightens participants’ perceptions of the intergroup 
divide between clinicians and the organisation and this was fuelled by a perception among 
members that organisational decisions around staffing and resourcing had potentially created 
conditions for error to occur. 
9.7.1 Recommendations 
 
It is recommended that PSOs are trained in methods to maximise HEAPS team identity from 
the initial stages of proceedings. This involves awareness of the salience of group identities for 
members and corresponding motivations and an understanding of the effect of intergroup history. 
Given that stereotypes are applied when individuals have not built up interpersonal relationships 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1978), it is recommended that preliminary meetings of the HEAPS team are held 
prior to the analysis process to minimise intergroup differentiation and outgroup derogation. This 
preliminary meeting would provide an opportunity for the PSO to prime members for their identity as 
HEAPS team members and increase the salience of patient safety goals. This would ensure that 
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members recognise the status and legitimacy of all members to have equal input regardless of status 
level. This is important as the medical hierarchy has been found to affect analysis proceedings 
adversely in terms of turn taking and dominance of the discourse by high-status members (Nicolini et 
al., 2011b). 
Second, the analysis team needs to be well balanced and include a diverse representation of 
professions and status levels. This acts as a safeguard against the power of ingroup salience. The PSO 
needs to have training on how to manage intergroup behaviours in this environment, which members 
perceive as threatening through fear of blame and recrimination. This research shows that despite 
healthcare organisational efforts to communicate that incident analysis is not about blame, clinician 
self-blame appears to be embedded and this needs to be acknowledged in the adoption of 
communication strategies that establish a psychologically safe environment in the analysis domain. 
9.8 Limitations 
 
This study had a number of limitations. It was a small study conducted in a regional 
Queensland hospital, so the applicability of the findings to other health services is uncertain. 
Further, participants knew I had gained permission for the interviews from the senior executives in 
the hospital, and this may have created a power imbalance (Krueger & Casey, 2009) between me 
and interviewees, which may have resulted in censoring of responses. Moreover, no doctors were 
interviewed. Given that status has been shown to affect team collaboration in hospitals (Gillespie, 
Chaboyer, Longbottom & Wallis, 2010) an exploration of their perception of taking part in incident 
analysis as high-status members may have enhanced understanding of how to manage the 
complexity of this intergroup environment. 
9.9 Conclusions 
 
Overall, these data show that SIT provides a framework to analyse and interpret 
participants’ motivations and behaviours in HEAPS meetings. This provides an understanding of 
how to reduce intergroup divides in an environment where members may feel fearful of 
transgressing group boundaries by commenting on the work of other professional groups. A 
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suggestion for future research is to develop an intergroup- informed education tool for members to 
enhance their understanding of how intergroup factors can impede the analysis process. 
9.10 Summary 
 
HEAPS participants’ responses were explored through a SIT lens to examine whether an 
intergroup mindset informs analysis. In the next chapter, study (4b) is presented. This examines 
participants goals, their perceptions of the barriers to analysis effectiveness and their understanding 
of the human factors approach to incident analysis. 
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Chapter 10: Study 4b—Examining HEAPS Participants’ Perceptions 
of Incident Analysis, Their Goals and the Barriers and Facilitators 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 9, the results for Study 4 (4a) were presented and categorised according to SIT 
and CAT. In this chapter participants’ perceptions of the process, their goals and their 
understanding of the barriers to the process are presented. 
10.2 Aims 
 
The aims of this study were to understand: 
 
• What were participants’ perceptions of the HEAPS process? 
 
• What were participants’ goals in taking part in HEAPS analysis? 
 
• What is participants’ perspective on the barriers and facilitators 
to an effective HEAPS process? 
 
10.3 Methods 
 
Details of the procedure, research context, participants, sampling method, interview 
questions, and data collection details for this study can be found in sections 9.3.1–9.3.4. 
10.3.1 Data Coding and Analysis 
 
The research questions led the analysis and set the stage for the results and discussion. 
 
Please refer to Section 9.3.5 for analysis procedure. 
 
10.4 Results 
 
13 themes and 26 subthemes emerged (Table 10.1). 
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Table 10.1 
 
Themes and Subthemes by Category 
 
Category Theme Subtheme 
Participants’ 
perceptions of 
the HEAPS 
process 
Benefits of participating Reflection on personal practice in terms of 
vulnerability to error 
Understanding of error context 
Understanding how other departments work 
  Insight into motivations and practices of other 
professions and units 
  Voice to management 
Participants’ 
Goals 
Learning Personal practice changes to optimise patient 
safety 
Personal practice changes to protect self and 
peers from error 
Ensuring a rigorous analysis approach 
 
Ensuring rigorous Consideration of systems factors 
 approach to analysis Optimising communication 
 Interdisciplinary  
 Awareness  
 Advocacy Advocate for patient 
Advocate for colleague 
 
 
Barriers Communication Communication style of PSO 
Communication of team members 
 Team composition Inclusion of clinicians involved in Error 
Disproportionate representation of one 
professional group 
 Resources Inadequate documentation 
No Agenda 
Fear report will be inadequate 
 Psychological safety Fear of blame 
 Human factors Failure to examine systems factors 
sufficiently 
Lack of understanding 
Resistance to change 
  
Organisational culture 
 
Organisational response to error 
Lack of feedback 
Analysis is a tick box approach 
Organisation does not prioritise patient 
safety 
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Facilitators Communication PSO and team communication 
 Team composition Inclusion of those involved in error 
Objectivity provided by outsiders 
 Psychological safety Psychologically safe environment 
 Organisational culture Modelling of open disclosure behaviours 
 
 
Participants spoke generally of their perceptions of the HEAPS process, including the ways 
they felt they had benefitted from participating and how they appraised the effectiveness of the 
process to achieve patient safety outcomes. In particular, they valued the opportunity to have a 
voice to the executive management about the key challenges and risks they face in their daily 
practice, which they viewed as the catalyst for error. Their goals were to learn; advocate for their 
patients, colleagues and units; and ensure the investigative process was robust. They spoke of 
wanting to improve processes and procedures to make a difference to patient outcomes. Overall 
though, the main focus of their responses was their perceptions of the barriers to the effectiveness of 
the HEAPS process to translate to meaningful patient safety practices. While the factors that 
enabled analysis effectiveness were related to communication and effective inter-professional 
collaboration, they cited fear of blame; defensive behaviours; PSO inexperience; lack of 
understanding of the human factors approach; applying an investigative approach that lacked rigour; 
and team composition as key challenges. These findings are discussed in detail below. 
10.4.1 RQ1: What were Participants’ Perceptions of the HEAPS Process? 
 
10.4.2 Theme 1: Benefit from participating 
 
Participants spoke of the ways they perceived they benefitted from participating in the 
HEAPS analysis. Subthemes included having the opportunity to reflect on personal practice in 
terms of vulnerability to error; deepen understanding of how errors occur; gain insight into others’ 
professional practice and an understanding of their motivations in the analysis setting; and have a 
voice to management on the risks to patient safety in their practice. 
Subtheme 1: Reflection on personal practice 
 
Participants said they benefitted from an increased awareness of error risk. They reflected on 
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how they could make changes to their practice to increase patient safety, as described here by the 
pharmacist: 
Seeing it in a formalised process and the patient had died, so 
it's a fairly important thing to do, it increases your awareness 
of the risk associated with clinical incidences, and the 
importance of changing them up and preventing them. 
[HEAPS3: Pharmacist1] 
Subtheme 2: Understanding of error context 
 
The participants in whose units’ errors had occurred said they benefitted from having the 
opportunity to explain to other team members how the error occurred. In this excerpt, a nurse talks 
about the benefit of heightening members’ understanding of the working conditions, which in her 
view had contributed to the error: 
Knowing they understood the process … helped. Going around 
the unit [tour of nursery afterwards] allowed them to see the 
conditions we work in. I tried to describe the dynamics of the 
nursery in my report … It's hard to really describe the dynamics 
in writing. And then go in and have the HEAPS with that 
understanding. [HEAPS2: NUM3] 
Subtheme 3: Understanding of how other departments operate 
 
Both AHPs and one nurse thought it was useful to hear from those involved in the error, so 
they could understand error context and how other departments operate. In this example, NUM4, 
from another hospital, valued hearing firsthand from NUM3 about how the error occurred, which 
had assisted her understanding in the analysis process: 
It is that fine line between being aware of how other units work and 
their approaches and what they’ve got available to them and being 
able to replicate any of that in your unit … Yeah sure, certainly it 
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enhanced that whole process, it made it far more meaningful and 
real, you could actually see firsthand how things happen 
[HEAPS2: NUM4] 
Subtheme 4: Motivations and practices of other professions 
 
Both AHPs and NUM4 appreciated the opportunity to gain insight into the roles, 
motivations and attitudes other professions in the analysis setting. Given that incident analysis 
teams are multidisciplinary in nature and healthcare professionals profess to have limited 
understanding of how other professionals operate (Braithwaite et al., 2015), this finding suggests 
that members appreciated the opportunity to have an insight into others’ domains of practice and 
mindset. In the following comment, the dietician implies she appreciated the opportunity to have an 
understanding into the workings and mindsets of other groups in the analysis meeting. This was 
salient because later in her interview she spoke of some of the difficulties she had experienced in 
gaining access to professional teams to offer her professional input: 
It was interesting for me to see other people's opinion in there 
 
… you actually learn what people's agendas are in that are, so 
you sort of understand what people's roles are and where they 
might be coming from, with a bigger experience in your 
background, and in that HEAPS setting, you understand where 
that's coming from. [HEAPS2: Dietician1] 
Subtheme 5: Voice to management 
 
All participants other than the research officer (who did not respond on this issue) valued the 
opportunity to voice concerns about error risk to management. They expressed hope that this would 
result in management addressing staff resourcing, improved facilities and increased communication 
with other departments. Ignoring resourcing issues, inadequate communication and poor facilities 
have been found to contribute to patient harm (Hewett et al., 2009; Stephen, Melville & Krause, 
2012). This is exemplified in the following statement from a nurse, in whose unit the SAC2 event 
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occurred: ‘It highlights the many inadequacies and gives us the opportunity to voice our concerns’ 
[HEAPS2: NUM3]. 
Resourcing issues were a concern for participants. Their comments suggested they felt 
management did not understand how under-resourcing contributed to poor patient outcomes. Here, 
the pharmacist says the analysis process brought an awareness of how organisational decisions 
around resources and training affected patient safety: 
I think it just, again, brings the importance of the risks the clinicians are facing 
 
... to the attention of the executives, ...it's just a strong re- 
affirmation that we are under-resourced at this hospital and the 
staffing is not perfect, the abundance of skills and upskilling of 
people is not adequate. … I think patients are at risk, particularly 
the really sick ones, due to workload issues and training deficits. I 
think it's just bringing that awareness that this has happened, 
we've looked into it, and these are the confounding factors, if they 
were there, this probably wouldn't have happened. [HEAPS3: 
Pharmacist1] 
10.4.3 RQ2: What were Participants’ Goals in Taking Part in HEAPS Analysis? 
 
While all participants had a clear sense of their goals from participating, nurses’ goals were 
passive and focused on what they wanted to gain from their involvement in the analysis, whereas 
the AHPs had active goals, speaking of what they wanted to bring to the process in terms of skills, 
knowledge and expertise. Underlying the participants’ goals was a desire to enhance patient safety 
outcomes. The nurses and AHPs mentioned more goals than the research officer, who saw her role 
as observing communication effectiveness. 
Sub Theme 1: Learning 
 
Two nurses and the pharmacist spoke of wanting to learn how they could improve their 
professional practice and mitigate future error. In the comment below, NUM1 speaks of her own 
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learning and how she planned to remind others to adopt patient safety behaviours: 
 
This is going to be a learning experience, because we're all going 
to come out of these meetings something that's going to be instilled 
in our brain. We'll check that. That's my question for the doctor. 
Okay, testing, is this, are you going to check it again tonight? 
 
[HEAPS3: NUM7] 
 
Sub Theme 2: Ensuring rigour 
 
Both AHPs wanted to ensure that the investigative process was rigorous and included an 
analysis of latent factors that contributed to the error. They spoke of the methods they employed to 
achieve this, including facilitating efficient communication across hierarchical levels, ensuring 
probing questions were asked of high-status members, and employing communication skills to 
ensure that the communication stayed on topic. 
We never resolve anything, so I always try to be the one that 
says, ‘We just talked for that 15 minutes, but back to the original 
topic, what are we going to do about this?’ I don't know if that's 
just me as a person, ... but you do need a facilitator in that 
meeting that is confident to bring it back. [HEAPS3: 
Pharmacist1] 
Sub Theme 3: Interdisciplinary awareness 
 
The AHPs also said they wanted to ensure that the investigation process included a 
consideration of how their specialty may have influenced patient care. This was informed by an 
impression that other professions knew little about what they do and by previous experience of 
departments resisting their input in patient care. Underlying this motivation was a concern that 
patient outcomes were negatively affected if other groups did not understand their expertise, as 
exemplified in this comment by the pharmacist: ‘So if I wasn't there about medication-related 
issues, who talks about them, who brings them up?’ [HEAPS3: Pharmacist1] 
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Subtheme 4: Advocacy 
Advocacy for colleagues 
Nurses in whose units the error occurred said they wanted to advocate for their 
colleagues and defend their staff from being targeted for the error as exemplified in the 
following comments from NUM3 and NUM7: 
I wasn't involved but I was advocating for that person in my 
unit. [HEAPS3: NUM3] 
Yes, I was thinking I had to defend my unit. [HEAPS2: NUM3] 
I remember saying to X (junior nurse), ‘You've got to make 
sure you don't take on anything that might make you feel like 
oh, have we done something wrong’. [HEAPS3: NUM7] 
The nurse not involved in the error explained she was motivated to prevent future errors to 
protect clinicians from the emotional impact of error, an understanding commonly termed in the 
medical literature as clinicians being the ‘second victims’ of medical error (Wu, 2000; Wu & 
Steckelberg, 2012): 
The only other thing that I am passionate about it is …looking 
after your staff … none of us go to work to make a mistake and I 
think that how we respond to our team members when they do 
make a mistake is pivotal to how that person continues or doesn’t 
in their job. [HEAPS2: NUM4] 
Advocacy for patients 
 
All the nurses and both AHPs spoke of wanting to advocate for patients. While the nurses 
were motivated by individual relationships with their patients, the AHPs were motivated by a desire 
to improve patient safety and to make a difference: 
‘If you want to look after and be an advocate for your patient, you 
need to be comfortable to say “This is wrong, I need to look 
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there”’ [HEAPS3: Pharmacis1t]. 
 
10.4.4 RQ3: What are the Barriers and Facilitators in the HEAPSProcess? 
 
Although participants identified barriers to the effectiveness of the HEAPS process, these 
were often associated with opposing facilitators. Therefore, barriers and facilitators are discussed 
together. The AHPs and NUM7, who had previously been involved in incident analysis, cited 
approximately twice as many barriers as the other nurses or research officer suggesting their 
involvement had heightened their understanding of the analysis purpose. 
10.4.5 Theme 1: Communication 
 
Participants associated effective communication style with analysis outcomes, linking the 
communication styles of the PSO and team members with member engagement and the depth of the 
investigative process. While the nurses referred to ways in which the communication styles of 
others affected them personally, the AHPs referred to how their own communication facilitated the 
process, citing their capacity to communicate across hierarchical levels and facilitate a logical 
approach (it is in the nature of the AHP role to work in an interdisciplinary way across teams or 
units)—as in this comment from the pharmacist where he discusses the benefit of his approach to 
the investigation: 
‘I just like logic, and I like having a problem solved, and if 
doesn't make sense I'll always find out why it doesn't make sense, 
I've always been a little bit inquisitive’ [HEAPS3: Pharmacist1]. 
The nurses were positive about analysis communication, perceiving it as respectful and 
inclusive, and they felt valued. The establishment of respectful and equal communicative norms 
where team members’ input was appreciated was important for NUM1: 
‘I think everyone respected each other's role and respective 
of their input and their knowledge. There was none of this 
‘no, that didn't happen, no I wouldn't say that’. They 
appreciated the feedback that you gave’ [HEAPS3: NUM 7]. 
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Subtheme 1: Patient safety officer communication 
 
All the nurses said they valued the PSO’s structured approach to communication, 
commenting on her appropriate questioning, discourse management and ensuring equal input by 
members. NUM7 stated this resulted in questions being answered and more recommendations 
generated. NUM4 said she valued the PSO’s welcoming manner, because she was from another 
hospital and did not know the other members: 
‘I guess just by being there and being made to feel welcome 
created that environment where I felt I could join in the 
conversation’ [HEAPS2: NUM4]. 
In contrast, the AHPs and NUM7 appraised the PSO’s communication negatively. For 
instance, in the following comment, the dietician who attended the meeting where there were a high 
proportion of nurses perceived that the PSO was dismissive of her input: 
‘There were a couple of times that I raised issues around 
process in the meeting. It didn’t get a lot of airtime. It was 
acknowledged but washed over’ [HEAPS2: Dietician1]. 
NUM7 nurse said that the fact the PSO had not assigned roles to members was a barrier to 
the investigative process and resulted in members not knowing how to contribute during the 
meeting. She said this resulted in chaotic and frustrating communication and the process going 
‘round and round in circles’ with no concrete outcomes: 
Because I really wanted to be involved into the whys. Why did it happen, 
not what if this was done? Eventually, during the whole HEAPS, 
it became that everyone was asking the questions. Everyone 
started asking the what ifs. [HEAPS3: NUM7] 
 
Both Pharmacist1 and Dietician1 expressed concern that the PSO’s lack of confidence in her 
communication style compromised the quality of the investigative process. They linked this to her 
reluctance to ask questions that might offend high-status members or make powerful personalities 
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uncomfortable. Both perceived that this resulted in a group norm of members being reluctant to be 
critical of members, commenting that this resulted in a loss of knowledge and insight from those 
involved in the error. In this statement, Pharmacist1 surmises that the power disparity between the 
PSO and two senior clinicians muted the PSO’s ability to ask probing questions of high- status 
members, which resulted in the analysis meeting finishing prematurely. 
The patient safety officer is ... that person to facilitate the 
discussion, but they don't feel confident in themselves to 
challenge the surgeon, then we're back to square one, so it's just 
been dismissed and move on. [HEAPS3: Pharmacist1] 
This view was shared by a nurse who noticed that the domineering communication style of 
high-status members not only stopped her and a fellow nurse from providing their input, but also 
deterred the PSO from pursuing a comprehensive level of questioning. 
We both looked at each other and said, ‘Yes, but there's lots of 
other things we want to ask and to talk about’, as did X [the 
PSO]. We talked about a lot of things after they'd left. [HEAPS3: 
NUM7] 
Subtheme 2: Communication style of other members 
 
Participants perceived that members’ communication style prevented other members giving 
their input and suggested that this was intimidating. NUM7 gave the example of a member ‘who 
was very outspoken and liked to hear his own voice and didn’t allow a lot of other input’. In this 
comment she explains how members’ expressions of defensiveness in conjunction with an 
overbearing communication style resulted in her feeling overwhelmed: 
‘It's being there with the very forceful personalities. You think, 
‘Oh my goodness’. As you sit there, they're defending their 
positions and their actions, and you felt a little intimidated if 
that's the word’ [HEAPS3: NUM7]. 
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10.4.6 Theme 2: Team composition 
 
These data reveal that participants thought that the composition of the HEAPS team had a 
critical influence on the effectiveness of the HEAPS process, and all gave clear examples of the 
ways in which team composition facilitated or inhibited the effectiveness of the HEAPS process. 
Subtheme 1: Inclusion of clinicians involved in the error 
The influence of clinicians involved in the error on the analysis process was appraised 
differently by members. NUM4 said that hearing the story of the error from the clinicians allowed a 
clear insight into what had happened: 
I think that it really does give you that insight … that you know 
there are going to be all these other things going on, but it is 
important to ...have them clearly explained. [HEAPS2: NUM4] 
However, the dietician viewed the inclusion of those involved in the error more negatively, 
saying it limited a logical and rational examination of the incident: 
It negatively affects the process and the emotion that is there, I 
don’t think you can look at it rationally or logically when you 
have the people that are either distressed or emotional or 
aggressive or defensive. I think it would be better if those people 
had an opportunity to provide information to the group that was 
looking at it rather than to be at the table. [HEAPS2: Dietician1] 
Subtheme 2: Appropriate representation of professional groups 
 
The dietician and NUM7 and NUM4 viewed having a balance of professions on the team as integral 
to maintaining objectivity in the investigative process. The dietician who had participated in an 
analysis meeting where over 70% of participants were nurses commented that having a 
disproportionate number of one profession resulted in ‘a reluctance to really talk through the 
systems that should have been in place’ because of nurses ‘wanting to support each other and the 
collegiate nature of that unit’. Further: 
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I think it would have taken a lot of the emotion out of it and 
there would have been more a look at the process and what did 
happen. And less focus on the under-resourcing … a focus on 
why the process wasn’t place. Even if the protagonist is there, 
then they need to be outnumbered by the external people, 
matched by over 50% that are external. [HEAPS2: Dietician1] 
She explained that diversity in the team was important because members of the same 
profession become immune to their ways of practice and this blurred their capacity to examine 
processes that may have contributed to the error: 
It weakens the process because you don’t have as many 
perspectives coming to the table... People from a different place 
might have different questions. Even being naïve to the process 
might have something to add. I know I was asking questions that I 
didn’t have the answers to and clarifying certain things that 
others obviously knew. [HEAPS2: Dietician]1 
Pharmacist1 felt the analysis team lacked robustness because it did not involve the required 
clinical expertise. He argued it was important to have the right expertise in the team to ensure an 
effective investigation of error factors and means to mitigate error: 
As a HEAPS review, patients have received drugs and have died. You 
would expect that a pharmacist would probably be important to be on 
that HEAPS team, you do need to get the right players on the team at the 
table to actually investigate what's going on. [HEAPS3: Pharmacist1] 
 
10.4.7 Theme 3: Resources 
 
Three participants provided examples of how inadequate resources were a barrier to the 
analysis process, citing examples of either the case details being delivered to them within 24 hours 
of the meeting, or having no case notes, notes or agenda during the meeting. 
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Subtheme 1: Documentation 
 
The lack of preparatory documentation was perceived by participants to create a non-level 
playing field where some members had a greater understanding of what had happened than others, 
because members were coming from different perspectives. For Dietician1, this left her with the 
impression that the case had already been prosecuted informally by the nursing fraternity, and a 
foregone conclusion of error causation arrived at: 
I went into the meeting without knowing the ins and outs of the 
incident whereas I had the sense everyone else was aware of the 
incident. Because they all work in that area and everyone knows 
from thegossip vine. [HEAPS2: Dietician1] 
Subtheme 2: Agenda 
 
The lack of an agenda was perceived by Dietician1 to have derailed proceedings because it 
meant that members spent half the meeting discussing under-resourcing, rather than focusing on 
every step of the procedure. Both AHPs stated that not having any documentation prevented them 
from understanding which area of the investigation they needed to focus on, later stating that not 
having an agenda meant the talkers went off track and the meeting was not getting anywhere. This 
was concerning for Dietician1 because she had never been involved in a HEAPS meeting before so 
had little understanding of what to expect: 
Well we never even got a written overview. I mean I had material 
in front of me that was just a procedure I had found from other 
facilities, I never actually had anything formal in front of me. I was 
really surprised. I thought the PSO would have provided 
documentation that would have broken it down for discussion 
points that broke down the incident, or at least displayed it on a bit 
of paper that we could have then gone through. [HEAPS2: 
Dietician1] 
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Subtheme 2: Analysis report 
 
Both AHPs were concerned about the robustness of the report, with pharmacist1 [HEAPS3] 
commenting that a previous report from another HEAPS meeting had been ‘dismissive of the 
incident’ and the other being concerned that the report would not contain all the recommendations 
made during the meeting. Recognition of time constraints and the requirement to meet tight 
deadlines were forwarded as potential barriers to this; however, concern that the PSO would favour 
the input of some members over others was also raised. Although some participants seemed 
fatalistic about outcomes—stating the process to ensure the quality of the final report was not 
perfect but was probably good enough—others were more despondent about the ability of the 
analysis to result in evidence-based changes to processes that could enhance patient safety 
outcomes, as illustrated in this comment from Dietician1: 
I was hopeful that putting it in a report would then have an 
accountability attached to it. Process to go back to check that 
things had been put in place. I haven’t been sent the report ...But 
I am expecting to see a report and I can assess whether the 
information that I felt should be out in there is actually in there. I 
left the meeting dubious about whether what I added would be in 
there. [HEAPS2: Dietician1] 
10.4.8 Theme 4: Psychological safety 
 
All the nurses cited the importance of being made to feel the HEAPS process was a safe 
environment, stating that this was fundamental to them feeling they could join in the analysis 
discourse. Their comments indicated that a fear of being targeted or blamed for error informed their 
need for a psychologically safe environment. Interestingly, neither the AHPs nor research officer 
expressed a fear of blame in the analysis process. 
Socio-historical factors informed nurses’ fear of blame in the analysis process. 
 
In the following example, NUM4 states that she entered the analysis process fearful that the process 
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was about blame and stated that this was informed by observing how those involved in error were 
treated in the medical culture: ‘You know I think health is behind anyway and historically this has 
been very much about finger pointing and blaming and you know we will fix the problem by getting 
rid of that person’ [HEAPS2: NUM4]. 
The fear of blame was particularly pertinent to those team members who were involved in 
the incidents and both used the term ‘witch hunt’ to describe their fear that the analysis process 
would be about assigning blame to them. In this comment the NUM in whose unit error occurred 
speaks of her fear that she would be criticised in the analysis and that the goal of the analysis was to 
find someone to blame: ‘No one was out to criticise me. I was concerned it was going to be a witch 
hunt. It's the fear of the unknown’ [HEAPS3: NUM3]. 
However, the data reveal that the nurses derived a sense of psychological safety from having 
fellow nurses on the team or interpersonal relationships with other team members. They also said 
that the PSO played a significant role in making them feel safe by allaying their fears that this was a 
blame environment. She did this by being reassuring, informative and taking the time to discuss 
their fears with them beforehand, as in this example from NUM3: 
I had spoken to her; she was supportive of that. She didn't know 
what had happened. I knew she wanted the nuts and bolts of what 
had happened. But she told me it wasn't about name and shame … 
She got what we were having to do. I felt supported by her. 
[HEAPS2: NUM3] 
For NUM4 who was not involved in the error, observing other nurses having the courage to 
admit their mistakes in front of others and model collaborative behaviours to ‘work through it 
together’ was a facilitator in reducing her fear of participating in the analysis process because of a 
fear of blame: 
You know as human beings we; I think we are at that stage where 
we are ok with saying ‘oh my god, I’ve made a mistake’. And 
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working through that … Well we still like to do that within our own 
comfortable group…It’s too raw and too vulnerable … you kind of 
want to manage it in house, and I think it is really brave to involve 
outside people of your unit to work through it. It is confronting, 
[HEAPS2: NUM4] 
10.4.9 Theme 5: Human factors approach 
 
Subtheme 1: Lack of rigour 
 
Participants’ comments implied that the analysis process was insufficiently informed by a 
human factors’ methodology. Half the sample perceived the process to lack rigour, and they 
suggested that this increased fear of blame among participants, blocked proper enquiry into error 
factors and rendered the outcomes ineffective at enhancing patient safety. The responses from both 
AHPs and one NUM suggested this had a critical effect on their psychological mindset in the 
analysis setting—increasing their fear that the analysis was about blaming individuals rather than an 
examination of systems factors and embedding a sense of hopelessness that the process would result 
in meaningful change to processes and procedures to mitigate error recurrence. 
In the following example, dietician1 from HEAPS2 describes how the PSO failed to 
examine how systems and processes informed the error; instead focusing on the active role 
individuals played in error occurrence. She had previously inferred that the PSO had a blasé 
approach to the investigation, being too willing to agree to a nurse’s claim that the error was caused 
by staffing shortages (this was the nurse in whose unit the error had occurred). In her view, this 
focus on the role of human error stymied any effective enquiry into the ‘nitty gritty and 
understanding of what the process needs to stop this happening again’: 
I was surprised that she wasn’t more hard-core in trying to get 
the meeting to look at that. Because there were a couple of times 
that I raised issues around process in the meeting. It didn’t get a 
lot of airtime. There was a response provided but it just came 
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down to human error or we are too busy. [HEAPS2: Dietician1] 
 
For NUM7, the PSO’s lack of focus on system factors in error causation resulted in the team 
searching for someone to blame for the error, thus heightening her fear that the process was about 
blaming individuals: 
I felt a bit upset really, because it was more like trying to find 
someone to blame when there was no one to blame. It was a lot of 
human circumstances, a lot of other resource circumstances that 
were impacting on this gentleman's incident. [HEAPS3: NUM7]. 
For the AHPs and NUM7, the lack of a rigorous human factors approach to the analysis 
made them sceptical that the analysis would result in meaningful changes to processes to enhance 
patient safety outcomes. In the following example, Dietician1 comments that because there was 
insufficient examination of existing procedures and processes in the nursery where the baby was 
given the wrong mother’s breast milk, the opportunity to enhance processes to ensure that this 
would not happen again was missed, later implying that this was because the PSO was too willing to 
examine the issue being caused by under-resourcing: 
I did expect there would be a much more of a refining of what their 
process is to actually walk away from that meeting with what a 
new procedure would be or an enhanced procedure and an 
agreement on certain issues, but that was not the case at all. 
[HEAPS2: Dietician1] 
 
Subtheme 2: Resistance to change 
 
Participants expressed scepticism that a human factors approach would reduce error. Two 
participants who held management roles (NUM7 and pharmacist1) were not convinced human error 
could be reduced in medicine, accepting error as an inevitable aspect of medical practice. For 
NUM7, this was based on previous experience of analysis recommendations failing to prevent 
human error: 
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I'm thinking no matter what recommendations are put in place, 
you can't account for the human error or the circumstances 
leading to that human error 
… It's like going back to my very first HEAPS analysis and the 
penicillin reaction. One of the recommendations was in each 
medication, the patient's folder, there will be a big sign saying, 
‘Stop, is this person allergic?’ Well, that happened, everybody 
had big green signs with a stop sign put in. It was all in the front 
of the medications, but we still had errors. Didn't work. 
[HEAPS3: NUM7] 
Even those participants who understood that the analysis needed to follow a human factors 
approach expressed doubt that a human factors approach could mitigate human error. For instance, 
pharmacist1who emphasised the importance of following a systems approach to error analysis 
during his interview and reminded the PSO about this during the HEAPS meeting—was sceptical 
that changing procedures could prevent human error, given the unpredictable nature of both the 
patient and the clinician: 
I think we put a lot of faith in procedures ... in fixing a problem. In 
the instance of someone deteriorating, procedure is not going to 
help someone out, it's being aware of what to do and being 
confident to do that, and I don't think that will necessarily happen 
overnight, and if the same situation happened tomorrow, I think 
we'd find ourselves in the same spot. I don't think this incident 
analysis will change the world. [HEAPS3: Pharmacist1] 
10.4.10 Theme 6: Organisational culture 
 
The data revealed that half the participants perceived that the organisation did not prioritise 
incident analysis processes and had a dismissive approach to the analysis of error, their comments 
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implying that this was almost a tick box approach for the hospital. For instance, in one comment, 
the pharmacist implied the hospital was disinterested in determining why an error had occurred: ‘A 
lot of HEAPS just get sanctioned here without too much thought about what's going on with the 
actual incident’ [Pharmacist]. An AHP and two NUMs perceived that the organisation failed to 
close the loop and act on the recommendations of the analysis: 
Do I have faith that those recommendations are going to be put in 
place and followed? No. I don't know. It's just that I see 
recommendations coming through in anything that we talk about, 
our standards and to do this recommendation is this, this, and this. 
 
10.5 Discussion 
You think well the simple ones can be achieved’. [NUM1] 
 
The interviews with HEAPS participants revealed themes that characterised their 
perceptions of the HEAPS process, their motivations in taking part and what they considered the 
barriers to an effective process, as well as those aspects that they perceived enhanced the process. 
The themes that emerged highlight the ways in which the medical and organisational culture can 
inform barriers to the effectiveness of the incident analysis process. However, the themes also 
highlighted the ways in which health professionals enter the process and make sense of the analysis 
process in a novel way of engaging with patient safety issues that was found to transcend some of 
those cultural barriers. 
The first research question was concerned with participants’ general perceptions of HEAPS 
analysis. The main theme that arose was the ways in which participants felt they benefitted from 
taking part, and this was focused on the opportunity the HEAPS meeting gave them to engage with 
other clinicians and gain a deeper understanding of one another’s role and work processes. 
Given that clinicians are trained and work in disciplinary and sector silos—and research has 
found that medicine’s siloed model of professional identity leads to reduced understandings of 
others’ roles, skills and cultures (Lingard et al., 2004)—the data reveal that participants welcomed 
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the opportunity the analysis process gave them to permeate professional knowledge boundaries and 
understand how error trajectories manifested in other professional settings. This is important 
because previous research has shown that medicine’s siloed model of training and healthcare 
delivery affects clinicians’ ability to collaborate in multidisciplinary teams (Clancy, 2006; Kreindler 
et al., 2012; O’Leary, Ritter, Wheeler et al., 2010; Thomas, Sexton & Helmreich, 2003). The 
opportunity to work collaboratively in the analysis setting had particular salience for the AHPs who 
said they welcomed the opportunity to demonstrate to other members how their specialty affects 
patient care. They were concerned that other healthcare groups not only had limited knowledge of 
what they do but actively resisted including them in patient care decisions and delivery and 
expressed concern that this had compromised patient outcomes. 
The HEAPS analysis setting presents a complex interaction for participants as they are 
required to communicate about their clinical work in a multidisciplinary team in a manner that 
potentially exposes them to what Iedema et al. (2006) referred to as the ‘medical gaze’. Thus, the 
finding that participants wanted to collaborate with others, and further interdisciplinary knowledge 
sharing, questions the embedded cultural stereotype that clinicians are motivated to monopolise 
medical knowledge and narrow professional boundaries (Braithwaite, 2016; Turner, 1995). While 
this finding is based on only six respondents, it does suggest that either the incentive to prevent 
error or the novelty of the analysis setting has the potential to dissemble traditionally informed 
disciplinary and hierarchical divides. This suggests that participants are open to 
approaching the HEAPS environment as distinguishable from other healthcare settings, meaning 
that organisations can leverage the novel nature of the environment to establish a flatter hierarchy 
where team members may feel more comfortable raising concerns and engaging with others. 
The data also showed that participants saw the analysis meeting as a platform to have their 
professional agendas addressed and welcomed the opportunity to voice their concerns about issues 
of under- resourcing to management, qualifying that these were aspects that undermined the safety 
of patients. While this was an emotive issue for some of the nurses, who spoke of the analysis 
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setting as a platform to voice their grievances, concerns and frustrations to management, the AHPs 
had the same view, and expressed doubts that management really understood the nature of safety 
challenges that clinicians face on a daily basis. 
The heightened emotion expressed by nurses is consistent with research that shows that 
nurses characterise the organisational system as unresponsive to their concerns about patient safety 
(Attree, 2007). Some research suggests clinicians are more optimistic about this, perceiving that one 
of the positive outcomes associated with error identification/investigation is that it results in 
corrective actions within the department or hospital (Scott, Hirschinger, Cox et al., 2009). However, 
this was not apparent in these data, with some participants perceiving that management were not 
sufficiently aware of how decisions around staffing and resources contributed to patient harm and 
seeing the analysis as a forum to highlight to management the effect of budgetary decisions on 
patient safety. This accords with the findings of Singer, Gaba, Geppert et al. (2003) who found that 
senior managers, who are not front-line clinicians, have a reduced understanding of the risks to 
patient safety. 
The second research question was concerned with participants’ goals in taking part in the 
analysis meeting. One of the recommendations of the IOM 2000 report was that health 
organisations adopt a learning culture to enable professionals to mitigate the potential for 
preventable harm to patients (IOM, 2000). These data show that participants appreciated the chance 
to reflect on their own professional practice in terms of their own and their team’s vulnerability to 
error and stated that the learning would furnish their approach to healthcare delivery henceforth. 
This was motivated by a desire to not only enhance patient outcomes but also to protect themselves 
and their colleagues from the psychological impact of medical error, with one senior NUM referring 
to clinicians being the ‘second victims’, a view that is well supported in the literature (Seys et al., 
2013; Wu & Steckelberg, 2012). 
However, participants differed in how they conceptualised their learning goals and this was 
informed by their profession: nurses framed their goals in terms of self- learning whereas the AHPs 
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and research officer were motivated by organisational learning. This suggests that nurses 
rationalised error internally, whereas AHPs and the research officer wanted to improve process to 
enhance overall patient safety outcomes. This difference informed how they engaged in the analysis 
discourse: the AHPs expressed a desire to adhere to the investigative protocol and were motivated 
to get to the root cause of the error by asking difficult questions of team members; whereas the 
nurses adopted a more passive response, expressing a reluctance to ask the probing questions that 
may make other members uncomfortable. Overall, however, participants’ comments suggested that 
this level of self-analysis was an emergent focus for them and required them to think of their role in 
new ways, their comments suggested that this was a catalyst for them to engage in the process. 
This has interesting implications for how HEAPS training is conducted and how PSOs 
communicate with participants. These findings indicate that participants can be primed to engage 
fully in the process by emphasising a superordinate goal of improved outcomes for both patients 
and clinicians rather than the current analysis focus on a case-by-case basis, which these data 
suggest triggered a level of defensiveness among participants. 
The final research question was concerned with what participants perceived to be the 
barriers and facilitators to an effective HEAPS process. Fear of blame was found to be a 
disincentive for nurses to participate and this was informed by their previous experiences of seeing 
individuals ‘targeted’ for error. They spoke of feeling they needed to defend themselves in the 
analysis meeting. This finding is concordant with studies on whistleblowing that have shown that 
nurses fear that raising their concerns about patient safety could lead to negative consequences 
(McDonald & Aherne, 2000) such as disciplinary action or a negative effect on their career (Castel, 
Ginsburg, Zaheer & Tamim, 2015; Jeffe, Dunagan, Garbutt, Burroughs et al., 2004). 
Interestingly, little research has examined AHPs’ perceptions of raising concerns about 
error, despite them being shown to report error more often than doctors (Braithwaite, Westbrook, 
Travaglia & Hughes, 2010). These interview data offered a new level of insight into the mindset of 
AHPs around discussing error, showing that they did not appraise the HEAPS environment as being 
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about blame. Indeed, they expressed concern that fear of blame and the subsequent defensive 
behaviours were a distraction and a disruption to the investigative process. Given that fear of blame 
has been found to be exacerbated by the level of meaning clinicians attach to hierarchy, with studies 
showing that lower- status health professionals report censorial responses from senior colleagues for 
reporting error (Wolf et al., 2001), this suggests that AHPs are less susceptible to hierarchical 
influences in the work place and this could be a moderator in how they interpret the potential 
repercussions around participating in error management processes. Further, fear of blame appears to 
be culturally embedded and since AHPs have a more nascent history in medicine than nurses or 
doctors, this finding suggests that fear of blame is influenced more by embedded historic cultural 
factors than the current organisational environment. 
Because clinicians who have been involved in error attend HEAPS meetings, these data 
provide a unique opportunity to understand how fear of blame manifests for those clinicians. 
Analysis suggested that when individuals were involved in an error, their emotional distress can be 
contagious to fellow team members. Participants spoke of how the defensive behaviours that 
stemmed from fear of blame were disruptive to the analysis process; participants from one meeting 
gave examples of team members being more motivated to support their colleagues by not engaging 
in the process or reducing their input to avoid offending the error protagonists. 
The inclusion of clinicians involved in error in the HEAPS team was met with mixed 
feelings by participants and this was informed by their profession: the nurses who were involved in 
the error welcomed the opportunity to defend themselves from being ‘unfairly targeted’ and wanted 
to explain ‘what had happened’. One nurse welcomed the opportunity to support her peers, while 
the AHPs and the research officer perceived that the psychological distress of those clinicians 
involved in the error detracted from a logical and objective appraisal of the factors that contributed 
to the error. It appears certain participants can enter the process from different perspectives, which 
are in conflict with each other—one seeking to ‘survive’ the process without being ascribed blame 
and the other wanting a thorough investigative process to be undertaken. 
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While these findings imply that emotional responses are salient for team members and block 
objective enquiry, the long-term effects of not managing this can be deleterious for the mental 
health of clinicians. Wolf et al. (2001) found that the inadequate management of error results in 
reduced learning and how health professionals cope going forward after being involved in an error. 
Thus, this level of shutting down of process could have ongoing ramifications for clinicians in terms 
of defining themselves by the error rather than the learning and personal growth that effective 
analysis engenders. Further, when clinicians feel threatened by the organisational response to error 
and perceive that they will be held accountable for systemic failings they are more likely to act 
defensively, wanting to deal with error in house rather than transparently (Kingston, Evans, Smith 
& Berry, 2004) and this view was concordant with the responses of a senior nurse. Not surprisingly, 
a lack of investigative transparency has been found to be deleterious for patient outcomes 
(Renkema, Broekhuis & Ahaus, 2014; Walshe & Shortell, 2004). 
However, this finding must be contextualised in terms of the PSO’s level of experience. In 
the HEAPS meetings attended by these participants, the PSO had only been in the role for two 
months and therefore it could be surmised that she lacked the expertise and experience to manage 
the heightened level of distress and defensiveness displayed. Overall, these findings suggest that 
including those involved in the error on the analysis team brings with it certain responsibilities, 
including the requirement to balance the emotional needs of error protagonists while also being 
mindful of the power of emotional expression to derail objectivity and investigative enquiry. Thus, 
the role of the PSO needs to include an awareness of managing team members’ response to the 
emotional burden associated with making an error. 
What was noteworthy was that these data reveal a significant discrepancy in participants’ 
understanding of the human factors’ framework. While AHPs seemed cognisant of a human factors 
approach, the nurses were unclear about the process and determined it was about blame. This 
resulted in them feeling unclear about their role in meetings and led to them admitting that they 
reduced their input to avoid being targeted. Interestingly this included a nurse who had been 
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involved in two analysis meetings. 
 
What was also apparent from these data was that both AHPs and nurses expressed a sense of 
learned helplessness about error occurrence, saying that they felt their involvement could not do 
much to change anything, even though the AHPs expressed a clear understanding of the human 
factors approach. This has interesting implications for how organisations conduct analysis training, 
suggesting that clinicians are not convinced that the purpose of the process is about organisational 
learning rather than individual culpability. It also suggests that the influence of socio-historical 
factors around blame and retribution and error being an inevitable part of healthcare is deeply 
embedded for clinicians. 
Another barrier to HEAPS effectiveness that emerged from these data was that participants 
perceived that a deficiency in resources, such as preparatory notes, negatively affected the process. 
Participants stated that not having an agenda created uncertainty among members around how the 
analysis process would occur and allowed some members to divert the topic of discourse to a focus 
on their own agendas. The AHPs and one senior nurse perceived that this meant the process lacked 
credibility and that their input would not translate to meaningful change. This reflects research 
where clinicians stated that one of the reasons they did not have faith in the analysis process was 
that they thought it was treated as a ‘tick box’ approach within a pre- defined incident analysis 
protocol where recommendations were rarely followed up on (Evans et al., 2006. Participants’ 
perceptions of how the process is managed are critical to the success of the analysis as the literature 
suggests that how clinicians perceive that an organisation supports error management has 
implications for the development and maintenance of clinicians’ attitudes to error reporting and 
engagement in error management processes (Kroll, Singleton, Collier et al., 2008). 
This is an important finding as these participants were invested in seeing their input translate into 
safer practices and saw the lack of rigour in how the process was managed as tantamount to the 
organisation not prioritising the process. Given that some of the members felt personally 
accountable for the error and responsible for the devastating effect on staff and families, how they 
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perceived the process was managed was critical to their perception that their experience could 
translate to organisational learning. 
10.6 Limitations 
 
Limitations of this study were related to the lack of professional diversity among 
participants. However, the data did highlight professional differences between AHPs and nurses in 
this setting. 
A further limitation was that the interviews took place in a small regional hospital where 
participants had existing relationships with both the PSO and other participants. This may have 
meant that interpersonal bias influenced their answers. Further, non-response bias may have 
occurred, whereby participants interested in protecting professional relationships may have limited 
their expression of views about other participants. Acknowledging the potential for biased 
responses, participants recounted experiences and opinions that resonated well with my perceptions 
of what occurred during the HEAPS meetings observed in Study 1. 
While I aimed to be impartial in the line of questioning, the fact that I had observed the 
HEAPS meetings may have influenced the direction of the interview questions and the focus given 
to certain aspects of the answers. 
10.7 Conclusion 
 
These findings show that participants’ lack of awareness of the human factors approach 
together with the PSO’s failure to examine systems factors had an adverse effect on members’ trust 
that the process was focused on learning and not blame. Emphasis should be placed on developing 
the skill set of the PSO and clinicians to include an in-depth understanding of how human factors 
and systems-based approaches work, together with an understanding of how effective 
communication and management can reduce members’ fear of blame, without diverting the 
fundamental purpose of the HEAPS process. 
An important aspect of member preparation is an emphasis on the value of their role in the 
analysis process. Given that professional and hierarchical divides inform members’ cognitions and 
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motivations in other settings, these data suggest that it is important for the PSO to reiterate to 
members that their role is based on their professional expertise and not their position on the 
hierarchy. This may go some way to enhancing members’ capacity to communicate across 
professional and hierarchical divides. 
These data suggest that organisational endorsement is required for clinicians to feel that 
patient safety is a priority for management. Participants’ answers indicated that they wanted to see 
organisations invest in training clinicians to participate in incident analysis, a PSO with greater 
expertise in running the analysis meetings and transparent processes to ensure learnings are shared 
appropriately and recommendations translated to practice improvement. These data also revealed 
that they noticed when there were no repercussions for high status clinicians refusing to engage 
meaningfully in the analysis process and so it is suggested that management address these 
behaviours to indicate to staff that they are invested in patient safety measures. 
10.8 Summary 
 
This chapter described the themes from interviews with HEAPS participants around their 
perceptions of the process, their goals and the barriers and enablers to its effectiveness. This 
provides an understanding of practical suggestions on how to enhance the effectiveness of the 
process. The next chapter presents the final discussion which ties together the implications of the 
findings from the studies for theory and practice. 
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Chapter 11: Discussion 
 
The high number of adverse events has prompted a body of research into the conduct of 
incident analysis processes in healthcare (Taitz et al., 2010; Bagian et al., 2011; Peerally et al., 
2016. Research worldwide suggests that the rate of adverse events is not decreasing (Kellogg et al., 
2016; Duckett & Jorm, 2018. This thesis augments a mounting body of research on the challenges 
to current incident analysis models in healthcare and particularly in the Australian context 
(Braithwaite et al., 2006; Tamuz, Franchois & Thomas, 2011; Wu et al., 2008. 
This research had two aims: firstly, to provide an understanding of what the various players 
at different levels of the incident analysis continuum feel are the challenges around incident 
analysis; and secondly to use intergroup theory, (SIT and CAT, to understand the role of group 
identity in incident analysis. 
Whilst this research is situated in Australia and uses observations of incident analysis in 
Queensland public hospitals, it has the potential to be generalised to other healthcare institutions 
who employ incident analysis to investigate adverse events. This is because it examines an incident 
analysis method that uses the same tools and techniques as the RCA used in other healthcare 
regions and institutions. This research also offers an understanding of what policy makers and 
healthcare executives at a national level believe are the challenges to the current model of incident 
analysis and what they think could be done to improve incident analysis effectiveness. 
11.1 The Meaning of the Findings 
 
11.1.1 The Challenges and Issues around Incident Analysis 
 
The first aim of this research was to understand the challenges and issues around incident 
analysis from the perspective of players at various levels of the analysis continuum. This has 
implications for how healthcare organisations conduct and support the analysis process, in terms of 
the role of human factors expertise and training; the integration of tools and methods to identify 
latent factors and evidenced based recommendations; and processes to implement and monitor 
safety changes for effectiveness and sustainability as well as the dissemination of learnings. This 
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research also offers an understanding of the conflict organisations face in terms of balancing cost 
concerns and political and personal agendas with a requirement to be accountable for error 
occurrence. Finally, these findings have implications at a national level in terms of how incident 
analysis is regulated and how the current accreditation model impacts the effectiveness of incident 
analysis and its capacity to reduce error rates. 
This research also offers the opportunity to compare how different players in the analysis 
continuum converge or diverge in their perspectives on the challenges to analysis processes in 
health care. Given that triangulation was achieved through examining the perspectives of three 
levels of analysis stake holders and then observing incident analysis in practice. Participants’ 
perspectives were then mapped onto the observational data to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of what is happening in the analysis domain. These issues are discussed below: 
11.1.1.1 Patient Safety is not an organisational priority 
 
There was a shared impression amongst all the participant groups that healthcare 
organisations do not prioritise incident analysis processes, or patient safety work. They gave 
different reasons for their perspective and this was reflective of their involvement and experience of 
the analysis process. Healthcare executives and policy makers perceived that organisations 
prioritised meeting cost concerns and personal and political agendas over patient safety matters and 
stated that this resulted in incident analysis being performed to satisfy accreditation requirements 
rather than to mitigate error occurrence and improve patient safety outcomes. To support their 
argument, they gave examples of the ways in which the analysis lacked robustness, speaking of 
low-level analysis reports, a failure to consider human factors, examples of the same errors 
continuing to occur despite having been the subject of previous analysis processes and no processes 
in place to measure the effectiveness of the implementation of recommendations or share the 
learning. These findings are in line with that of previous literature around the futility of incident 
analysis processes when the same errors continue to occur (Hibbert, Healey, Lamont et al., 2015) 
and echo Edmondson’s (2004) argument that the organisational response to learning from error is 
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poor because the medical culture is about fixing errors quickly rather than understanding the root 
cause, suggesting that organisations are not convinced about the benefit of a human factors 
approach to error reduction. 
The PSOs’ concerns around the lack of support they received from management to perform 
the role was underpinned by a sense that management placed more importance on meeting the 
agendas of high-status clinicians than patient safety. Indeed, there was an impression held by both 
the executives and PSOs that analysis recommendations were subject to personal agendas of 
management and high-status individuals, and findings were used to support the case for existing 
hospital agendas. This is in line with the findings from previous research (Nicolini et al., 2011a; 
2011b; Hibbert et al., 2018) and suggest that there is a need to minimise the impact of personal 
agendas on how organisations respond to analysis findings. 
What emerged from this research was a concern about the disempowerment of Clinical 
Governance Committees, and this was mentioned by both the PSOs and healthcare executives, who 
saw CGC beholden to organisational agendas around cost and a need to retain high status clinicians. 
Furthermore, there was an impression held by healthcare CEOs and executives that hospital boards 
not only lacked understanding of the risks faced by clinicians in delivering patient care but also did 
not understand a system- based approach to error analysis. These findings reflect concern amongst 
healthcare researchers that boards and management do not work synergistically with clinicians 
around patient safety issues and therefore lack an understanding of what clinicians deal with at the 
front line of medical care (Goeschel, Wachter, & Pronovost, 2010; Wachter, 2010). Ironically, to 
address this gap, a critical part of organisational practice in promoting patient safety has been a 
policy focus on the development of clinical governance units with patient safety committees. 
However, these data suggest that this localised level of gate keeping can be thwarted by 
organisational agendas. This is a pertinent finding as poor clinical governance was raised as a 
critical contributory factor to patient safety failure in the Mid Staffordshire NHS Public Trust 
Inquiry Report of 2013 in response to the Bristol Royal Infirmary Enquiry of 2001. These findings 
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suggest that the capacity of CGC to ameliorate safety outcomes is dependent on organisational 
priorities around patient safety. 
Analysis participants' (study 4) comments and concerns about the way in which the analysis 
process was conducted and their experience of change as a result of analysis contributed to an 
impression that incident analysis was not a priority for organisations. For instance, they spoke of 
not receiving training to participate, a lack of preparatory materials, the PSO being inexperienced 
and ill equipped to perform the role, a lack of rigour in the analysis process including a failure to 
use analysis tools or integrate a consideration of systems factors and no systematic method for 
generating risk recommendations. They spoke of a lack of transparency around the final report or 
whether the recommendations would translate into measures to improve patient outcomes. These 
findings are in line with those of Card et al. (2012) and support the view of healthcare executives 
from study one that there is a lack of transparency around reporting, feedback to clinical 
stakeholders and dissemination of learnings or measures around the effectiveness and sustainability 
of analysis recommendations. Without learning from incident analysis, the process becomes what 
Hibbert et al., (2018) refer to as waste. Given that there has been much research on the futility of 
excessive medical tests and x-rays (Brownlee, Chalkidou, Doust et al., 2017) this appraisal of the 
analysis process renders it futile. 
By employing a process of triangulation of data sources, this research offered an opportunity 
to map what participants were saying was happening with incident analysis onto what was actually 
happening in the HEAPS analysis meetings. The observational data supported participants’ 
concerns that current analysis processes lack rigour. For instance, it was observed that the PSO did 
not employ analysis tools or techniques during the HEAPS meetings and CEOs interviewed stated 
that the findings were not robust enough to translate to organisational measures to reduce error 
occurrence. Both the observational data, the comments from analysis participants and health 
executives suggested that there was limited consideration of human factors or underlying system 
issues when establishing error cause. Indeed, the observational data indicated that the PSO did not 
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use of evidenced based tools to devise recommendations to prevent error recurrence. Furthermore, 
whilst this was not brought up by participants, it was observed that even though the PSO was new 
to the role, she conducted the analysis meeting without the guidance of a more experienced PSO. 
These factors support participants’ concern that healthcare organisations do not allocate time or 
adequate resources to support those involved in the analysis process: reflective of the findings of 
Trbovich and Shojana (2017) who found that staff were expected to conduct the analysis with little 
analysis experience, a paucity of resources and minimal training. 
This differs from the model in high risk industries where independent teams of highly trained 
safety experts are brought in to conduct the analysis and organisations are held accountable for 
implementing change as a result of the recommendations (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2017). 
 
11.1.1.2 Regulatory Environment 
 
In the current regulatory environment, healthcare organisations’ accreditation to practice is 
based on having error reporting systems in place and conducting error analysis of severe adverse 
events. Thus, there is no consequence for organisations if the quality of the analysis process is 
inadequate or if there is no feedback loop or visible action from incident analysis. The experts 
interviewed for this research emphasised the importance of this aspect of error management and this 
is consistent with the findings from previous research (Mitchell et al., 2015; Shojania, 2008). In 
particular, participants’ concern about the disempowerment of clinical governance committees and 
organisational investment in patient safety work suggests that the current decentralised model of 
error management which relies on the quality of the analysis process being dependent on the 
motivation of healthcare executives and boards, is not working effectively. Given that these data 
revealed that concerns around cost, and individual and organisational agendas impact the 
effectiveness of analysis outcomes, it is likely that healthcare organisations will only be motivated 
to address these issues if a clear business case can be made to do so. 
This supports the case for including these components of safety work in accreditation 
requirements, thereby removing the decision making from organisations and placing it in the hands 
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of regulators. This finding is reflective of an increased focus worldwide on the role of regulatory 
and accreditation standards to compel boards and hospital executives to prioritise patient safety 
measures (Zhan, Friedman, Mosso, & Provonost, 2006; Weeks & Bagian, 2003), especially in 
austere financial times to ensure the safety budget remains untouched. Wachter (2010) points out 
that a further incentive to address patient safety issues is that health insurers. For example, Aetna 
and Blue Cross in the US will not cover the costs of care related to medical complications that 
would not be expected to occur during a patient’s hospital stay, thereby creating a compelling 
financial incentive for healthcare organisations to address certain types of medical errors. 
11.1.1.2 Lack of Understanding of Human Factors 
 
Whatever the external motivators to address medical error, one of the most important 
findings of this study was the lack of human factors proficiency in the analysis process, suggesting 
that there is an insufficient focus on human factors principles in current training models or patient 
safety discourse, an issue highlighted in the literature (Percarpio, Watts, & Weeks, 2008; Berwick, 
2016). Given that PSOs are drawn from the clinical workforce, and as such are not expert in human 
factors principles, it is recommended that organisations appoint a human factors expert to the 
analysis team. Since these data demonstrate that personal and organisational agendas impact the 
analysis process, it is preferable to appoint an independent expert who is not informed by these 
factors (Pham et al., 2010). This would inform the integration of a systems-based approach to the 
analysis and an exploration of latent factors in error causation to inform the development of 
sustainable and effective recommendations and the integration of tools to support the process. 
11.1.2 An Intergroup Perspective on Incident Analysis in Healthcare 
 
The second aim of this research was to use intergroup theory of SIT and CAT to understand 
what is happening in incident analysis, both from the perspective of the various players and in terms 
of how group identities impacted the analysis meeting. By understanding the effect of intergroup 
factors, SIT and CAT provide a means of predicting how and when health professionals’ 
communication and behaviours are motivated by their salient group memberships. However, given 
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that analysis team members had multiple salient professional group memberships 
(profession/team/unit/ hospital), these data suggest that any exploration of communication strategies 
to reduce intergroup differences in analysis teams needs to take account of the complexity of 
multiple group memberships, and the fluidity of members' ingroup/outgroup orientation. For 
instance, communicative strategies could be both accommodative (by referencing shared 
experience) and non-accommodative (by drawing attention to intergroup differences). This is an 
aspect that has not been explored previously in the analysis setting. 
What this would mean for future practice is that PSOs would have a greater awareness of 
how to leverage the mobility of members’ social identities to establish a superordinate team identity 
that supports members’ engagement in the analysis process. 
Thus, these data suggest that analysis participants’ group identities and relational needs are 
an important dimension of the analysis dynamic and deserve as much attention as the analysis 
methodology and process. This is a worthwhile finding as previous studies have not focused on this 
aspect and participants’ meaningful group identities are perceived as secondary to how the process 
is conducted. For instance, the observations of HEAPS meetings showed that identity, status and 
intergroup conflict adversely affected the analysis process, reducing interactive enquiry, problem 
solving and collaborative analysis. In particular, this negated the PSO’s capacity to explore the 
clinical expertise of analysis team members present at the meeting. Moreover, the salience of 
identities shifted according to the stage and nature of the analysis, such that in the initial stages unit 
identity was more meaningful than superordinate team identity. 
The interview data suggested that intergroup factors reduced members’ willingness to 
engage fully in the process. Interestingly, the impact of status and identity was not just confined to 
members but included the PSO. When incident analysis was first implemented, the role of PSO was 
positioned outside the medical hierarchy; however, these data revealed that this was not the case, 
with PSOs implying their status was perceived by team members and hospital administration staff 
in terms of their status as a nurse rather than their identity as PSO. 
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From a CAT perspective, this research elicited an understanding that the relationships 
between those involved in incident analysis can be understood theoretically by examining 
communication during the meetings. For instance, these data suggest that the PSO’s use of 
appropriate discourse management and emotional expression strategies impacts member 
engagement in the process. CAT also demonstrated that status was a complex issue in analysis 
teams which had the potential to both promote and reduce member engagement. For example, the 
observational data suggested that whilst higher status members were categorised as employing 
higher levels of interpersonal control, which may have constrained lower status members in less 
equal roles, their employment of accommodative discourse management and emotional expression 
strategies facilitated member engagement but disempowered the PSO’s ability to do so. Interview 
data indicated that members perceived this favourably. It could be argued that given the difference 
in status between members, the findings imply that status difference is an accepted part of 
intergroup relations in analysis meetings and members look to higher status members to 
demonstrate a level of expertise and control in uncertain environments and be a role model in this 
unfamiliar environment. 
The intergroup nature of analysis teams was also found to be beneficial, affording members 
the opportunity to bridge disciplinary and status divides, thereby facilitating knowledge of other 
specialties and promoting collaboration between professions. Moreover, lower status members 
welcomed the opportunity to have input into patient safety issues. However, it is important that 
organisations recognise the fragile and transient nature of these benefits: the interview data revealed 
that members engagement with patient safety work and sense of empowerment was contingent on 
how they perceived the outcomes of the meeting were honoured by the organisation. This is a 
valuable finding as it demonstrates the importance of feedback, transparency of the report and 
organisational visibility and accountability for acting upon recommendations as valuable 
components of not only enhancing the salience of a patient safety culture but also as tools to support 
effective intergroup relations. In conclusion, these findings suggest that healthcare organisations 
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have a responsibility not only to manage inter professional communication in the analysis meeting 
but also a responsibility to honour the empowerment of health professionals in terms of managing 
outcomes and maintaining engagement with patient safety work. 
11.2 Conclusions 
 
It must be noted that these conclusions are based on the Australian hospital cases examined 
in this thesis. As such, while important and valid, they are indicative rather than absolutely 
conclusive. 
In conclusion, these data suggest that the translation of incident analysis methods to 
healthcare appears to have been superficial and has failed to address the complexities of intergroup 
factors in the process. While the method itself offers valuable potential to discern system 
vulnerabilities, it is suggested that the current model of analysis is partly destabilised by an 
inadequate organisational and governance infrastructure to support its capacity to reach its full 
potential. Given the embedded socio-historical factors that surround error in healthcare, it is 
apparent that organisational changes will only go part of the way to addressing these issues. A 
change in the regulatory environment will make organisations accountable for the quality of the 
analysis process and the dissemination of learnings. This will create an environment where 
organisations see incident analysis as more than just a compliance requirement, but a critical part of 
an appropriate safety culture. 
Accreditation can be the mechanism for change in error management. Whilst this may 
impose a level of bureaucratisation on error management processes, it also imposes a degree of 
gravity to the process that does not currently exist in terms of ensuring the rigour of the process and 
the dissemination of learnings. This would act as a catalyst to prioritise the investigative skill and 
independence of the investigative team. Similar to the aviation model, this could be addressed by 
using independent government-appointed investigators who are as free as possible from cultural and 
socio-historical bias and well versed in human factors methodologies. 
The focus on accreditation is in line with new national standards defined in the Australian 
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Health Service Safety and Quality Accreditation (AHSSQA) Standards to be met by healthcare 
organisations to gain accreditation to practice. Whilst these standards focus on the eight most high- 
profile adverse events, they herald the beginning of institutional change at a federal level to improve 
patient safety outcomes using an approach whereby healthcare organisations’ accreditation is 
dependent on them providing evidence that they have implemented analysis recommendations. 
This research also demonstrates that the capacity to learn from error is hindered by the focus 
solely on a case-by-case analysis of SAC1 and SAC2 errors. This creates a focus on professional 
responsibility for error occurrence and elicits a level of defensiveness around professional 
boundaries. Thus, one potential way to remove this focus on ownership of error is to categorise 
errors according to specific clinical areas of expertise and use groups of specialists with relevant 
knowledge to analyse them in aggregate form to determine patterns of error occurrence. This is a 
critical aspect of building a safer patient culture as it would remove the focus from one of failure to 
one of growth and potential and take the clinician from feeling fear of being targeted to a place of 
feeling valued and instrumental in that safety culture. 
11.3 Limitations 
 
There are several limitations to this work. A potential weakness is the small number of 
HEAPS analysis meetings observed (n = 3 and the fact that the PSO who conducted them was 
inexperienced. This presented a bias to the analysis because there was no inclusion of HEAPS 
analysis conducted by a more experienced PSO. This may limit the usefulness of the findings. 
Further, this PSO was unavailable for interview, which meant that triangulating the results of the 
observational studies and interviews with the participants was not possible. In addition, no doctors 
were available for interview despite them having participated in two of the three HEAPS meetings 
observed. This was despite several requests and it could be argued that this supports the findings 
that they find incident analysis laborious and burdensome (Mitchell et al., 2015). 
A further limitation is that there was only one PSE interviewed from Queensland, which is 
where the HEAPS meetings took place. Further, the inclusion of CEOs from Queensland could have 
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provided a richer data source relating to the situation in Queensland health services, which is 
important given the localisation of error management initiatives. Consequently, the results of the 
interviews with patient safety executives, regulators and CEOs need to be considered in the broader 
context of incident analysis systems in Australian healthcare. 
11.4 Future Implications 
 
This research has implications in terms of integrating human factors expertise to current 
training programmes and analysis tools. This could include tools to determine error cause and error 
recommendations, which are cognisant of the potential bias that inform analysis processes. 
It is suggested that systems are embedded to feedback to users the learning from incident 
analysis. One suggestion is to incorporate the learnings from analysis into a data system that links 
reporters to the findings and ensuing actions. The effectiveness of the actions can then be monitored 
on a regular basis and clinicians can access a repository of knowledge on how to address near 
misses and error factors that are pertinent to their practice. 
This research has implications for the way communication is managed during analysis 
meetings and indicates the usefulness of training for the PSO and participants on how 
communication in analysis teams may be informed by group identities. The development of CAT 
informed communication training programmes can serve to reduce intergroup divides and promote 
collaboration within interdisciplinary teams. This is an aspect of incident analysis that has not been 
developed but could facilitate more equal input amongst members and consequently outcomes that 
incorporate a variety of perspectives and viewpoints . 
Finally, this research has implications in terms of the way incident analysis is regulated and 
accredited. The extension of current accreditation requirements to include analysis rigour and the 
effectiveness of outcomes will minimise the impact of personal agendas on analysis processes and 
increase organisational motivation to embrace patient safety work and utilise the analysis process to 
its full potential. These implications are presented in table 11.1. 
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Table 11.1 Future Implications of Analysis Findings 
 
Recommendations Future Implications 
Regulatory Environment 
Extend accreditation requirements to 
include: 
• Measures of analysis quality 
• Mechanisms to monitor 
implementation of recommendations 
• Mechanisms to share learnings 
• Improved analysis process 
• Enhanced clinician engagement in analysis 
process 
• Reduced occurrence of same type of errors 
Appoint independent human factors trained 
investigators to run analysis process 
• Objective investigation 
• Reduction in power blocks 
• Reduce fear of blame in participants 
• Reduction in cultural bias 
• Ensure quality of process 
o Systems approach 
o Adherence to RCA tools 
Organisational Environment 
Establish CAT informed communication tools 
for PSOs to equip them to manage status and 
professional disparities within team 
• Facilitate equal input by members – gain 
different perspectives on error 
• Enhanced engagement by lower status 
participants 
• Establish super ordinate analysis team 
identity 
Implement human factors training for: 
 
• Clinicians and non-clinician hospital staff 
• management 
• board members 
• Systems approach to analysis 
• Reduce fear of blame 
• Hospital boards integrate a systems-view to 
error occurrence – address systems factors 
• Management address systems factors 
Establish centralised systems to feedback 
learning from incident analysis across 
jurisdictions 
 
• Link reporters to the findings and ensuing 
actions 
• The effectiveness of the actions can then be 
monitored on a regular basis 
• Enhanced engagement with error 
management processes 
• Provision of learning platform so 
organisations can implement prophylactic 
measures to mitigate chance of error 
occurrence 
• Reduction in same type of error occurring 
across healthcare jurisdictions 
Establish systems to monitor effectiveness 
of actions to reduce error 
• Opportunity to fine tune system changes 
to local conditions 
• Enhanced engagement by clinicians / 
increased sense of ownership by analysis 
team 
• Increased patient safety culture 
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Enquiries to: 
Approval Amendments 
Our Ref: 
 
4. 
3. 
2. 
1. 
Site No. 
11.4.2 Appendix 2: HREC Approval: HREC/14/QPCH/3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 October 2015 Human Research Ethics 
Committee 
Mrs Elizabeth Blackwood 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Mrs Blackwood 
 
Re: HREC/14/QPCH/3: Communication between Health 
Professionals within Incident Analysis Teams: A 
Communication Accommodation Theory Approach 
 
I am pleased to advise that Human Research Ethics Committee 
reviewed the amendments submitted and upon 
recommendation, the Chair has granted approval for the 
following: 
 
      Addition of as a site – Principal Investigator 
This information will be tabled at the HREC meeting on 22 October 2015 for noting. 
 
A copy of this approval must be submitted to the relevant Hospital & 
Health Service Research Governance Officer/s or Delegated Personnel, 
along with Site Specific documentation, for CEO or Delegate 
authorisation for each site. 
 
List of approved Sites: 
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Patient information collected and distributed as part of the previously approved 
research has been approved in accordance with Section 62 of the Health 
Services Act and the recent amendments to the Public Health Act 
Sections 282 and 284. Any change to the collection and or distribution 
will need to be reviewed by the HREC. 
 
This HREC is constituted and operates in accordance with the National 
Health and Medical Research Council’s (NHMRC) National Statement on 
Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007), NHMRC and Universities 
Australia Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (2007) and 
the CPMP/ICH Note for Guidance on Good Clinical Practice. 
 
 
Research, Ethics & Governance Office Building 14 
  
  
  
 2 
 
Please be advised that in the instance of an investigator being a 
member of the HREC, they are absented from the decision-making 
process relating to that study. 
 
On behalf of the Human Research Ethics Committee, I would like to 
wish you every success with your research endeavour. 
 
Yours truly, 
5. 
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11.4.3 Appendix 3: Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form 
 
School of Psychology 
 
 
 
HREC No: HREC/14/QPCH/3 
Project Title: Communication between Health Professionals in Incident Analysis: A 
Communication Theory Accommodation Approach 
Name of Researchers: Elizabeth Blackwood, Bernadette Watson, Fiona Hawthorne 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
The purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the role communication plays in incident 
analysis and how it influences the effectiveness of patient safety initiatives. This 
study is being conducted by Elizabeth Blackwood, as part of the requirements for 
the Doctor of Philosophy Research degree at the University of QLD under the 
supervision of Dr Bernadette Watson from the School of Psychology at the 
University of QLD. 
 
Participation and withdrawal 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary and you are free to withdraw 
from this study at any time 
without prejudice or penalty. If you wish to withdraw, simply stop participation in 
the interview. If you do withdraw 
from the study, the materials that you have completed to that point will be 
deleted and will not be included in the 
study. 
 
What is involved 
The researcher will observe the communication processes that occur during the 
incident analysis process. Observation by the researcher will be non- 
participatory and overt. At another time, participants will be asked to participate 
in a one on one interview with the researcher to discuss their perceptions and 
experiences of the incident analysis process. Participation in the interviews for 
this study will take approximately 30 minutes. 
 
Risks 
Participation in this study should involve no physical or mental discomfort, and 
no risks beyond those of everyday living. If, however, you should find any 
question or procedure to be invasive or offensive, you are free to omit answering 
or participating in that aspect of the study. 
 
Confidentiality and security of data 
All data collected in this study will be stored confidentially. Only members of 
the research team will have access to identified data. All data will be coded in a 
de-identified manner and subsequently analysed and reported in such a way that 
responses will not be able to be linked to any individual. The data you provide 
will only be used for the specific research purposes of this study. 
 
Ethics Clearance and Contacts 
This study has been approved in accordance with the ethical review processes of 
the University of QLD and Human Research Ethics Committee and within the 
guidelines of the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research You 
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are, of course, free to discuss your participation with project staff (contactable on: 
uqeblac3@uq.edu.au or 0422 047417). If you would like to speak to an officer of 
the University not involved in the study, you may contact one of the School of 
Psychology Ethics Review Officers: Jolanda Jetten (j.jetten@psy.uq.edu.au, tel 
3365 4909), Jeanie Sheffield (jeanie@psy.uq.edu.au, tel 3365 6690 or Alex 
Haslam (uqshasla@uq.edu.au, tel 3346 7345). Alternatively, you may leave a 
message with Ann Lee (3365 6448) a.lee@psy.uq.edu.au), for an ethics officer to 
contact you, or contact the University of QLD Ethics Officer, Michael Tse, on 
3365 3924, e-mail: humanethics@research.uq.edu.au 
 
 
 
The person you may need to contact will depend on the nature of your query. 
If you want any further information concerning this project or if you have 
any medical problems which may be related to your involvement in the 
project (for example, any side effects), you can contact the principal study 
researcher on:- 
Research contact person 
 
Name  
Position  
Telephone  
Email   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For matters relating to research at the site at which you are participating, 
the details of the local site complaints person are: 
 
 
Complaints contact person 
 
Name  
Position   
 
Telephone  
Email  
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If you would like to learn the outcome of the study in which you are 
participating, you can contact me at the email above, and I will send 
you an abstract of the study and findings. 
 
Thank you for your participation in this study. 
 
 
Mrs Elizabeth Blackwood 
MAPS Psychologist 
PhD 
Candidate, 
School of 
Psychology, 
University of QLD, St Lucia, QLD 
 
 
 
 
School of Psychology 
 
HREC No: HREC/14/QPCH/3 
Project Title: Communication between Health Professionals in Incident Analysis: A 
Communication Theory Accommodation Approach 
Name of Researchers: Elizabeth Blackwood, Bernadette Watson, Fiona Hawthorne 
 
Consent Form for Participants 
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Elizabeth Blackwood 
in the School of Psychology at the University of QLD. 
Background 
The purpose of this study is to explore how communication styles impact upon the 
incident analysis process in healthcare. This study considers communication in incident 
analysis from two aspects: how participant’s communication style is influenced by their 
professional identity and how communication is influenced by our own personal traits 
and experiences. 
Procedures 
You will be invited to take part in a 30-minute interview with Elizabeth Blackwood at 
your place of work to understand your perspective on incident analysis in healthcare, 
which methods of analysis you prefer 
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and what role you believe communication plays in contributing to the effectiveness of 
incident analysis outcomes. The interview will be recorded. 
Participation and Withdrawal 
Participation in this study is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any 
time. If you wish to withdraw, please tell the researcher and the interview will be 
terminated. All data collected will be destroyed. 
Confidentiality 
All the data will be de-identified and will be stored confidentially. Only members of the 
research team will have access to the data. All data will be coded in a de-identified 
manner and subsequently analysed and reported in such a way that responses will not be 
linked to an individual. The data provided will only be used for the specific purposes of 
the study and will be destroyed in seven years. 
Questions and Concerns 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research study, please feel free to 
contact Elizabeth Blackwood, Chief Researcher on 0422 047417 or 
uqeblac3@uq.edu.au or Dr Bernadette Watson, Associate Investigator at 
Bernadette@uq.edu.au . 
SIGNATURE 
I ............................................................................ (Name of Participant) understand theprocedures 
described above and agree to participate in this study. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
… 
……………………… 
Signature Date 
Date of Preparation …………………………… 
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11.4.4 Appendix 4: Cast List of Study Participants 
 
 
STUDY Study1: Executive 
interviews 
Study 2: 
PSO interviews 
Study 3: 
Observations of 3 
HEAPS Meetings 
Study 4: HEAPS 
participants 
interviews 
 
CEO1# 
   
 
CEO2 
   
 
PSE1** QLD 
   
 
PSE2 (National) 
   
 
PSE3 (National) 
   
 
PSE4 (National) 
   
 
PSE5 (National) 
   
 
PSE6 (National) 
   
 
PSE7 (National) 
   
 
PSE8 (SA) 
   
 
PSE9 (SA) 
   
  
PSO1 
  
  
PSO2 
  
  
PSO3 
  
HEAPS 1* 
  
PSO4^ 
 
   
NUM1+ 
 
   
NUM2 
 
   
Doctor1 
 
   
Doctor2 
 
   
Doctor3 
 
   
Security Guard1 
 
HEAPS2* 
  
PSO4 
 
   
NUM3 NUM3 
   
NUM4 NUM4 
   
NUM5 
 
   
NUM6 
 
   
Dietician1 Dietician1 
   
Research Officer1 Research Officer1 
HEAPS3* 
  
PSO4 
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   NUM7 NUM7 
   Nurse1  
   Doctor4  
   Pharmacist 1 Pharmacist 1 
 
 
*HEAPS: Human Error and Patient Safety Meeting 
+NUM: Nursing Unit Manager 
^ PSO: Patient 
Safety Officer 
#CEO: Chief 
Executive Officer 
**PSE: Patient Safety Expert 
++(National): Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Healthcare 
^^(QLD): QLD Based Patient 
Safety Expert ##(SA): South 
Australian Patient Safety Expert 
303  
11.4.5 Appendix 5: Descriptions - HEAPS Meetings 
 
 
HEAPS 1 – SAC1 Event 
 
 
A male patient aged 64 absconded from the mental health ward at the regional hospital. 
 
He had been admitted after suffering a bout of delirium. He had been agitated on the morning of his 
escape and had told ward staff he wanted to leave the hospital. They had called for a doctor to 
categorise him as “without capacity”. However, the patient left through the ward door as a staff 
member had entered and left the hospital. The ward doctor rang police immediately it was noticed 
he was missing. He was not noticed by security officers and his decomposed body was found two 
weeks later by police on a riverbank. The meeting was attended by: 
 
• NUM who managed the ward 
 
• Senior doctor who oversaw the mental health facility 
 
• Two doctors who worked in the ward 
• Head of security at the hospital 
 
• NUM from a mental health ward in a metropolitan hospital 
 
 
Recommendations: 
 
1. Ward access via identity card swipe 
2. Patients assessed as “without capacity” given colour coded bracelet to wear 
3. Increase in security cameras 
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HEAPS 2: SAC2 Event 
 
A newborn baby in the special care nursery of the regional hospital was given 
another mother's expressed breast milk by a junior nurse. The nursery was staffed by a 
junior nurse and a midwife but at the time of the incident, the midwife was attending to a 
birth in the labour ward. The nursery had a policy of storing mothers' expressed breast 
milk in a single fridge in an ante room beside the nursery. Bottles were labelled by 
mothers and stored in the fridge. The nursery policy stated that there was a requirement 
for two staff to sign off on expressed milk administration to a baby, however only one 
staff member was available at time of incident. 
During the night shift, a junior nurse mistakenly took another mother's milk and 
fed the baby. The nurse noted her mistake and reported it to the NUM. This was the 
third time such an incident had occurred in this nursery. 
The HEAPS meeting was attended by: 
 
• the NUM of the special care nursery, a midwife 
 
• the relief NUM of the special care nursery, a midwife 
 
• the NUM of the paediatric ward 
 
• the hospital dietician 
 
• a NUM of a special care nursery in a neighbouring hospital (content expert) 
 
• a nurse from the paediatric ward; 
 
• a communication researcher from the hospital. 
 
The recommendations that emerged from the incident analysis were: 
 
1. Install individual fridges and bottle warmers at the end of each baby's bed. 
2. Review policy for the requirement for two staff to sign off on expressed milk administration to baby. 
3. Additional nursing staff required for nursery. 
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HEAPS3 – SAC1 Event 
 
An 84-year-old male patient was admitted to hospital for a colectomy, (resection of the 
bowel). He had a high potassium level and poor urine output and was given resonium to lower his 
potassium levels. He had a stroke two days after surgery and dies. Whilst the coroner’s report 
stated the cause of death was due to a blood clot, the hospital was concerned that aspects of his 
care were not ideal. In particular, there were concerns that he had not been assessed correctly for 
the risk of a blood clot and that his INR levels had not been checked. The HEAPS meeting was 
attended by: 
 
• the NUM of the ward where the patient was treated 
 
• the ward nurse who had cared for him 
 
• the head pharmacist of the hospital 
 
• a consultant physician, (content expert) 
 
NB: The surgeon that operated on the patient did not attend the second HEAPS meeting, only 
the first. 
The incident analysis generated the following recommendations: 
 
1. Training to ensure staff document notes of treatment. 
2. Examine escalation systems when patient deteriorates 
3. Handover processes - Establish communication processes between consultants and 
staff caring for patient, via team leader. 
4. Discuss with older patients if they require resuscitation 
5. Open disclosure with patient's family over treatment review 
